Carvaka

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Carvaka (Sanskrit cārvāka, also sometimes written as Charvaka) is a system of Indian philosophy that assumed various forms of philosophical skepticism and religious indifference.^[1] It is also known as Lokayata (Sanskrit lokyāta).

In overviews of Indian Philosophy, Carvaka is classified as a "heterodox" (nāstika) system, the same classifcation as is given to Buddhism and Jainism.^{[2] [3]} It is characterized as a materialistic and atheistic school of thought. While this branch of Indian philosophy is not considered to be part of the six orthodox schools of Hinduism, it is noteworthy as evidence of a materialistic movement within Hinduism.^[4]

Contents 1 Etymology 2 Loss of original works 3 Madhavacharya and Carvaka system 3.1 Some quotations (attributed to Carvaka) from Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha 4 Brihaspati and Lokayata 5 Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayaraasi Bhatta 6 Astika schools, Buddhism, and Jainism versus Carvaka 7 Abul Fazl on Lokayata 8 See also 9 Notes 10 Bibliography 11 External links

[edit] Etymology

The Sanskrit word chaarvaaka is generally understood to be a compound of two words chaari and vaak. Chaari means "sweet" or "attractive", and vaak means "speaking". Some other meanings are also ascribed to the word, but "sweet speaking" is the most plausible. This school of thought was also called Lokayata, probably from pre-Vedic times. "Lokayata" would broadly mean "prevalent among people" or "prevalent in the world" (loka and ayata). One other meaning of the word "Loka" is sensory organs, thus another possible interpretation of the word "Lokayta" is 'An opinion based on the experiences through the sensory organs'.

[edit] Loss of original works

Chatterjee and Datta explain that our understanding of Carvaka philosophy is fragmentary, based largely on criticism of the ideas by other schools, and that it is not a living tradition:

"Though materialism in some form or other has always been present in India, and occasional references are found in the Vedas, the Buddhistic literature, the Epics, as well as in the later philosophical works we do not find any systematic work on materialism, nor any organised school of followers as the other philosophical schools possess. But almost every work of the other schools states, for reputation, the materialistic views. Our knowledge of Indian materialism is chiefly based on these." ^[5]

Available evidence suggests that Carvaka philosophy was set out in the Brhaspati Sutra in India, probably about 600 BCE. Neither this text nor any other original text of the Carvaka school of philosophy has been preserved. Its principal works are known only from fragments cited by its Hindu and Buddhist opponents.

Carvaka philosophy appears to have died out some time after 1400 CE.

Countering the argument that the Carvakas opposed all that was good in the Vedic tradition, Dale Riepe says, "It may be said from the available material that Carvakas hold truth, integrity, consistency, and freedom of thought in the highest esteem." ^[6]

[edit] Madhavacharya and Carvaka system

Madhavacharya, the 14th-century Vedantic philosopher from South India starts his famous work The Sarva-darsana-sangraha with a chapter on the Carvaka system with the intention of refuting it. After invoking, in the Prologue of the book, the Hindu gods Siva and Vishnu, ("by whom the earth and rest were produced"), Madhavacharya asks, in the first chapter:

...but how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Charvaka, the crest-gem of the atheistic school, the follower of the doctrine of Brihaspati? The efforts of Charvaka are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain:

While life is yours, live joyously;

None can escape Death's searching eye:

When once this frame of ours they burn,

How shall it e'er again return?

[edit] Some quotations (attributed to Carvaka) from Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing oneself with ashes —

Brihaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those who have no manliness nor sense.

In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire and air;

and from these four elements alone is intelligence produced —

just like the intoxicating power from kinwa &c, mixed together;

since in "I am fat", "I am lean", these attributes abide in the same subject,

and since fatness, &c, reside only in the body, it alone is the soul and no other,

and such phrases as "my body" are only significant metaphorically.

If a beast slain in the Jyothishtoma rite will itself go to heaven,

why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?

If the Sraddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,

then why not give food down below to those who are standing on the house-top?

If he who departs from the body goes to another world,

how is it that he come not back again, restless for love of his kindred?

Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have established here

all these ceremonies for the dead, — there is no other fruit anywhere.

The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons.

All the well-known formulae of the pandits, jarphari, turphari, etc.

and all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in Aswamedha,

these were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of presents to the priests,

while the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling demons.

Those parts which survive indicate a strong anti-clerical bias, accusing Brahmins of fostering religious beliefs only so they could obtain a livelihood. The proper aim of a Charvakan or Charvaka, according to these sources, was to live a prosperous, happy, and productive life in this world.

[edit] Brihaspati and Lokayata

The Hindu sage Brihaspati, the preceptor of the Vedic gods, founded and preached the Lokayata thought, though this involves a number of contradictions with Hindu scriptures which would aver otherwise. In all likelihood, the relevant Brihaspati was another philosopher of the same name. Ancient texts like Brhati, a commentary on Saabarbhaashya, Sarvadarsanasangraha, etc., mention Brihaspati as the founder and champion of the Carvaaka doctrine.^{[citation needed]}

The best-known verse attributed to Brihaspati enunciated a principle that is ironically used by the opponents as a handle to beat them with:

Yavajjivet sukham jivet

Rinam kritvaa ghritam pibet

Bhasmibhutasya dehasya

Punaraagamanam kutah

(As long as you live, live happily, take a loan and drink ghee. After a body is reduced to ashes where will it come back from?)

In Ayurveda, a Hindu medicinal system, "ghee is life" (aayurghritam) is a standard quotation. This is the seventh verse in a set of eleven in Sarvadarsana Sangraha. These verses criticise the financial benefits earned by Brahmins in religious functions. Whether the words are Brihaspati's or not is doubtful, but the sense does agree with the Chaarvaaka line of thinking. Ghee occupied a central place: it was symbolic of good food and had long been a primary offering to the sacrificial fire of Hindu ceremonies.

The Carvakas took to the idea that good-living, symbolized by ghee, was the route to self-fulfillment. Critics of the Carvaka school see this cleaving to only artha and kama, without regard of dharma (and ultimate moksha) as an extreme of self-centred hedonism.

In the Hindu epic Mahabharata, Carvaka, who was a friend of Duryodhana, was burned alive. This Charvaka was one of the few descendants of the then ancient Charvakas as per Krishna, the avatar of the Hindu god of preservation, Vishnu.^[7]

[edit] Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayaraasi Bhatta

The only extant work of this school is Tattvopaplavasimha ("the Upsetting of all principles") by Jayaraashi Bhatta (6th century AD). In the work there's a reference to another Lokaayata treatise called Lakshanasaara or the essence of definition, probably by the same author, but it is lost to us. Tattvopaplavasimha is a brilliant epistemological work where the author endeavors to refute the theories of rival schools - both orthodox and heterodox. Jayaraashi belongs to a branch of the Lokaayatas, which advocated absolute nihilism. This school like the Advaita Vedaanta of Bhagvatpada Shankara and the Maadhyamaka Buddhist school of Naagaarjuna denied the validity of all means of knowledge. But bound neither by the scripture nor by spiritual experience, they used it to deny any reality to the world. Given below is a brief account of how Jayaraashi refutes inference, acknowledged as one of the valid means of knowledge by the Indian school of logic (Nyaya) propounded by the philosopher Gautama and his followers.

The Nyaya Sutra defines inference as that which is preceded by perception. In the kitchen one apprehends the relation between fire and smoke through the function of the eyes. By this, a connection is formed in the mind. Thereafter when smoke is again perceived on a hill, then one remembers the universal relation between smoke and fire and hence concludes that the hill is on fire.

Perception is the cause and inference the effect. Without one there cannot be the other. Thus it's impossible to apprehend an invariable relation between events (smoke and fire) without perception.

There's another reason why an invariable relation cannot be established. Is the cognition of a relation between two universals or two particulars or a universal and a particular?

It cannot be between two universals, for a universal is a concept and is not itself demonstrated. Nor can it be between a universal and a particular, as again one part of the equation, the universal, is not demonstrable. It cannot be between particulars, for the simple reason that there are too many particulars. Nobody could have seen all the smokes and all the fires.

Moreover perception itself is not competent to establish a relation among particulars due to remoteness of time and place. One cannot have knowledge of a relation without perceiving the related terms, which is the basis of the relation. But again we do not perceive the related terms at the time of perceiving the relation. It would be an undue assumption to regard something as perceived unless it appears to be perceived - else when we taste a fruit, the palatal perception would be accompanied by the perception of its color also.

Since inference is based on the effect, the fact of there being an effect is itself disproved.

An effect is generally defined as something, which arises, exists for a while and ceases to exist.

But smoke cannot be regarded as an effect since its cessation is not apprehended.

If it's said that the cessation of smoke is directly perceived, then the perception of what forces such a conclusion?

It cannot be smoke, for then there would be no point in saying the smoke has ceased. It cannot be something else, for the perception of something only proves its existence and not the non-existence of another. It cannot be nothing, for it neither affirms nor denies anything! It cannot be asserted that destruction is only the end of existence and it is the object of perception, for then destruction is an altogether different object and the perception of it only proves its existence and doesn't deny the existence of another. Perceptions are limited only to their own objects and can only prove their existence. Neither can it be said that in the knowledge of the destruction there is no awareness of smoke. Because in this perception of destruction, the three worlds too are not perceived, but that doesn't mean that the three worlds are destroyed!

Criticism of the concept of the relation of opposition

If the denial of smoke means being opposed to smoke, then what is the meaning of opposition?

Does opposition mean :

Non apprehension of smoke - But then even the three worlds are not perceived and that doesn't necessarily mean that they don't exist! Non simultaneity of existence - Even the past, present and the future are not simultaneous! Non perception of smoke, but perception of its opposite - Non perception of a thing may be due to various causes - due to obstruction of distance etc. The absence of a lamp in a dark room causes the non perception of the things in the room, but that doesn't mean that the things don't exist. Impossibility of understanding the relation between cause and effect A cause before producing the effect, cannot be considered as a cause. Neither can it considered a cause after the effect is produced. The exact moment when the cause produces the effect is beyond knowledge.

Like in a burning piece of wood, one can perceive either the wood or the fire, but cannot perceive the actual moment when wood is transformed into fire.

Impossibility of understanding the relation between inferable and inferent (the base on which something is inferred)

In a sunset, the sun generally sinks and then vanishes and this gives rise to the inference that the sun has set. But then when the sun has vanished, there's no perception of the sun itself. So based on the non-perception of sun, how can we make an inference that the sun has set? The same logic applies to sunrise too, for we cannot form a relation between the non-existence of the sun before it has risen, to the existence of the sun after it has risen. The relation between sunrise and sunset to the sun is thus logically untenable.

[edit] Astika schools, Buddhism, and Jainism versus Carvaka

Carvakas cultivated a philosophy wherein theology and what they called "speculative metaphysics" were to be avoided. The Carvakas accepted direct perception as the surest method to prove the truth of anything. Though their opponents tried to caricature the Lokayatikas' arguments, the latter did not completely reject the method of inference. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya quotes S. N. Dasgupta:

"Purandara (a Lokayata philosopher) [...] admits the usefulness of inference in determining the nature of all worldly things where perceptual experience is available; but inference cannot be employed for establishing any dogma regarding the transcendental world, or life after death or the law of karma which cannot be available to ordinary perceptual experience." ^[8]

A Carvaka's thought is characterised by an insistence on joyful living, whereas Buddhism and Jainism are known to emphasise penance. Enjoyment of life in a tempered manner, much like the Epicureans of Greece, was the Carvakas' primary modus operandi.

The Carvakas did not deny the difference between the dead and the living and recognised both as realities. A person lives, the same person dies: that is a perceived, and hence the only provable, fact. In this regard, the Carvakas found themselves at odds with all the other religions of the time. Of the five fundamental elements, the Panchamahaabhutas, Prithvi (earth or solidity), jal (water or liquidity), agni (fire or fieriness or brightness), vaayu (wind or movement), and aakaasha (aether or emptiness), the Carvakas recognised the validity of only the first four and thought that a combination of these four elements produced a certain vitality called life.

Rejection of the soul as separate from the body led the Carvakas to confine their thinking to this world only. This does not mean that they denied the cause-effect relationship. They accepted the "like causes like result" (Karmavipaaka) rule, restricted it to this life and this world and admitted exceptions to that rule.

Whereas most systems of Astika philosophy advocated a caste system, the Carvakas denounced the caste system, calling it artificial, unreal and hence unacceptable. "What is this senseless humbug about the castes and the high and low among them when the organs like the mouth, etc in the human body are the same?" ^[9]

The Carvaka scholars carried on research, termed Aanvikshiki, into every branch of knowledge and developed it elaborately. It is possible that they also observed and kept records of the historical supernovae, which the Chinese, the Incas and Mayans and all other ancient civilizations did, as per records left to posterity in the form of astrological writings (Chinese) and cave paintings (Incas and Mayans). However, the Indian records have not yet come to light, perhaps due to the predominance of oral tradition in India, liable to easy distortion. More probably, any records have been destroyed by the Carvakas' opponents.^[10]

[edit] Abul Fazl on Lokayata

Aaine-Akbari, written by Abul Fazl, the famous historian of Akbar's court, mentions a symposium of philosophers of all faiths held in 1578 at Akbar's insistence. Some Carvaka thinkers are said to have participated in this symposium.^[11]

Under the heading "Nastika," Abul Fazl has referred to the good work, judicious administration, and welfare schemes that were emphasised by the Carvaka lawmakers. Somadeva has also mentioned the Carvaka method of defeating the enemies of the nation.

[edit] See also

• Atheism
• Atheism in Hinduism
• Nastika
• Hinduism

[edit] Notes

1. ^ Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli; and Moore, Charles A. A Source Book in Indian Philosophy. Princeton University Press; 1957. Princeton paperback 12th edition, 1989. ISBN 0-691-01958-4. p. 227.
2. ^ Radhakrishnan and Moore, "Contents".
3. ^ p. 224. Flood, Gavin (1996). An Introduction to Hinduism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
4. ^ Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore. A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy. (Princeton University Press: 1957, Twelfth Princeton Paperback printing 1989) pp. 227-49. ISBN 0-691-01958-4.
5. ^ Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy. Eighth Reprint Edition. (University of Calcutta: 1984). p. 55.
6. ^ Riepe, Dale. The Naturalistic Tradition of Indian Thought (Motilal Banarasidas, Varanasi) p.75
7. ^ Shantiparva, Mahabharata (Adhyaayas) pp 38, 39
8. ^ Indian Philosophy, p. 188
9. ^ Prabodhachandrodaya, 2.18
10. ^ A short novel on this theme is The Cosmic Explosion by J. V. Narlikar, published by Children's Book Trust, New Delhi, India, translated into English from the original Marathi.
11. ^ Aaine-Akbari, Vol. III, translated by H. S. Barrett, pp 217–218 (also see Amartya Sen [2005], pp 288–289)

[edit] Bibliography

• Bhatta, Jayarashi. Tattvopapalavasimha (Charvaka Philosophy). 
• Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad (1959). Lokayata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism. New Delhi: People's Pub. House. 
• Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad (1964). Indian Philosophy: A Popular Introduction. New Delhi: People's Pub. House. 
• Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad (1969). Indian Atheism: A Marxist Analysis. Kolkata: Manisha. 
• Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad (1976). What Is Living and What Is Dead in Indian Philosophy. New Delhi: People's Pub. House. 
• Flood, Gavin (1996). An Introduction to Hinduism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
• Mádhava Áchárya [1882] (1996). The Sarva-darsana-samgraha: or Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy, trans. E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. ISBN 81-208-1341-3. 
• Nambiar, Sita Krishna (1971). Prabodhacandrodaya of Krsna Misra. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass. 
• Phillott, D. C. (ed.) [1927] (1989). The Ain-i Akbari, by Abu l-Fazl Allami, trans. H. Blochmann, 3 vols., Delhi: Low Price Publications. ISBN 81-85395-19-5 (set). 
• Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli; and Moore, Charles A. A Source Book in Indian Philosophy. Princeton University Press; 1957. Princeton paperback 12th edition, 1989. ISBN 0-691-01958-4.
• Riepe, Dale (1964). The Naturalistic Tradition of Indian Thought, 2nd ed., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
• Salunkhe, A. Ha. Aastikashiromani Chaarvaaka (in Marathi). 
• Sen, Amartya (2005). The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity. London: Allen Lane. ISBN 0-7139-9687-0. 

[edit] External links

• Carvaka, the first Chapter of The Sarva-darsana-sangraha of Madhavacharya