Greco-Italian War

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Greco-Italian War
Part of Balkans Campaign, World War II
Map of Greco-Italian war.
Date 28 October 1940 – 6 April 1941 Location Southern Balkan Peninsula Result Greek Tactical victory, Strategic Stalemate
Combatants
Italy	Greece
Commanders
Sebastiano Visconti Prasca Ubaldo Soddu Ugo Cavallero Giovanni Messe	Alexander Papagos
Strength
529,000 men	Under 300,000 men
Casualties
13,755 dead, 50,874 wounded, 25,067 missing, 12,368 incapacitated by frostbites, ca. 23,000 taken prisoner	13,325 dead, 42,485 wounded, 1,237 missing, ca. 25,000 incapacitated by frostbites, 2,392 taken prisoner

The Greek cruiser Elli was sunk by an Italian submarine while anchored off the island of Tinos during a religious ceremony

The Greco-Italian War (Greek: Ελληνοϊταλικός Πόλεμος or Πόλεμος του Σαράντα, "War of '40") was a conflict between Italy and Greece from October 28, 1940 to April 6, 1941. It marked the beginning of the Balkans Campaign of World War II. From the intervention of Nazi Germany onwards, this conflict is known as the Battle of Greece.

Benito Mussolini had grown jealous of Hitler's conquests and wanted to prove to his Axis partner that he too could lead Italy to similar military successes. Italy had already occupied Albania (Greece’s north-western neighbour) in 1939 and several British strongholds in Africa, but could not boast the same victories of Nazi Germany. Mussolini, who regarded south-eastern Europe as lying within the Italian sphere of influence, decided to invade Greece.

On October 28, 1940, after Greek premier Ioannis Metaxas rejected an Italian ultimatum demanding the occupation of Greek territory, Italian forces invaded Greece. The Hellenic Army counter-attacked and forced the Italians to retreat and by mid-December, the Greeks occupied a quarter of Albania, tying down 530,000 Italian troops. In March 1941, a major Italian counter-attack failed, humiliating Italian military pretensions. The Greek victory over the Italians was the first Allied land victory of the Second World War, and may have influenced its course of events.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Background

Fascist Italy had long-term plans for the establishment of a new Roman Empire, which included Greece. The Greeks and the various inhabitants of the Italian peninsula had warred for millennia and for supremacy over each other (Romans versus the Epirotes, the Romans versus Macedonia, the Byzantines vs. the Ostrogoths and Lombards and the Venetians versus the Byzantines, for example) which gave Mussolini a seemingly historical context for invasion of Greece. Italy’s immediate reason for seeking war with Greece was a desire to emulate its German ally’s triumphs over Poland and France. Mussolini also wanted to reassert Italy’s interest in the Balkans (he was piqued that Romania, an Italian client, had accepted German protection for its Ploieşti oil fields earlier in October) and secure bases from which British eastern Mediterranean outposts could be attacked. As the Yugoslav Kingdom was perceived as too strong, the obvious victim was Greece, which the Italians thought to be weak and internally divided. Furthermore, Italy had been occupying the predominantly-Greek Dodecanese islands in the southeastern Aegean since 1912 (see Italo-Turkish War).

After the Greco-Turkish Friendship Treaty of 1930 and the Balkan Pact of 1934, the threat from Greece's traditional enemy, Turkey, was removed. Albania was too weak to be a threat and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia did not seriously press its claims on southern Macedonia. Therefore, during the 1930s, the main threat was perceived to be Bulgaria and her aspirations to reclaim Western Thrace. Thus, when Metaxas came to power in 1936 in Greece (see 4th of August Regime), plans had been laid down for the reorganization of the country's armed forces and for a fortified defensive line along the Greco-Bulgarian frontier. The line was constructed under Metaxas' regime and named after the dictator: the "Grammi Metaxa". In the following years, the Army benefited from great investments aiming at its modernization; it was technologically upgraded, enlarged, largely re-equipped and as a whole dramatically improved from its previous deplorable state. The Greek government purchased new arms for the three Armies. However, due to increasing threat and the eventual outbreak of war, the most significant purchases from abroad, made from 1938 to 1939, were never or only partially delivered. Also, a massive contingency plan was developed and great amounts of food and utilities were stockpiled by the Army in many parts of Greece for the eventuality of war.

In early 1939, Italian troops occupied Albania, long under Italian influence, thereby gaining an immediate land border with Greece. This action led to Britain and France guaranteeing the integrity of Greece, but for the Greeks, this development cancelled all previous plans, and hasty preparations started for the event of an Italian attack. As war exploded in Central Europe, Metaxas tried to keep Greece out of the conflict, but as the conflict progressed, Metaxas felt increasingly closer to Great Britain, encouraged by the ardent anglophile King George II, who provided the main support for the regime. This was ironic for Metaxas, who had always been a Germanophile, and had built strong economic ties with Hitler's Germany.

Soon after the fall of France, Mussolini set his sights on Greece. According to the July 3, 1940 entry in the diary of his son-in-law and foreign minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, "...British ships, perhaps even aircraft, are sheltered and refueled in Greece. Mussolini is enraged. He has decided to act." By August 11, the decision for war had been taken: "Mussolini continues to talk about a lightning attack into Greece at about the end of September."^{[citation needed]}

A propaganda campaign against Greece was launched in Italy, and repeated acts of provocation were carried out, such as overflights of Greek territory, reaching their peak with the torpedoing and sinking of the Greek light cruiser Elli in Tinos harbor on August 15, 1940 (a national religious holiday), by an Italian submarine. Despite undeniable evidence of Italian responsibility, the Greek government announced that the attack had been carried out by a submarine of "unknown nationality". Although the façade of neutrality was thus preserved, the people were well aware of the real perpetrator.^{[citation needed]}

On the Italian side, the final decision to go to war was taken in a conference in Rome on October 15, where the senior Italian political and military leaders showed themselves optimistic about the upcoming campaign. Only the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, had voiced objections, citing the need to assemble a force of at least 20 divisions prior to invasion, but the local commander in Albania, Lt. Gen. Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, argued that only 3 further divisions would be needed, and these only after the first phase of the offensive (the capture of Epirus) had been completed.

[edit] Order of Battle and Opposing Plans

The front, roughly 150 km in breadth, featured extremely mountainous terrain with very few roads. The Pindus mountain range practically divided it into two distinct theatres of operations: Epirus and Western Macedonia.

The Italian war plan, codenamed "Emergenza G" (Contingency Greece), called for the occupation of the country in three phases. The first would be the occupation of Epirus and the Ionian Islands, followed, after the arrival of reinforcements, by a thrust into Western Macedonia and towards Thessaloniki, aimed at capturing northern Greece. Afterwards, the remainder of the country would be occupied. Subsidiary attacks were to be carried out against the Ionian Islands, while it was hoped that Bulgaria would intervene and pin down the Greek forces in Eastern Macedonia.

The Italian High Command had accorded an Army Corps to each theatre, formed from the existing forces occupying Albania. The stronger XXV "Ciamuria" Corps in Epirus (23rd "Ferrara" and 51st "Siena" Infantry Divisions, 131st "Centauro" Armoured Division) intended to drive towards Ioannina, flanked on its right by a small brigade-sized "Littoral Group" along the coast, and to its left by the elite "Julia" Alpine Division which would advance through the Pindus Mountains. XXVI "Corizza" Corps in the Macedonian sector (29th "Piemonte", 49th "Parma" Infantry Divisions, with 19th "Venezia" Division en route from the north of the country) was initially intended to maintain a defensive stance. In total, the force facing the Greeks comprised about 85,000 men, under the command of Lt. Gen. Prasca.

After the Italian occupation of Albania, the Greek General Staff had prepared the "IB" (Italy-Bulgaria) plan, anticipating a combined offensive by Italy and Bulgaria. The plan was essentially prescribing a defensive stance in Epirus, with a gradual retreat to the Arachthos River-Metsovon-Aliakmon River-Mt. Vermion line, while maintaining the possibility of a limited offensive in Western Macedonia. Two variants of the plan existed for the defence of Epirus, "IBa", calling for forward defence on the border line, and "IBb", for defence in a position between the two. It was left to the local commander, Maj. Gen. Charalambos Katsimitros to choose his line of resistance. A significant factor in the Greeks' favour was that they had managed to obtain intelligence about the approximate date of the attack, and had just completed a limited mobilization in the areas facing the expected Italian attack.

The main Greek forces in the immediate area at the outbreak of the war were: In Epirus the 8th Infantry Division, fully mobilized and prepared for forward defence by its commander, Maj. Gen. Katsimitros. In Western Macedonia was the Corps-sized TSDM (Tmēma Stratias Dytikēs Makedonias, "Army Section of Western Macedonia") under Lt. Gen. Ioannis Pitsikas, including the "Pindus Detachment" (Apospasma Pindou) of regimental size under Col. Davakis, the 9th Infantry Division and the 4th Infantry Brigade. The Greek forces amounted to about 35,000 men.

The Greeks enjoyed a small advantage in that their divisions had 30% more infantry (three regiments as opposed to two) and slightly more medium artillery and number of machine-guns than the Italian ones,^{[citation needed]} but they completely lacked tanks, while the Italians could count on complete air superiority over the small Hellenic Royal Air Force. Greek morale, contrary to Italian expectations, was high, with many eager to "avenge Tinos".^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Italian ultimatum and reactions

Greek dictator Ioannis Metaxas

On the eve of October 28, 1940, Italy's ambassador in Athens, Grazzi, handed an ultimatum from Mussolini to Metaxas. In it, the Duce demanded free passage for his troops to occupy unspecified "strategic points" inside Greek territory. Greece had been friendly towards National Socialist Germany, especially profiting from mutual trade relations, but now Germany's ally Italy was to invade Greece (without Hitler's awareness). Metaxas rejected the ultimatum, echoing the will of the Greek people to resist, a will which was popularly expressed in one word: "Ohi" (Greek for "No"). Within hours Italy was attacking Greece from Albania.

Shortly thereafter, Metaxas addressed the Greek people with these words: "The time has come for Greece to fight for her independence. Greeks, now we must prove ourselves worthy of our forefathers and the freedom they bestowed upon us. Greeks, now fight for your Fatherland, for your wives, for your children and the sacred traditions. Now, over all things, fight!"^{[citation needed]} In response to this address, the people of Greece reportedly spontaneously went out to the streets singing Greek patriotic songs and shouting anti-Italian slogans,^{[citation needed]} and hundreds of thousands of volunteers, men and women, in all parts of Greece headed to the Army's offices to enlist for the war. The whole nation was united in the face of aggression. Even the imprisoned leader of Greece's banned Communist Party, Nikolaos Zachariadis, issued an open letter advocating resistance, despite the still existing Nazi-Soviet Pact, thereby contravening the current Comintern line (although in two further letters he accused Metaxas of waging an "imperialistic" war and called upon Greek soldiers to desert their ranks and overthrow the regime).

[edit] Stages of campaign

[edit] Initial Italian Offensive (28 Oct 1940 – 13 Nov 1940)

Italian artillery shelling Greek positions.

The Italians attacked on the morning of October 28, pushing back the Greek screening forces. The "Ciamuria" Corps, spearheaded by the "Ferrara" and "Centauro" divisions, attacked towards Kalpaki (Elaia), while οn its right the Littoral Group advanced along the coast and was able to secure a bridgehead over the Kalamas River. The Italians faced difficulties because of the harshness of the terrain, with their light tanks, the L3/35 and M11/39, unable to cope with the hilly terrain or the muddy tracks that served as roads. By November 1, the Italians had captured Konitsa and reached the Greek main line of defence, which they unsuccessfully tried to break through in repeated attacks until November 9.

A greater threat was posed by the advance of the 11,000-strong "Julia" Division over the Pindus mountains towards Metsovon, which threatened to separate the Greek forces in Epirus from those in Macedonia. "Julia" achieved early success, breaking through the central sector of Colonel Davakis' force. The Greek General Staff immediately ordered reinforcements into the area, which passed under the control of II Greek Army Corps. A first Greek counteroffensive was launched on October 31, and met with little success. The Italians managed to capture Vovousa, 30 km north of Metsovon, on November 3, but it had become clear that the Division lacked the manpower and the supplies to continue in the face of the arriving Greek reserves.

Greek counterattacks resulted in the recapture of several villages, including Vovousa, by November 4, practically encircling "Julia". Prasca tried to reinforce it with the newly arrived 47th "Bari" Division (originally intended for the invasion of Corfu), but it arrived too late to change the outcome. During the next days the Alpini fought bravely, under constant attacks by Greek cavalry and in atrocious weather conditions, but on November 8, the commander of "Julia", General Mario Girotti, was forced to order his units to begin their retreat via Mt. Smolikas towards Konitsa. This fighting retreat lasted for several days, until by November 13 the frontier area had been cleared of Italian presence, ending the "Battle of Pindus" in a complete Greek victory.

In Western Macedonia, in the face of Italian inactivity and as to relieve the Epirus front, on the 31st, the Greek High Command moved III Corps (10th and 11th Infantry Divisions and the Cavalry Brigade, under Lt Gen Georgios Tsolakoglou) into the area and ordered it to attack into Albania together with TSDM. For logistical reasons this attack was successively postponed until November 14.

The unexpected Greek resistance caught the Italian High Command, which was expecting a 'military picnic', by surprise. Several divisions were hastily sent to Albania,and the plans for subsidiary attacks on Greek islands were definitively scrapped. Enraged about the bogging down of the offensive, Mussolini reshuffled the command in Albania, replacing Prasca with General Umbaldo Soddu, his former Vice-Minister of War, on November 9. Immediately upon arrival, Soddu ordered his forces to turn to the defensive. It was clear that the Italian invasion had failed.

[edit] Greek counter-offensive and stalemate (14 Nov 1940 – 8 March 1941)

Extent of Greek advance.

Greek soldiers celebrating New Year's Day 1941 on the Albanian Front

Greek reserves started reaching the front in early November, while Bulgarian inactivity allowed the Greek High Command to transfer the majority of its divisions from the Greco-Bulgarian border and deploy them in the Albanian front, thus enabling Greek Commander-in-Chief Lt Gen Papagos to establish numerical superiority by mid-November, prior to launching his counter-offensive. Eleven infantry divisions, two infantry brigades and one cavalry division opposed fifteen Italian infantry divisions and one tank division.^[1]

TSDM and III Corps, continuously reinforced with units from all over northern Greece, launched their attack on November 14, in the direction of Korytsa. After bitter fighting on the fortified frontier line, the Greeks broke through on the 17th, entering Korytsa on the 22nd. However, due to indecisiveness among the Greek High Command, the Italians were allowed to break contact and regroup, avoiding a complete collapse.

The attack from Western Macedonia was combined with a general offensive along the entire front. I and II Corps advanced in Epirus, and after hard fighting captured Agioi Saranda, Pogradec and Argyrokastron by early December, and Himara on Christmas' Eve, practically occupying the entire area the Greeks called "Northern Epirus". A final Greek success was the forcing of the strategically important and heavily fortified Klisura pass on January 10 by II Corps, before the heavy winter, the Italian numerical superiority and their bad logistical situation forced the Greeks to stop their offensive by the end of the month. Meanwhile, General Soddu had been replaced in mid-December by Gen Ugo Cavallero.

[edit] Italian Spring Offensive and German Attack (9 March 1941 – 23 April 1941)

Main article: Battle of Greece

The stalemate continued, despite local actions, as both enemies were not strong enough to launch a major attack. Despite their gains, however, the Greeks were in a precarious position, as they had virtually stripped their northern frontier of weapons and men in order to sustain the Albanian front, and were too weak to resist a possible German attack via Bulgaria.

The Italians, on the other hand, wishing to achieve a success in the Albanian front before the impending German intervention, gathered their forces to launch a new offensive, codenamed "Primavera" (Spring). They assembled 17 divisions opposite the Greeks' 13, and, under Mussolini's personal supervision, launched a determined attack against the Klisura Pass. The assault lasted from March 9 to March 20, but failed to dislocate the Greeks. From that moment until the German attack on April 6, the stalemate continued, with operations on both sides scaled down.

In anticipation of the German attack, the British and some Greeks urged a withdrawal of the Army of Epirus, so as to spare badly needed troops and equipment for the repulsion of the Germans. However, national sentiment forbade the abandoning of so hard-won positions, overriding military logic, and retreat in the face of the 'defeated' Italians was deemed disgraceful. Therefore the bulk of the Greek Army was left deep in Albania, while the German attack approached. General Wilson derided this reluctance as "the fetishistic doctrine that not a yard of ground should be yielded to the Italians."^{[citation needed]}

Tsolakoglou discusses the third and final protocol of surrender of the Greek Army of Epirus with German General Alfred Jodl and Italian General Ferrero. Thessaloniki, 23 April 1941.

Eventually, due to the rapid German advance, the Army of Epirus was ordered to fall back on April 12, but was cut off when elements of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler motorized brigade captured the Metsovon Pass on April 18, after overcoming local Greek resistance. The next day, Ioannina fell to the Germans, completing the isolation of the Greek Army. Aware of the hopelessness of his situation, General Tsolakoglou, in agreement with several generals but without authorization from Papagos, relieved Army comander Gen. Pitsikas and offered the Army's surrender to Sepp Dietrich on April 20, primarily to avoid the dishonour of surrendering to the Italians.^[2] The terms of surrender were deemed honourable, as the Greek Army would not be taken prisoner, and officers were allowed to retain their sidearms. Mussolini, however, was enraged by this unilateral surrender, and after many protests to Hitler, the surrender ceremony was repeated on April 23 to include Italian representatives.

[edit] Naval operations

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[edit] Aftermath and effects on World War II

Main articles: Axis Occupation of Greece and Greek Resistance

Following the attack by Italy and the needs of the Albanian front, the Greek Army was too weak to repel the German forces that invaded via Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, despite the assistance of a Corps-sized British Commonwealth expeditionary force. With the fall of Crete in May 1941, all of Greece was under the complete control of the Axis. For the next 3 years it would endure a harsh joint occupation by Germany, Italy and Bulgaria. In the occupied country, an effective Resistance network was established, which achieved the liberation of much of the mountainous mainland by 1944. At the same time, Greek troops and ships were continuing the fight along the British in North Africa. With the German withdrawal from the Balkans in October 1944, Greece, with the exception of some isolated German garrisons in the islands, was liberated. Soon however, the country would be engulfed by a new conflict, the Greek Civil War.

Despite the ultimate triumph of the Axis powers in the Greek campaign, the Greek resistance to the Italian invasion had a great effect on the course of the Second World War. Several historians have argued that the need for a German intervention in the Balkans delayed Operation Barbarossa, and caused losses, especially in aircraft and paratroopers during the airborne invasion of Crete, which affected its outcome. Adolf Hitler, in conversation with Leni Riefenstahl, would bitterly say that "if the Italians hadn't attacked Greece and needed our help, the war would have taken a different course. We could have anticipated the Russian cold by weeks and conquered Leningrad and Moscow. There would have been no Stalingrad".^[3] Other historians such as Antony Beevor claim that it was not Greek resistance that delayed the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union, but instead the slow construction of airfields in Eastern Europe.^[4] Furthermore, the need to occupy the country, suppress the partisans and defend it against Allied actions, tied down several German and Italian divisions during the course of the war.

At the same time, however, the Greek resistance ultimately necessitated an Allied intervention. The decision to send British forces into Greece was primarily motivated by political considerations, and is considered in hindsight, in the words of General Alan Brooke, "a definite strategic blunder", as it diverted forces from the Middle East, at a very critical stage, to Greece. These forces in the event proved insufficient to halt the German invasion of Greece, but could have played a decisive role in the North African Campaign, bringing it to a victorious conclusion much sooner.

Also important was the moral example, set in a time when only the British Empire resisted the Axis Powers, of a small country fighting off the supposedly mighty Fascist Italy, something reflected in the exuberant praise the Greek struggle received at the time. Most prominent is the quote of Winston Churchill:

French general Charles de Gaulle was among those who praised the fierceness of the Greek resistance. In an official notice released to coincide with the Greek national celebration of the Day of Independence (25 March), De Gaulle expressed his admiration for the heroic Greek resistance:

Greece's siding with the Allies also contributed to its annexation of the Italian-occupied but Greek-populated Dodecanese islands at the conclusion of World War II, in 1947.

[edit] The Greco-Italian War remembered

The 1940 war, popularly referred to as the Épos toú Saránda (Greek: Έπος του Σαράντα, i.e. Epic of '40) in Greece, and the resistance of the Greeks to the Axis Powers, is celebrated to this day in Greece every year. October 28, the day of Ioannis Metaxas' rejection of the Italian ultimatum, is a day of national celebration in Greece, named Okhi Day (Greek for "Day of No"). A military parade takes place in Salonica (to coincide with the city's anniversary of liberation during the First Balkan War and the feast of its patron saint, St. Demetrius) and student parades in Athens and other cities. For several days, many buildings in Greece, public or private, displays the Greek flag. In the days preceding the anniversary, television and radio often feature historical films and documentaries about 1940, or broadcast Greek patriotic songs, especially those of Sophia Vembo, a singer whose songs gained immense popularity during the war. It serves also as a day of remembrance for the "dark years" of the Axis occupation of Greece (1941-1944).

[edit] Military insights gained from the War

The poor performance of the Italian forces can be blamed on many things. Some sources state nationality and motivational factors,^{[citation needed]} others blame the weakness of the Italian forces, especially in infantry, with only two regiments per division.^{[citation needed]} The fact that Italy had been at war since 1936, first in Ethiopia, where it had faced difficulties against the much inferior Ethiopian army, and then through its prolonged intervention in the Spanish Civil War, is rarely mentioned,^{[citation needed]} nor is the fact that Mussolini's generals felt that they needed more than double the troops on hand for the operation.^{[citation needed]} However the Italians were stronger in artillery and mortars than the Greeks, had much better supply and enjoyed absolute superiority in air forces, which they did not manage to exploit properly. Another notable failure is the lack of any attack on the Ionian Islands or Crete, which were obvious and relatively undefended targets, and could have provided Italy with strong forward naval and air bases. General Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, in his memoirs, attributes the failure of the campaign to poor organization, personal agendas, corruption and lack of cooperation among the top ranks of Italy's Armed Forces.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Footnotes

[edit] Sources

• Cervi, Mario, The Hollow Legions, Chatto and Windus, London 1972. ISBN 0-7011-1351-0.
• Prasca, Sebastiano Visconti, Io Ho Aggredito La Grecia, Rizzoli 1946.
• Hellenic Army General Staff (1997). An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, 1940-1941 (Land Operations). Athens: Army History Directorate Editions. No ISBN available OCLC 45409635.
• Papagos, Alexander, The Battle of Greece 1940–1941, J.M. Scazikis “Alpha”, editions Athens. 1949 ASIN B0007J4DRU.
• Keegan, John (2005). The Second World War. Penguin (Non-Classics); Reprint edition. ISBN 0-14-303573-8.
• Beevor, Antony. Crete: The Battle and the Resistance, John Murray Ltd, 1991. Penguin Books, 1992. Pbk ISBN 0-14-016787-0 Boulder : Westview Press, 1994. LCCN 93047914
• Ciano, Galeazzo, The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943, 1946
• The Greek Army in World War II, A six volume series, Greek official history (in Greek).
• La Campagna di Grecia, Italian official history (in Italian), 1980.

[edit] See also

• Military history of Italy during World War II
• Military history of Greece during World War II
• Battle of Greece
• Okhi Day
• Axis occupation of Greece during World War II

[edit] External links

• Commando Supremo: Invasion of Greece 28 October - Italian Order of battle
• The Defence of Greece 1940-41 website
• Greco-Italian War (Serbian)

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