Battle of Greece
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Battle of Greece | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of Balkans Campaign, World War II | |||||||
|
|||||||
Combatants | |||||||
Germany, Italy, Bulgaria |
Greece, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand |
||||||
Commanders | |||||||
Wilhelm List, Maximilian von Weichs |
Alexander Papagos, Henry Maitland Wilson, Thomas Blamey |
||||||
Strength | |||||||
Germany: 680,000 men,[1] 1200 tanks, 700 aircraft, Italy: 529,000 men |
Greece: 350,000 men, British Commonwealth: 58,000 men |
||||||
Casualties | |||||||
Italy: 13,755 dead, 63,142 wounded, 25,067 missing, [1]Germany: 2,559 dead, 5,820 wounded, 3,169 missing, Total: 112,000 |
Greece: 13,325 dead, 62,663 wounded, 1,290 missing, British Commonwealth: 903 dead, 1250 wounded, 13,958 captured, Total: 93,000 |
Balkans Campaign |
---|
Greco-Italian War - Yugoslavia - Greece - Crete |
The Battle of Greece (also know as Operation Marita, German: Unternehmen Marita[2]) was an important World War II battle which occurred on the Greek mainland and in southern Albania. The battle was fought between the Allies (Greece and the British Commonwealth) and the Axis (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) forces. With the Battle of Crete and several naval actions, the Battle of Greece is considered part of the wider Aegean component of the Balkans Campaign of World War II.
The Battle of Greece is regarded as the continuation of the Greco-Italian War. Italian troups invaded Greece on October 28, 1940, but within weeks not only had they been driven from Greek territory, but Greek forces had pushed on to occupy much of southern Albania. In March 1941 a major Italian counterattack failed, and Germany, the main Axis power, was thus obliged to assist its ally. The execution of Operation Marita started on April 6, 1941, when German troops invaded Greece through Bulgaria to secure its southern flank. The combined Greek and British forces fought back with great tenacity but they were vastly outnumbered and outgunned, and finally collapsed. Athens fell on April 27, but the British Commonwealth managed to evacuate nearly 50,000 troops. The Battle of Greece ended with the fall of Kalamata in the Peloponnese.
Some historians regard the Greco-Italian War and the Battle of Greece as decisive in determining the future course of World War II, because they delayed the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union.[3] German officials expressed their admiration for the strong resistance of the Greek soldiers, who were also paid homage by the leaders of the Allies.
[edit] Background: Greco-Italian War
- For more details on this topic, see Greco-Italian War.
[edit] Prelude
“ | Hitler always faces me with a fait accompli. This time I am going to pay him back in his own coin. He will find out from the papers that I have occupied Greece.[4] | ” |
—Benito Mussolini speaking to Count Ciano |
At the outbreak of World War II Ioannis Metaxas, Prime Minister of Greece during the dictatorial 4th of August Regime (from 1936 until his death in 1941), tried to maintain neutrality, but Greece was increasingly subject to pressure from Italy. The culmination of this pressure was the torpedoing of Greek cruiser Elli on August 15, 1940 near the island of Tinos by the Italian submarine Delfino.[5] Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, having already occupied Albania (Greece's north-western neighbour) and several British Commonwealth strongholds in Africa, hoped to continue his expansion with the conquest of Greece.[6] Therefore, he sought an easy military triumph to match those of Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, who had unleashed its Blitzkrieg and overrun much of Western Europe. Mussolini was also irritated that Hitler had not first consulted him on war policy, and hoped to show his independencea[›] with a successful attack on Greece, which was regarded by him as an easy opponent.[7]
[edit] Italian invasion, Greek counterattack, and Italian spring offensive
On October 15, 1940 Mussolini decided to invade Greece,b[›] and in the early morning hours of October 28 Italian Ambassador Emmanuel Grazzi presented Metaxas a three-hour ultimatum: Italy demanded free passage for his troops to occupy unspecified "strategic sites" inside Greek territory.[8] Metaxas rejected the ultimatum (the refusal of the ultimatum is commemorated as Okhi Day, a national holiday in Greece), but even before its expiration Italian troops had invaded Greece from Albania.c[›]
The principal Italian thrust was delivered in Pindus towards the city of Ioannina and made some progress at first. The Greek troops, unable to match the Italian armour or Italian attacks from the air, took to higher ground and lobbed their mortar shells and artillery pieces down upon the massed enemy. The Italians crossed the Kalamas river and approached Ioannina, but were soon driven back and pursued beyond Greek territory and into Albania.[9] Further north the Greeks checked Italian attempts to advance, and then passed on the offensive. Within three weeks Greek territory was clear of the invader and a full scale counterattack was in place.[10] The counterattack was met with great success, while a change in Italian commanders and the arrival of considerable reinforcements had little effect. Korçë, a major city in south-eastern Albania, fell to Greek forces on November 13, to be followed by Pogradec, Argyrokastron on December 4, Himarë on December 24, and Kelcyre on January 10.[11]
After weeks of inconclusive winter warfare the Italians, supervised by Mussolini himself, launched a full scale counterattack all along the front on March 9, 1941. Within two hours, 100,000 rounds of artillery were fired and Greek positions were bombed from the air. Despite the superiority of the Italian armed forces, the counterattack failed. After one week and 12,000 casualties, Mussolini called off the counterattack, and left Albania twelve days later.[12]
[edit] Effect on the imminent German invasion
In the six month fight against Italy, the Greek army made local gains by eliminating enemy salients, but it was difficult to foretell how a German attack would affect it. Moreover, since Greece had practically no armament industry, its equipment and ammunition supplies consisted mainly of stocks that the British had captured from the defeated Italian armies in North Africa. In order to feed the battle in Albania, the Greek command had been forced to make continuous withdrawals from eastern Macedonia and western Thrace. To reverse this process in anticipation of a German attack was inexpedient, because the available forces were inadequate for sustained resistance on both fronts. The Greek command therefore decided to continue its successful resistance in Albania, no matter how the situation might develop under the impact of a German attack across the Bulgarian border.[13]
[edit] Hitler's decision to occupy Greece
"I wanted, above all to ask you to postpone the operation until a more favorable season, in any ease until after the presidential election in America. In any event I wanted to ask you not to undertake this action without previously carrying out a blitzkrieg operation on Crete. For this purpose I intended to make practical suggestions regarding the employment of a parachute and of an airborne division." |
From a letter Adolf Hitler addressed to Mussolini on November 20, 1940[14] |
Hitler decided to intervene in the military operations on November 4, 1940 (seven days after Italy had attacked Greece through Albania and four days after the British had occupied Crete and Lemnos), and ordered the Army General Staff to prepare plans for the invasion of northern Greece from Romania via Bulgaria. The plans for this campaign, together with the projects involving Gibraltar and North Africa, were incorporated into a master plan to deprive the British of all their Mediterranean bases.[15] On November 12 the Armed Forces High Command issued Directive No. 18, in which the operations against Gibraltar and Greece were scheduled to take place simultaneously in January 1941. In December 1940 the German plans in the Mediterranean underwent considerable change when, at the beginning of the month, Franco rejected the plan for an attack on Gibraltar. Consequently, German offensive planning for southern Europe had to be restricted to the campaign against Greece. Upon insistence of the Luftwaffe, the entire country was to be occupied, not just the northern provinces. For this purpose the Armed Forces High Command issued Directive No. 20, dated December 13, 1940, which outlined the Greek campaign under the code designation "Operation Marita". According to the Directive, in March, 1941, when the weather would be more favorable, German troops were to occupy the northern coast of the Aegean Sea and, if necessary, the entire Greek mainland.[15]
“ | The Yugoslav coup came suddenly out of the blue. When the news was brought to me on the morning of the 27th I thought it was a joke.[16] | ” |
—Hitler speaking to his Commanders-in-Chief |
The overthrow of the Yugoslav Government by a military coup d'état on March 27 was, however, a complete surprise to Hitler. That nignt, March 27 - 28, the Führer called a meeting of the High Command, and told his Commanders-in-Chief that the beginning of Operation Barbarossa would have to be postponed up to four weeks as a result of the Balkan operations. During the meeting, the orders for the campaign in Yugoslavia were drawn up and changes made in the plans for the attack upon Greece. On April 6 both Greece and Yugoslavia would be attacked.[17]
[edit] British aid to Greece and diplomatic background
“ | Ζήτω η Ελλάς (Long live Greece) | ” |
— Winston Churchill, Telegraph to Metaxas written in Greek[18]
|
Britain was bound to Greece by the declaration of 1939, according to which in the event of Greek (or Romanian) independence being threatened by action which the government(s) thought it vital to resist "His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Greek or Romanian Government [...] all the support in their power."[19] Although the British army was committed to fighting in North Africa and could not spare many military units or war material to assist Greece, British public opinion was inspired by the way the Greeks had repulsed the Italians, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill thought it was UK's duty to aid the Greeks.[18] The first British help to Greece were a few RAF squadrons under Air Vice-Marshal John d'Albiac, sent to aid the small Royal Hellenic Air Force in November 1940.[20] With the consent of the Greek government, British forces were dispatched to Crete on October 31 to guard Suda Bay, thereby enabling the Greek government to deploy the 5th Cretan Division, to the mainland where it helped repel the Italian invasion.[21] Early on, however, voices were raised among the British commanders against committing some of the already limited forces from North Africa to mainland Greece, a move which would both weaken their position in Libya, and be of little help to the Greeks.
During a meeting of British and Greek military and political leaders which took place in Athens on 13 January 1941 General Alexandros Papagos, Commander-in-Chief of the Hellenic Army, reviewed the situation and expressed the opinion that Yugoslavia would probably remain neutral. The minimum assistance he asked from Britain was nine fully equipped divisions with corresponding air support. These divisions should arrive in eastern Macedonia and western Thrace before the Germans moved from Romania to Bulgaria and assembled their forces for the attack on Greece. Secrecy and deception as to the ultimate destination of the British expeditionary force, which was to be assembled in Egypt, were essential to prevent any German interference. However, all the British could offer was two to three divisions and a relatively small number of planes whose arrival would furthermore be delayed by the existing shortage of shipping. The British suggested the immediate dispatch of a small token force of less than divisional strength. This offer was rejected by the Greeks who feared that the arrival of such a contingent would precipitate a German attack without giving them any sizable assistance.d[›] British help would be requested if and when German troops crossed the Danube from Romania into Bulgaria.[22]
"We did not then know that he [Hitler] was already deeply set upon his gigantic invasion of Russia. If we had we should have felt more confidence in the success of our policy. We should have seen that he risked falling between two stools, and might easily impair his supreme undertaking for the sake of a Balkan preliminary. This is what actually happened, but we could not know that at the time. Some may think we builded rightly; at least we builded better than we knew at the time. It was our aim to animate and combine Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Our duty so fas as possible was to aid the Greeks." |
Winston Churchill[23] |
Churchill still wanted however to recreate a Balkan Front comprising Yugolavia, Greece and Turkey.[23] He thus sent Anthony Eden and Sir John Dill to resume negotiations with the Greek government. At a meeting in Athens on February 22 between Eden and the Greek leadership, the decision to send a British Commonwealth expeditionary force was taken. Already German troops had been massing in Romania, and on 1 March 1941, Wehrmacht forces began to move into Bulgaria. At the same time, the Bulgarian Army mobilized and took up positions along the Greek frontier.[23]
On March 2 Operation Lustre, the transportation of troops and equipment to Greece, got under way, and 26 troopships first arrived at the port of Piraeus, accompanied by the cruiser Calcutta, from which disembarked the first Australian troops.[24] On 3 April, during a meeting of British, Yugoslav, and Greek military representatives the Yugoslavs promised to block the Strimon Valley in case of a German attack across their territory.[25] During this meeting, Papagos laid stress on the importance of a joint Greco-Yugoslavian offensive against the Italians, as soon as the Germans launch their own offensive against the two countries.e[›] Until April 24 58.000 British, Australian, and New Zealand troops were sent to Greece, comprising the 6th Australian Division, the New Zealand 2nd Division, and the British 1st Armoured Brigade.[26] The three formations later became known as 'W' Force from their commanding general Henry Maitland Wilson.f[›]
[edit] Military preparations
[edit] Topography
In order to enter northern Greece the German forces had to cross the Rhodope Mountains, where only a few passes and river valleys permitted the passage of major military units. Two invasion routes led across the passes west of Kyustendil along the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border and another one through the Strimon Valley in the south. The very steep mountain roads with their numerous turns could not be negotiated by heavy vehicles until German engineer troops had widened them by blasting the rocks. Off the roads only infantry and pack animals could pass through the terrain. The Greek fortifications along the border had been adapted to these terrain features and a defense system in depth covered the few available roads. No continuous fortifications had been erected along the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border, but road blocks, demolitions, and extensive mine fields had been prepared at all border points. The Strimon and Nestos rivers cut across the mountain range along the Greek-Bulgarian frontier; both valleys were well protected by strong fortifications which formed part of the Metaxas Line, a system of concrete pillboxes and field fortifications, which had been constructed along the Bulgarian border in the late 1930s, based on principles similar to those applied in the Maginot Line. Its strength resided mainly in the inaccessibility of the intermediate terrain leading up to the defense positions.[27]
[edit] Strategic factors
The mountainous terrain of Greece would seem suited for defense, since the high ranges of the Rhodope, Epirus, Pindus, and Olympus mountains offer many possibilities to stop an invader. However, the defender must have sufficient air power, if the many defiles are not to become traps for his ground forces, and whereas an invader thrusting from Albania can be stopped with relatively small forces in the high Pindus mountains, the northeastern part of the country is difficult to defend against an attack from the north.[28]
After the conference at Athens in March, the British had thought that they and the Greeks would immediately begin to occupy the Haliacmon Line (a short line facing northeastward along the Vermion Mountains and the lower Haliacmon river). Nevertheless, Papagos first waited for an answer from the Yugoslav Government clarifying its intentions, and then proposed to hold the Metaxas Line, which had become a symbol of national security in the popular mind, and not to withdraw any of his divisions from Albania;[29] he argued that to do so would seem to concede victory to the Italians. At the same time, Thessaloniki, a strategically important port, was practically indefensible, and the transportation of British troops to the city would be too dangerous.[30] The course of action Papagos proposed was expected to take advantage of the naturally difficult terrain and the prepared fortifications, while protecting Thessaloniki.
General Dill characterized Papagos' attitude "unaccommodating and defeatist". The British argued that Papagos' plan disregarded the fact that the forces and equipment of the Greek army were only adequate for a token resistance. They also believed that because of the rivalry against Bulgaria (Metaxas line was for use in the event of a war with Bulgaria), and being on traditionally good terms with the Yugoslavs, the Greeks had left the Yugoslav border largely undefended.[32] Although the British fully realized the vulnerability of the Greek border defense system (it was bound to collapse in the event of a German thrust between the Strimon and Axios rivers), they finally let the Greeks have their way. On March 4 Dill accepted the plans for the Metaxas line, and the agreement was ratified by the British Cabinet on March 7[33] the overall command was to be retained by Papagos, and the Greek and British commands resigned themselves to fighting a delaying action in the northeastern part of the country.[28] Nevertheless, the British did not move their forces up to the frontier into the sector west of the Metaxas Line, because General Wilson was of the opinion that his forces were too weak to hold such an extended front line. Instead, he placed his forces some forty miles west of the course of the Axios across the Haliacmon Line.[34] The two main objectives in establishing this position were to maintain contact with the Greek First Army in Albania and to deny the Germans access to central Greece. The advantage of this position was that it required fewer forces, and that more time would be available for preparing the position. However, it also involved abandoning nearly the whole of Northern Greece, which was unacceptable to the Greeks for political and psychological reasons. Moreover, the left flank of this line too was susceptible to flanking from Germans operating through the Monastir gap in Yugoslavia.[35] The possibility of a rapid disintegration of the Yugoslav Army and a German thrust into the rear of the Vermion Position was not taken into consideration.[28]
The German strategy called for the same blitzkrieg tactics that proved successful during the invasion of Yugoslavia; daring thrusts by mobile elements, strongly supported by tactical air power' would be the key to success. Once Thessaloniki had been captured, Athens and the port of Piraeus, was to be the principal objective. With this port and the Isthmus of Corinth in German hands, the withdrawal and evacuation of the British and Greek defense forces would be seriously jeopardized.[28]
[edit] Defense and attack forces
The Fifth Yugoslav Army was responsible for the defense of the southeastern border in the area between Kriva Palanka and the Greek border, but at the time of the German attack the Yugoslav troops in this area were not fully mobilized, and they were short of modern equipment and weapons. Following the entry of German forces into Bulgaria, most of the Greek troops were evacuated from western Thrace. The total strength of the Greek forces defending the Bulgarian border was roughly 70.000 men under the command of the Greek Second Army. The bulk of the Greek forces (First Army with its fourteen divisions) was committed in Albania.[36]
On March 28 the Greek forces in central Macedonia, consisted of the 12th Infantry Division and the 20th Infantry Division, were brought under the command of General Wilson who established his headquarters northwest of Larissa. The New Zealand division took up positions north of Mount Olympus, and the Australian division blocked the Haliacmon Valley up to the Vermion Range The Royal Air Force continued to operate from airfields in central and southern Greece, but there were few planes that could be diverted to this theater. The British forces were almost fully motorized, but their equipment was suitable for desert warfare; not for the steep mountain roads in Greece. There was a shortage of tanks and anti-aircraft guns, and the lines of communication across the Mediterranean were very vulnerable despite the fact that the British Navy dominated the Aegean Sea, since all convoys had to pass close to enemy-held islands in the Aegean. The logistical problems were aggravated by the limited availability of shipping and the low capacity of the Greek ports.[37]
The German Twelfth Army under the command of Field Marshal Wilhelm List was charged with the execution of Operation Marita. This army was composed of the following units:
- First Panzer Group, under the command of General Ewald van Kleist.
- XL Panzer Corps, under Lieutenant General Georg Stumme.
- XVIII Mountain Corps, under Lieutenant General Franz Böhme.
- XXX Infantry Corps, under Lieutenant General Otto Hartmann.
- L Infantry Corps, under Lieutenant General Georg Lindemann.
- 16th Panzer Division, deployed behind the Turkish-Bulgarian border to support the Bulgarian forces in case of a Turkish attack.[38]
[edit] German plan of attack and assembly
The German plan of attack was influenced by the experience during the Battle of France. It was based on the premise that, because of the diversion created by the campaign in Albania, the Greeks would lack sufficient manpower to defend their borders with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. By driving armored wedges through the weakest links in the defense chain, the freedom of maneuver necessary for thrusting deep into enemy territory could be gained more easily than by moving up the armor only after the infantry had forced its way through the mountain valleys and defiles. Once the weak defense system of southern Yugoslavia had been overrun by German armor, the Metaxas Line, which obstructed a rapid invasion of Greece from Bulgaria, could be outflanked by highly mobile forces thrusting southward from Yugoslavia. Possession of Monastir and the Axios Valley leading to Thessaloniki was essential to such an outflanking maneuver.[39]
The Yugoslav coup d'etat led to a sudden change in the plan of attack, which confronted the Twelfth Army with a number of difficult problems. According to Directive No. 25, which was received at army headquarters on the morning of March 28, Twelfth Army was to regroup its forces in such a manner that a task force consisting almost entirely of mobile units would be available to attack via Niš toward Belgrade. With only nine days left before D-Day, every hour became valuable since a new assembly involving considerable troop movements had to be carried out with a minimum of delay. Nevertheless, by the evening of April 5 all attack forces that were to enter southern Yugoslavia and Greece the next morning had moved into their assembly areas and were ready for action.[40]
[edit] German invasion
[edit] Thrust across Southern Yugoslavia and drive to Thessaloniki
At first light on April 6 the German armies invaded Greece and Yugoslavia and the Luftwaffe began an intensive bombardment of Belgrade. The XL Panzer Corps, which was to attack across southern Yugoslavia, jumped off at 5:30 a.m., thrusting across the Bulgarian frontier at two points. By the evening of April 8 the 1st SS Division Adolf Hitler captured Prilep; the important rail line between Belgrade and Salonika was severed and one of the strategic objectives of the campaign – to isolate Yugoslavia from its allies – was achieved. In addition, the Germans were now in possession of terrain which was favorable for the continuation of the offensive. On the evening of April 9 General Stumme deployed his forces north of Monastir, ready to carry the attack across the Greek border toward Florina, thereby threatening to encircle the Greeks in Albania and W Force in the are of Florina, Edessa, and Katerini.[41] While weak security detachments covered the rear of his corps against a surprise attack from central Yugoslavia, elements of the 9th Panzer Division drove westward to link up with the Italians at the Albanian border.[42]
The 2nd Panzer Division (XVIII Mountain troops) entered Yugoslavia from the east on the morning of 6 April, and advanced westward through the Strimon Valley. It encountered little enemy resistance, but was delayed by demolitions, mine fields, and muddy roads. Nevertheless, the division divas able to reach the objective of the day, the town of Strumica. On April 7 a Yugoslav counter attack against the northern flank of the division was repelled, and the next day the division forced its way across the mountains and overran the Greek 19th Motorized Infantry Division Units stationed south of Lake Doiran. Despite many delays along the narrow mountain roads an armored advance guard dispatched in the direction of Thessaloniki succeeded in entering the city by the morning of April 9; the seizure of the city took place without any fighting.[43]
[edit] Metaxas Line
The Metaxas Line was defended by the Greek Eastern Macedonia Army Section (Tμήμα Στρατıάς Ανατολικής Μακεδονίας or TΣAM) under the command of Lt. General Konstantinos Bakopoulos, comprising 7th, 14th and 17th Infantry Divisions, all under-strength. The line ran for ca. 170 km along the river Nestos in the east, and then along the Bulgarian border as far as Mount Beles near the Yugoslav border. The fortifications were designed to garrison an army of over 200,000 but were only manned by roughly 70,000 soldiers to face the German threat due to lack of manpower. As a result of the small numbers, the line's defenses were spread thin.[44]
Initial German attacks against the Metaxas Line, undertaken by one German infantry and two reinforced mountain divisions of the XVIII Mountain Corps, encountered extremely tough resistance and had limited success.[45] A German report at the end of the first day said that the German 5th Mountain Division "was repulsed in the Rupel Pass despite strongest air support and sustained considerable casualties".[46] Of the twenty-four forts which made up the Metaxas Line only two had fallen and only after they had been destroyed.[47]
The Line was finally penetrated after a three-day struggle, during which the Germans massed artillery and dive bombers. The German 6th Mountain Division crossed a 7,000-foot snow-covered mountain range and broke through at a point that had been considered inaccessible by the Greeks. The division reached the rail line to Thessaloniki on the evening of April 7. The other XVIII Mountain Corps units advanced step by step under great hardship. The 5th Division together with the reinforced 125th Infantry Regiment penetrated the Strimon defenses on April 7 and, attacking along both banks of the river, cleaned out one bunker after another. Nevertheless, it suffered such heavy casualties that it had to be withdrawn from further action after it had reached its objective. The 72d Infantry Division, which advanced from Gotse Delchev across the mountains, got through the Metaxas Line by the evening of April 9, when it reached the area northeast of Serres.[48] Even after General Bakopoulos surrendered the Metaxas Line, however, some of the fortresses of the line held out for days, and could not be reduced until heavy guns were brought up. Soldiers manning the frontier forts, and some of the field troops, continued to fight on, and, as a result of this continued resistance, some of the troops that defended the Metaxas line were able to evacuate by sea.[49]
[edit] Capitulation of the Greek Second Army
The XXX Infantry Corps on the deft wing reached its designated objective: by the evening of April 8 the 164th Infantry Division captured Xanthi, while the 50th Infantry Division advanced far beyond Komotini towards the Nestos River, which both divisions reached on the next day. On April 9 the Greek Second Army capitulated unconditionally after the collapse of Greek resistance east of the Vardar River. In an estimate of the situation dated 9 April, Field Marshal List expressed the opinion that, as a result of the swift advance of the mobile units, his 12th Army was in a favorable position for gaining access to central Greece by smashing the enemy buildup behind the Vardar River.[50]
[edit] Breakthrough to Kozani
- See also: Battle of Vevi (1941)
By the morning of April 10 the XL Panzer Corps had finished its preparations for the continuation of the offensive, and continued the advance in the direction of Kozani. First contact with British troops was made north of Vevi at 11:00 a.m. on 10 April. The SS troops seized Vevi on April 11, but were stopped a short distance south of that town, where a mixed Commonwealth-Greek formation, known as Mackay Force, was assembled to, as Wilson put it, "....stop a blitzkrieg down the Florina Valley.".[51] During the next day the SS regiment reconnoitered the enemy positions and at dusk launched a frontal attack against the pass. After heavy fighting the Germans overcame the enemy resistance and broke through the defile.[52] By the morning of April 14 the spearheads of the 9th Panzer Division reached Kozani. That same evening the division established a bridgehead across the Aliakmon River, but an attempt to advance beyond this point was stopped by intense enemy fire. For the next three days the 9th Panzer Division advance was stalled in front of the strongly fortified mountain positions held by the British.[52]
[edit] Allied retreat
W Force had only began to settle in their defensive line when news of the German invasion came. The outcome of initial clashes with the Germans at Vevi were not encouraging and the rapid advance of the Panzers into Thessaloniki and Prilep in Southern Yugoslavia greatly disturbed Wilson. Wilson was now faced with the prospect of being pinned by the invading Germans operating from Thessaloniki while being flanked by the German XL Panzer Corps descending through the Monastir Gap. This necessitated a retreat, initially to the Aliakmon river, and then to the narrow pass at Thermopylae, where the Germans broke through again on April 23.[53]
[edit] Olympus and Servia passes
By the morning of April 14, the spearheads of the 9th Panzer Division reached Kozani after violent clashes with British tanks and anti-tank guns. That same evening the division established a bridgehead across the Haliacmon (Aliakmon) river and the Allies fell back to a line which ran near Mt. Olympus. This defense had three main components: the Platamon tunnel area between Olympus and the sea, the Olympus Pass itself, and the Servia Pass south-east. By channelling attack through these three defiles, the new line offered far greater defensive strength for the limited forces available. The defenses of the Olympus and Servia passes consisted of the 4th New Zealand Brigade, 5th New Zealand Brigade, and the 16th Australian Brigade. For the next three days the advance of the 9th Panzer Division was stalled in front of these strongly fortified mountain positions.[54]
The Platamon tunnel came under attack from German motor cycle troops on April 15, but the Germans were repulsed by the 21st New Zealand Battalion under Colonel Macky, which suffered heavy losses in the process. Later that day a German armoured regiment arrived and struck the coastal and inland flanks of the battalion, but the New Zealanders held their ground. After being reinforced during the night of the 15th-16th, the Germans managed to assemble a tank battalion, infantry battalion, and a battalion of motor cycle troops. The German infantry attacked the New Zealanders left company at dawn, while the tanks attacked along the coast several hours later. Macky, who had lost communications with the company on his left, and had two companies farther down the hill being fired upon from the flank and the rear, gave the order to retire.[55]
The withdrawal was covered by the reserve company, which was on a ridge south of that pierced by the tunnel. Macky had intended to hold a new position about one mile south of Platamon, but this was found to be impracticable, and continued the retirement to the mouth of the Pinios Gorge. Macky was informed that it was "essential to deny the gorge to the enemy till 19th April even if it meant extinction".[56] Macky sank the crossing barge at the western end of the gorge once all his men were across and began to set up defenses. The 21st battalion was reinforced by the Australian 2/2nd Battalion and later by the 2/3rd, this force became known as Allen force after Maj General Arthur Samuel Allen. The 2/5th and 2/11th battalions moved to the Elatia area south-west of the gorge and were ordered to hold the western exit possibly for three or four days.[57]
On April 16 General Wilson met General Papagos at Lamia and informed him of his decision to withdrawal to Thermopylae. General Blamney divided responsibility between generals Mackay and Freyberg during the leapfrogging move back to Thermopylae. Mackay would protect the flanks of the New Zealand Division as far south as an east-west line through Larissa and would control the withdrawal through Domokos to Thermopylae of Savige Force and the Zarkos Force, and finally of Lee Force; the 1st Armoured Brigade would cover the withdrawal of Savige Force to Larissa and thereafter the withdrawal of the 6th Division under whose command it would come; Freyberg would control the withdrawal of Allen Force which was to move along the same route as the New Zealand Division. The British Commonwealth forces remained under constant attack throughout the entire withdrawal.[58]
[edit] Withdrawal and surrender of the Greek First Army
As the invading Germans advanced deep into Greek territory, the Greek First Army operating in Albania against the Italians was reluctant to retreat. General Wilson described this reluctance as “the fetishistic doctrine that not a yard of ground should be yielded to the Italians.”[59] Because of this reluctance to yield ground to the Italians, the Greek retreat did not materialise until April 13. The Allied retreat to Thermopylae uncovered a route across the Pindus Mountains by which the Germans might take the Greek army in flank and rear. An SS regiment was given the mission of cutting off the Greek First Army's line of retreat from Albania by driving westward to the Metsovon Pass, and from there, to Ioannina.[60]
Greek commander in chief, Alexandros Papagos, rushed Greek units to the Metsovon Pass, where the Germans were expected to attack. On April 18, a pitched battle between several Greek units and the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler brigade developed there. The Greek units fought bravely, but lacked equipment necessary to fight against a motorised unit, and were soon encircled and overwhelmed. The Germans advanced further and captured Ioannina on April 19, the final supply route of the Greek First Army.[61] Newspapers around the world dubbed the Greek army's fate as a modern day Greek tragedy. Historian and former war-correspondent, Christopher Buckley, when describing the fate of the Greek army, writes, "...one experiences a genuine Aristotelian Katharsis, an awe-inspiring sense of the futility of all human effort and all human courage..."[62]
On April 20, the commander of the Greek forces in Albania, General Georgios Tsolakoglou offered his surrender to the advancing Germans. World War II historian John Keegan writes that Tsolakoglou "was so determined, however, to deny the Italians the satisfaction of a victory they had not earned that, once the hopelessness of his position became apparent to him, he opened quite unauthorised parley with the commander of the German SS division opposite him, Sepp Dietrich, to arrange a surrender to the Germans alone."[63] The original surrender document did not include the Italians. Outraged by this decision, Mussolini ordered counterattacks against the Greek forces which had just surrendered, and to Mussolini's embarrassment, these counterattacks were repulsed. It took personal representation from Mussolini to Hitler to bring about an armistice in which Italy was included on April 23.[64] In recognition of the valour displayed by Greek forces, the enlisted men were allowed to return to their homes (rather than being confined to POW camps) and officers were permitted to retain their sidearms.[65]
On the same day that Tsolakoglou offered his surrender, the Bulgarian Army entered the Aegean region. The goal was to gain an Aegean Sea outlet in Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia in Greece. The Bulgarians occupied territory between the Strimon river and a line of demarcation running through Alexandroupoli and Svilengrad west of Evros river. Included in the area occupied were the cities of Alexandroupoli, Komotini, Serres, Xanthi, Drama and Kavala and the islands of Thasos and Samothrace in Greece, as well as much of eastern Serbia and almost all of Vardar Banovina (today the Republic of Macedonia) in Yugoslavia.
[edit] Thermopylae position
Following the retreat from the Olympus and Servia passes the British Commonwealth forces began to set up defensive position at the historic pass at Thermopylae (Thermopylae is famous for the 300 Spartans under King Leonidas who fought to the death against a gigantic Persian army in 480 BC). General Bernard Freyberg was given the task of defending the coastal pass with Mackay defending the village of Brallos. In the New Zealand sector the 5th Brigade was deployed along the coastal road, the foothills south of Lamia, and the Spercheios river. The 4th Brigade was on the right where it had established coast-watching patrols, and the 6th was in reserve. In the Australian sector the 19th Brigade, comprising the 2/4th and 1/8th Battalions, defended Brallos.[66] On 19 April the 2/1st and 2/5th Battalions were placed under the command of Maj Gen George Vasey, and that day and during the early hours of the next, 2/11th Battalion rejoined the brigade.[67] Generals Freyberg and Mackay had been informing their subordinates that there would be no more withdrawals, both unaware of the higher level discussions on the evacuation.[68] After the battle Mackay was quoted as saying.
“ | I thought that we'd hang on for about a fortnight and be beaten by weight of numbers[69] | ” |
When the order to retreat was received on the morning of the 23rd it was decided that each of the two positions was to be held by one brigade each. These brigades, the Australian 19th and 6th New Zealand were to hold the passes as long as possible, allowing the other units to withdraw. General Vasey, commander of the 19th Brigade said
“ | Here we bloody well are and here we bloody well stay[70] | ” |
which was interpreted by his brigade major as the "Brigade will hold its present defensive positions come what may".[71] The Germans attacked on April 24, met fierce resistance, lost fifteen tanks and sustained considerable casualties. The Allies held out the entire day. With the delaying action accomplished, they retreated in the direction of the evacuation beaches and set up another rearguard at Thebes.[72]
[edit] German airborne attack on the Isthmus of Corinth
After the Thermopylae position was forced, the Germans staged an airborne operation to seize the bridges over the Corinth Canal, with the double aim of both cutting off the British line of retreat, and securing their own way across the isthmus. The attack, carried out by the 2nd Regiment of 1st Fallschirmjäger Division on April 26, met with initial success, until a stray British shell ignited the disconnected demolition charges, destroying the bridge and causing several casualties.[73] Although German engineers managed to construct a temporary bridge within hours, over which 5th Panzer division crossed to the Peloponnese, the attack came a few days too late to cut off the bulk of the British troops in Central Greece, but did manage to isolate the Australian 16th and 17th Brigades.[74] By the time the isthmus was secured, most Allied units had already begun to evacuate from the town of Kalamata and other small harbours.
[edit] Athens Falls
On April 27, 1941, German motorcycle troops entered the Greek capital Athens, followed by armoured cars, tanks, and infantry. The people of Athens had been expecting the Germans to enter the city for several days and kept themselves confined to their homes with their windows shut. The previous night Athens Radio had made the following announcement:
You are listening to the voice of Greece. Greeks, stand firm, proud, and dignified. You must prove yourselves worthy of your history. The valour and victory of our army has already been recognised. The righteousness of our cause will also be recognised. We did our duty honestly. Friends! Have Greece in your hearts, live inspired with the fire of her latest triumph and the glory of our army. Greece will live again and will be great, because she fought honestly for a just cause and for freedom. Brothers! Have courage and patience. Be stouthearted. We will overcome these hardships. Greeks! With Greece in your minds you must be proud and dignified. We have been an honest nation and brave soldiers.[75]
The German motorcycle troops drove straight to the Acropolis and raised the Nazi flag. In the days that followed, the people of Athens, and newspapers around the World, told different stories of the raising of the German flag. According to the most popular account, the Evzone soldier on guard duty, Konstantinos Koukidis, took down the Greek flag, wrapped himself in it, and jumped off the Acropolis. Whether the story was true or not, many Greeks believed the story and looked at the soldier as a martyr.[76]
[edit] Evacuation
After some brief holding actions on the Peloponnese, the Greek and British Commonwealth forces had to be evacuated to Crete and Egypt. The 5th New Zealand Brigade was evacuated on the night of 24 April, while the 4th New Zealand Brigade remained to block to narrow road to Athens, which was dubbed the 24 Hour Pass by the New Zealanders.[77] On 25 April, (Anzac Day) some 5500 Australian troops of the Australian 19th Brigade were evacuated from the beaches at Nauplion by HMAS Perth, Stuart and Voyager.[78] The evacuation of about 43,000 soldiers was completed on April 28, but was heavily contested by the German Luftwaffe, which managed to sink at least twenty-six troop-laden ships. The Germans managed to capture around 8,000 Commonwealth and Yugoslav troops who had not been evacuated, while liberating many Italian prisoners from POW camps.[79]
[edit] Battle of Crete
Main Article: Battle of Crete
Following the occupation of the mainland, Nazi Germany invaded the Greek island of Crete on May 20, 1941. In the bitterly contested Battle of Crete, the Germans employed parachute forces in a massive airborne invasion. The Germans attacked the three main airfields of the island of Maleme, Rethimnon, and Heraklion. The Germans met surprising resistance from the Greek, British, Australian, and New Zealand troops on the island and from local civilians. After one day of fighting, none of the objectives were reached and the Germans had suffered around 4,000 casualties.[80] German plans were in disarray and Commanding General Kurt Student was contemplating suicide.
During the next day, through miscommunication and failure of Allied commanders to grasp the situation, Maleme airfield in western Crete fell to the Germans. With Maleme airfield secure, the Germans flew in thousands of reinforcements and overwhelmed the western side of the island. After seven days of fighting Allied commanders realised that so many Germans had been flown in that hope of Allied victory was gone. By June 1, 1941, the evacuation of Crete by the Allies was complete and the island was under German occupation. In light of the heavy casualties suffered by the elite 7th Flieger Division, Adolf Hitler forbade further airborne operations.[81] General Kurt Student would dub Crete "the graveyard of the German paratroopers" and a "disastrous victory."[82]
[edit] Evaluation
The speed of the German tank movements through the rugged Balkan Mountains and the efficiency of the campaign amazed military men around the world. At the same time, the Greek and Allied troops gave, what many historians such as John Keegan and Antony Beevor believe, an astonishingly effective resistance given their limited resources. Historian John Keegan writes "The Greek campaign had been an old-fashioned gentlemens's war, with honour given and accepted by brave adversaries on each side."[83] Keegan also writes that the Greek and Allied forces, being vastly outnumbered, "had, rightly, the sensation of having fought the good fight."[84]
The overall German casualties in the Battle of Greece, as they were officially announced by Germany after the end of the operation, are roughly 5,000 men including 1,100 dead. The actual losses, as they are estimated are 11,500, with 2,500 dead. The Allied expeditionary force lost approximately a quarter (14,500) of its 58,000 strength including 11,000 captured, and Greece was effectively forced out of the war, although a vigorous resistance movement lasted throughout the Axis occupation. Italian casualties were far heavier and amounted to over 100,000 as a result of their six month fight with Greece.[85]
[edit] Effect on World War II
Greek resistance in World War II may have been a turning point in the war. Some historians such as John Keegan believe that the German invasion of Greece delayed the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union by six weeks. Hitler planned the invasion of the Soviet Union to take place on May 15, 1941 but it was not until June 22, 1941 when the invasion was launched. This delay proved costly as it forced the Axis Powers to fight through the Russian Winter. The German army was unable to capture Moscow and its advance towards the Caucasus was delayed as a result. Adolf Hitler in conversation with Leni Riefenstahl would bitterly say that "if the Italians hadn't attacked Greece and needed our help, the war would have taken a different course. We could have anticipated the Russian cold by weeks and conquered Leningrad and Moscow. There would have been no Stalingrad".[86]
The Axis Occupation of Greece, which came as a result of the Battle of Greece, proved to be a difficult and costly task. The occupation led to the creation of several resistance groups. These resistance groups launched guerilla attacks against the occupying forces and set up espionage networks. The vigorous resistance movement forced the Axis Powers to station hundreds of thousands of soldiers in Greece, when those soldiers could have been better used elsewhere. Famous acts of resistance include the taking down of the Nazi flag off the Acropolis by Manolis Glezos and Apostolos Santas and the destruction of the railway bridge over the Gorgopotamos gorge. Greek civilians suffered terrible hardships as a result of the brutal occupation. From 1940 to 1945 Greece counted, according to Russian historian Vadim Erlikman, 435,000 casualties.[87]
At the same time, the politically-motivated decision to send British forces into Greece is considered, in the words of General Alan Brooke, "a definite strategic blunder", as it denied Wavell the necessary reserves to complete the conquest of Italian-held Libya after Operation Compass, or to successfully withstand Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps March offensive, while being totally inadequate to prevent the collapse of Greece. Thereby it arguably prolonged the North African Campaign, which otherwise might have been successfully concluded within 1941.
[edit] Homage to the Greek resistance
The measure of resistance was paid considerable homage to by German officials. Hitler's Chief of Staff, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel stated during the Nuremberg Trials, "the unbelievably strong resistance of the Greeks delayed by two or more vital months the German attack against Russia; if we did not have this long delay, the outcome of the war would have been different in the eastern front and in the war in general."[88] Adolf Hitler ordered that no Greek soldier shall be taken prisoner and that those who were, were to be released immediately out of respect of their bravery.[89]
A speech Adolf Hitler made at the Reichstag in 1941 said of the campaign: "It must be said, for the sake of historical truth, that amongst all our opponents, only the Greeks fought with such endless courage and defiance of death."[90] The diary of Joseph Goebbels 9 April 1941: "I forbid the Press to underestimate the Greeks, to defame them.... The Führer admires the bravery of Greeks."[91]
The measure of Greek resistance was paid homage and aroused admiration around the world. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill would say "until now we would say that the Greeks fight like heroes. From now on we will say that heroes fight like Greeks."[92] American President Franklin Roosevelt would say "all free peoples are deeply impressed by the courage and steadfastness of the Greek nation ... which is defending itself so valiantly."[93] Joseph Stalin, in an open letter read over the air on Radio Moscow short wave on numerous occasions during the war, would say "the Russian people will always be grateful to the Greeks for delaying the German army long enough for winter to set in, thereby giving us the precious time we needed to prepare. We will never forget."[94]
[edit] Notes
This, incidentally, disposes of the German assertion that they were forced to attack us only in order to expel the British from Greece, for they knew that, if they had not marched into Bulgaria, no British troops would have landed in Greece. Their assertion was merely an excuse on their part to enable them to plead extenuating circumstances in justification of their aggression against a small nation, already entangled in a war against a Great Power. But, irrespective of the presence or absence of British troops in the Balkans, German intervention would have taken place firstly because the Germans had to secure the right flank of the German Army which was to operate against Russia according to the plans already prepared in autumn 1940, and secondly because the possession of the southern part of the Balkan Peninsula commanding the eastern end of the Mediterranean was of great strategic importance for Germany's plan of attacking Great Britain and the line of Imperial communications with the East.[97]
[edit] Citations
- ^ a b Collier (1971), 180
- ^ a b Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 82
- ^ Keegan (2005), 144
* Riefenstahl (1987), 295 - ^ Ciano (1946), 247
- ^ "Greece, History of". Encyclopaedia "The Helios".
- ^ Goldstein (1992), 53
- ^ Buckley (1984), 18
* Goldstein (1992), 53 - ^ Buckley (1984), 17
- ^ Southern Europe, World War-2.Net
- ^ Buckley (1984), 19
- ^ Buckley (1984), 18-20
- ^ Bailey (1984), 22
* More U-boat Aces Hunted down, OnWar.Com - ^ a b Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 70-71
- ^ Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 5
- ^ a b Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 5-7
* "Greece, History of". Encyclopaedia "The Helios". - ^ McClymont, 158
- ^ "Greece, History of". Encyclopaedia "The Helios".
* McClymont, 158-159 - ^ a b "Greece, History of". Encyclopaedia The Helios.
- ^ Lawlor (1994), 167
- ^ Barrass, Air Marshal Sir John D'Albiac
* Beevor (1992), 26 - ^ Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 71-72
* Vick (1995), 22 - ^ Beevor (1992), 38
* Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 71-72 - ^ a b c Churchill (1991), 420
- ^ "Greece, History of". Encyclopaedia The Helios.
* Simpson (2004), 86-87 - ^ Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 74
- ^ Balkan Operations – Order of Battle – W-Force – 5th April 1941, Orders of Battle
- ^ Bailey (1979), 37
* Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 75 - ^ a b c d Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 77
- ^ McClymont (1959), 106-107
* Papagos (1949), 115
* Ziemke, Balkan Campaigns - ^ McClymont (1959), 106-107
- ^ Lawlor (1994), 191-192
- ^ Bailey (1979), 37
- ^ Lawlor (1994), 168
* McClymont (1959), 107-108 - ^ Ziemke, Balkan Campaigns
- ^ Buckley (1979), p. 40-45
- ^ Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 79
- ^ Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 79-80
- ^ Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 81
- ^ Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 81
- ^ Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 83-84
- ^ McClymont (1959), 160
- ^ Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 86
- ^ Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 87
- ^ Buckley, p. 30-33
- ^ Buckley (1984), 50
* Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 88 - ^ Beevor (1991), 33
- ^ Buckley (1984), 50
- ^ Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 88
- ^ Buckley (1984), 61
* Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 89 - ^ Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 89-91
- ^ The Roof is Leaking, Australian Department of Veterans' Affairs
- ^ a b Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 91
- ^ Hondros, John (1983). Occupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony 1941-44. Pella Pub Co. ISBN 0-918618-19-3 p. 52
- ^ Smith, p. 94
- ^ Official Histories – Second World War Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria (1st edition, 1953) accessed 13 October, 2006
- ^ Official Histories – Second World War Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria (1st edition, 1953) accessed 13 October, 2006
- ^ Official Histories – Second World War Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria (1st edition, 1953) accessed 13 October, 2006
- ^ Official Histories – Second World War Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria (1st edition, 1953) accessed 13 October, 2006
- ^ Beevor, p. 39
- ^ Bailey, p. 32
- ^ Smith, p. 95
- ^ Buckley, p. 113
- ^ Keegan, p. 157
- ^ Keegan, P. 158
- ^ Hondros, p. 90
- ^ Official Histories – Second World War Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria (1st edition, 1953) accessed 13 October, 2006
- ^ Official Histories – Second World War Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria (1st edition, 1953) accessed 13 October, 2006
- ^ Official Histories – Second World War Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria (1st edition, 1953) accessed 13 October, 2006
- ^ Official Histories – Second World War Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria (1st edition, 1953) accessed 13 October, 2006
- ^ Official Histories – Second World War Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria (1st edition, 1953) accessed 13 October, 2006
- ^ Official Histories – Second World War Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria (1st edition, 1953) accessed 13 October, 2006
- ^ Bailey, p. 33
- ^ Smith, p. 108
- ^ Macdougall Pg. 195
- ^ Hadjipateras and Fafalios, p. 248-249
- ^ Bailey, p. 33
- ^ Macdougall pg. 194
- ^ Macdougall pg. 195
- ^ Smith, p. 112
- ^ Bailey, P. 54
- ^ Beevor, P. 231
- ^ Antony. Crete: The Battle and the Resistance, John Murray Ltd, 1991. Penguin Books, 1992. Boulder : Westview Press, 1994. Pbk ISBN 0-14-016787-0 p. 231
- ^ Keegan, p. 158
- ^ Keegan, p. 158
- ^ Collier, Richard (1971). Duce!. Viking Adult. ISBN 0-670-28603-6 p. 180
- ^ Leni Riefenstahl, Leni Riefenstahl: A Memoir. (Picador New York, USA. 1987) p. 295 ISBN 0-312-11926-7
- ^ Vadim Erlikman. Poteri narodonaseleniia v XX veke : spravochnik. Moscow 2004. ISBN 5-93165-107-1.
- ^ Lest we forget the 28th of October of 1940, by Peter N. Yiannos, Ph.D
- ^ Adolf Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on May 4, 1941accessed October 10, 2006
- ^ Adolf Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on May 4, 1941
- ^ Joseph Goebbels The Goebbels Diaries,1939-1941, (H. Hamilton 1982) ISBN 0-241-10893-4
- ^ Reflections on the 65th Anniversary of the day Greece answered no and once again changed the course of history, by Chris P. Tomarasaccessed October 10, 2006
- ^ Reflections on the 65th Anniversary of the day Greece answered no and once again changed the course of history, by Chris P. Tomarasaccessed October 10, 2006
- ^ Reflections on the 65th Anniversary of the day Greece answered no and once again changed the course of history, by Chris P. Tomarasaccessed October 10, 2006
- ^ Center of Military Editions (1984-1986), 3-4
- ^ Buckley (1984), 17
- ^ Papagos (1949), 317
- ^ "Greece, History of". Encyclopaedia The Helios.
* Long (1953), 41 - ^ Beevor (1992), 60
[edit] References
- Balkan Operations – Order of Battle – W-Force – 5th April 1941. Orders of Battle. Retrieved on March 31, 2007.
- Bailey, Robert H. (1979). Partisans and Guerrillas (World War II). Time Life UK. ISBN 0-8094-2490-8.
- Barber, Laurie and Tonkin-Covell, John. Freyberg : Churchill's Salamander, Hutchinson 1990. ISBN 1-86941-052-1
- Barrass, M.B.. Air Marshal Sir John D'Albiac. Air of Authority - A History of RAF Organisation. Retrieved on March 31, 2007.
- Beevor, Antony. Crete: The Battle and the Resistance, John Murray Ltd, 1991. Penguin Books, 1992. Pbk ISBN 0-14-016787-0 Boulder : Westview Press, 1994. LCCN 93047914
- Bitzes, John (1989). Greece in World War II: To April 1941. Sunflower University Press. ISBN 0-89745-093-0.
- Bosworth, R.J.B (2002). Mussolini. A Hodder Arnold Publication. ISBN 0-340-73144-3.
- Buckley, Christopher,Greece and Crete 1941, (London: 1952; P. Efstathiadis & Sons S.A.:1984) ISBN 960-226-041-6
- Center of Military History (1953 – Reissue edition 1984-1986). The German Campaigns in the Balkans. Washington DC: United States Army.
- Churchill, Sir Winston (1991). "Yugoslavia and Greece", Memoirs of the Second World War. Houghton Mifflin Books. ISBN 0-395-59968-7.
- Collier, Richard (1971). Duce!. Viking Adult. ISBN 0-670-28603-6.
- Ciano, Galeazzo (1946). The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943. Doubleday & Company. ASIN B000IVT93U.
- Fafalios, Maria, and Hadjipateras, Costas, Greece 1940-41: Eyewitnessed (Athens: 1995; Efstathiadis Group) ISBN 960-226-533-7
- Goldstein, Erik (21992). "Second World War 1939-1945", Wars and Peace Treaties. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-07822-9.
- "Greece, History of". Encyclopaedia "The Helios". (1952).
- Hondros, John (1983). Occupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony 1941-44. Pella Pub Co. ISBN 0-918618-19-3.
- Keegan, John (2005). The Second World War. Penguin (Non-Classics); Reprint edition. ISBN 0-14-303573-8.
- Lawlor, Sheila (1994). Churchill and the Politics of War, 1940-1941. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-46685-7.
- Long, Gavin (1953). "The German Attack Opens", Official Histories — Second World War Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria. Canberra: Australian War Memorial.
- Macdougall, A.K (2004). Australians ar War A Pictorial History. The Five Mile Press. ISBN 1-86503-865-2.
- McClymont, W.G. (1959). "The Misunderstanding about the Aliakmon Line", To Greece. Wellington: Historical Publications Branch Part of: The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945.
- More U-boat Aces Hunted down (Sunday, March 16, 1941). Chronology of World War II. OnWar.Com. Retrieved on October 6, 2006.
- Papagos, Alexandros (1949). The Battle of Greece 1940-1941 (in Greek). Athens: J. M. Scazikis Alpha.
- Riefenstahl, Leni, Leni Riefenstahl: A Memoir. (Picador New York, USA. 1987) ISBN 0-312-11926-7
- Smith, A.C. (1953). Historical Study: The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring 1941) [Dept of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-261]. Department of the Army. ASIN B000FH2RQ8.
- The Roof is Leaking. Australia's Wars 1939-1945. Australian Department of Veterans' Affairs. Retrieved on October 9, 2006.
- Air Marshal Sir John D'Albiac. Air of Authority - A History of RAF Organisation. Retrieved on March 31, 2007.
- Vick, Alan (1995). "The German Airborne Assault on Greece", Snakes in the Eagle's Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases. Rand Corporation. ISBN 0-833-01629-6.
- Ziemke, Earl F.. Balkan Campaigns. World War II Commemoration. Retrieved on April 4, 2007.
[edit] Further reading
- Alexander, Bevin (2001). How Hitler Could Have Won World War II: The Fatal Errors That Led to Nazi Defeat. Three Rivers Press; Reprint edition. ISBN 0-609-80844-3.
- Cervi, Mario 1972,The Hollow Legions Chatto and Windus London. ISBN 0-7011-1351-0.
- Harokopos, George. The Fortress Crete, subtitled on cover '1941-1944' and within 'The Secret War 1941-1944' and 'Espionage and Counter-Espionage in Occupied Crete', Seagull Publications. Greek paperback edition/English translation: B. Giannikos & Co., Athens, 1993. Translation and comments by Spilios Menounos. Pbk ISBN 960-7296-35-4
- Hellenic Army General Staff (1997). An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, 1940-1941 (Land Operations). Athens: Army History Directorate Editions. No ISBN available OCLC 45409635.
- Mazower, Mark (2001). Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941-44. Yale University Press; New Ed edition. ISBN 0-300-08923-6.
- Papagos, Alexander, The Battle of Greece 1940–1941, J.M. Scazikis “Alpha”, editions Athens. 1949 ASIN B0007J4DRU.
- Rigopoulos, Rigas (2003). Secret War: Greece-Middle East 1940-1945: The Events Surrounding the Story of Service 5-16-5. Turner Publishing Company. ISBN 1-56311-886-6.
- Shores, Christopher (1992). Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete 1940-1941. Grub Street. ISBN 0-948817-07-0.
- Stassinopoulos, Costas, Modern Greeks: Greece in World War II: The German Occupation and National Resistance and Civil War, American Hellenic Institute Foundation, Inc. 2005 ISBN 1-889247-01-4
- Willingham, Mathew (2005). Perilous Commitments: The Battle for Greece and Crete 1940-1941. Spellmount Publishers. ISBN 1-86227-236-0.
- Zotos, Stephanos (1967). Greece:The Struggle For Freedom. ASIN B0006BRA38.
[edit] See also
- Military history of Germany during World War II
- Military history of Italy during World War II
- Military history of Bulgaria during World War II
- Military history of Greece during World War II
- Military history of Britain during World War II
- Axis occupation of Greece during World War II