Maginot Line
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Maginot Line | |
---|---|
Eastern France | |
![]() The entrance to Ouvrage Schoenenbourg along the Maginot Line in Alsace. |
|
Type | Defensive line |
Built | 1930–40 |
Construction materials |
Concrete, steel |
In use | 1935–69 |
Controlled by | France |
Battles/wars | Battle of France |
The Maginot Line (IPA: [maʒi'noː], named after French minister of defence André Maginot) was a line of concrete fortifications, tank obstacles, machine gun posts and other defenses which France constructed along its borders with Germany and with Italy, in the light of experience from World War I, and in the run-up to World War II. Generally the term describes either the entire system or just the defences facing Germany while the Alpine Line is used for the Franco-Italian defences. The French believed the fortification would provide time for their army to mobilize in the event of attack. The success of static, defensive combat in World War I was a key influence on French thinking. The fortification system utterly failed to contain the Germans in World War II, and the term is sometimes used today to describe any comically ineffective protection.
Contents |
[edit] Planning and construction
The defenses were first proposed by Marshal Joffre. He was opposed by modernists such as Paul Reynaud and Charles de Gaulle who favoured investment in armour and aircraft. Joffre had support from Henri Philippe Pétain and there were a number of reports and commissions organised by the government. It was André Maginot who finally convinced the government to invest in the scheme. Maginot was another veteran of WW I who became France's Minister of Veteran Affairs and then Minister of War (1928–1931).
The line was built in a number of phases from 1930 by the STG (Service Technique du Génie) overseen by CORF (Commission d'Organisation des Régions Fortifiées). The main construction was largely completed by 1939 at a cost of around 3 billion French francs.
The line stretched from Switzerland to Luxembourg, although a much lighter extension was extended to the channel after 1934. This lighter extension whilst allocated funds never established anything like the capabilities of the earlier construction partially because the CORF had been disbanded and construction was in the hands of local commanders. The original line construction did not cover the area chosen for its first challenge which was through the Ardennes by the Germans in 1940, a plan known as Fall Gelb. The location of this attack, probably because of the Maginot line, was through the Belgian Ardennes forest (sector 4) which is off the map to the left of Maginot line sector 6 (as marked).
[edit] Purposes of the line
The Maginot Line was built to fulfill several purposes:
- To avoid a surprise attack and to give alarm.
- To cover the mobilization of the French Army (which took between 2 and 3 weeks).
- To be used as a basis for a counter-offensive.
- To push the enemy to circumvent it while passing by Switzerland or Belgium.
[edit] Organization of the line
Although the name of the fortification suggests a simple linear organization, from front to rear the Line varies between 20 to 25 kilometers, with a variety of structures of alarm, resistance, combat, support and infrastructure. These various structures reinforce a line of principal resistance, made up of the most solid and strongly armed ouvrages.
From the front and proceeding to the rear, the line is composed of:
- Border posts (1): blockhouses often camouflaged in inoffensive residences (strong houses), from a few meters of the border, intended to give alarm in the event of abrupt attack as well as delay enemy tanks with prepared explosives and barricades.
- Approximately 5 kilometers behind the border, a line of points of support and outposts (2) consisting of anti-tank blockhouses able to provide resistance and delay the enemy in order to allow the crews of the ouvrages C.O.R.F. to be ready at their stations of combat. These outposts cover major passage along a principal line.
- 10 kilometers behind the border, the principal line of resistance (3) began, preceded by anti-tank obstacles; rails planted vertically in 6 rows with heights varying from 0.70 to 1.40 m and buried to a depth of two meters. This anti-tank obstacle extended from end to end in front of the works across hundreds of kilometers, interrupted only by extremely dense forests, rivers, or difficult terrain.
- The anti-tank obstacle is immediately followed by an anti-personnel obstacle made primarily of very dense barbed wire. Anti-tank road barriers also make it made it possible to block roads at necessary points of passage through the tank obstacles.
- Casemates of infantry (4), armed with twinnings of machine-guns (called JM in french) and anti-tank guns of 37 or 47 mm. They can be simple (only one shooting room, in only one direction) or double (two shooting rooms, in 2 opposite directions), they generally have 2 floors, a level of combat and a lower floor of rest and services (power generating units, reserves of water, fuel, food, ventilation, etc…). The casemates of infantry are surmounted by 1 or 2 cupolas of guettor (cloches GFM), sometimes of machine-guns cupola or observatories. Their crew are 20 to 30 men.
- Throughout, the line of the casemates was reinforced by more important works, known as petits ouvrages (5) (small works of infantry), generally made up of several casemates of infantry connected by underground galleries on which housing and service were grafted (quartering, power station, systems of ventilation, transmissions, kitchens, medical, reserves of water, fuel, food, etc…). Their crew consisted of between 100 and 200 men.
- The ouvrages (6) (great works of artillery) represented the pillars of the strengthened system. They were the most important works, the most solidly built and the most strongly armed. They were composed of at least six blocks of combat and two entrances, interconnected via a network of underground galleries which were often equipped with narrow gauge electric railways. The various blocks contained necessary infrastructure such as power stations with generating units, independent systems of ventilation, troop quartering, kitchens, feeder systems and distribution of water, hoists, ammunition stores, spare parts, food, workshops, etc… Their crew can range from 500 to more than 1000 men.
- On the hills profiting of best view, observatories (7) are established whose mission consists in locating the enemy objectives and to direct the shootings of artillery of the works. They are large blocks firmly concreted, buried, equipped with armoured cupolas of optical instruments of high precision and connected by telephone and T.S.F (Wireless transmission) to the ouvrages on which it depends.
- Every works of the strengthened system, insulated casemates, small and great works, observatories and shelters were connected by a telephone network (8). Two by-pass parallel with the line of the works, many transversals and a multitude of concreted rooms of cut (in which the troops of countryside could connect) constitute this network.
- Between 500 and 1000 meters behind of the principal line of resistance were shelters of interval (9) (or shelters for local reserves). They are true barracks under concrete which can shelter to a company of infantry, that means 200 to 250 men, and having technical installations such as power generating units, systems of ventilation, water supply, kitchens, heating, allowing them a certain autonomy. They can also be used as headquarters and basic starting for operations of counter-attack.
- Certain natural basins or rivers can be arranged in zones of flood (10) and thus constitute an additional obstacle in the event of enemy offensive.
- quarterings of safety (11) were built near the ouvrages in order to make possible to the crews to reach their stations of combat within the shortest time in the event of abrupt attack in time of peace.
- deposits of material (12).
- ammunitions dumps (13).
- A network of railways of 60 cm (14) developed on more than 50 kilometers connecting these deposits to the great ouvrages. Armoured power trolleys with gasoline (as the engines with vapor of 1914-18) tractor draw special platforms with ammunitions.
- A network of high-voltage lines (15), initially air then buried, connected on the civil network, feeds the rough ouvrages in electric power.
- To supplement artillery of the ouvrages whose range was intentionally limited to 10-12 kilometers, of the heavy artillery (16) positions on railways were established.
[edit] Inventory
[edit] Ouvrages
There are 142 ouvrages, 352 casemates, 78 shelters, 17 observatories and 5,000 blockhouses over all the Maginot Line.
[edit] Armoured cloches
There are several kinds of armoured cloches. The word cloche is a French term meaning bell due to its shape. All cloches were made in an alloy steel.
- The most widespread are the cloches GFM, where GFM means Guettor - Rifle machine-gun. They are composed of 3 to 4 opens, called crenels. These crenels are next equipped by differents hoppers: Rifle machine-gun, direct vision block, binoculars block or mortar of 50 mm. Sometimes, the cloche is topped by a periscope. There are 1,118 cloches GFM on all the line. Almost every block, casemate and shelter is topped by one or two cloches GFM.
- The cloches JM are the same as the cloches GFM except that they have one opening equipped with a pair of machine-guns. There are 174 cloches JM on all the line.
- The cloches AM (Mixed weapons) are 72 on the line and are equipped with a pair of machine guns and a 25mm anti-tank gun. Some cloches GFM were transformed into cloche AM in 1934. (The aforementioned total does not include these modified cloches.)
- The cloches LG (grenades launcher) are 75 on the line. Those cloches are almost completely covered by concrete, only a hole is kept open to launch the grenades.
- The cloches VP (periscopic vision) are 20 on all the line. Those cloches could be equipped with several different periscopes. Like the cloches LG, they were almost completly covered by concrete.
- The cloches VDP (direct and periscopic vision) are similar to the cloches VP, but have 2 or 3 openings to provide a direct view. Consequently, they were not covered by concrete.
[edit] Eclipsable turrets
There is the inventory of turrets.
- 21 turrets of 75 mm model 1933
- 12 turrets of 75 mm model 1932
- 1 turret of 75 mm model 1905
- 17 turrets of 135 mm
- 21 turrets of 81 mm
- 12 turrets for mixed weapons (AM)
- 7 turrets for mixed weapons + mortar of 50 mm
- 61 turrets of machine-guns
[edit] Artillery
75 mm under casemate: It was the most popular canon on the line.
[edit] Anti-tank guns
[edit] Features
The specification of the defences was very high, with extensive and interconnected bunker complexes for thousands of men; there were 45 main forts (grands ouvrages) at 15 kilometres intervals, 97 smaller forts (petits ouvrages) and 352 casements between, with over 100 kilometres of tunnels. The fortifications did not extend through the Ardennes Forest (which was believed to be impénétrable ("impassable")) or along the border with Belgium because the countries had signed an alliance in 1920, by which the French army would operate in Belgium if the German forces invaded. When Belgium abrogated the treaty in 1936 and declared neutrality, the Maginot Line was quickly extended along the Franco-Belgian border, but not to the standard of the rest of the Line. As the water table in this region was high, there was the danger of underground passages getting flooded, which the designers of the line knew would be difficult and expensive to overcome.
There was a final flurry of construction in 1939–1940 with general improvements all along the Line. The final Line was strongest around the industrial regions of Metz, Lauter and Alsace, while other areas were in comparison only weakly guarded. In contrast, the propaganda about the line made it appear far greater a construction than it was; illustrations showed multiple stories of interwoven passages, and even underground railyards and cinemas. This reassured allied civilians.
[edit] German invasion
The World War II German invasion plan of 1940 (Sichelschnitt) was designed to deal with the Line. A decoy force sat opposite the Line while a second Army Group cut through the Low Countries of Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as through the Ardennes Forest which lay north of the main French defences. Thus the Germans were able to avoid assaulting the Maginot Line directly. Attacking on May 10, German forces were well into France within five days and they continued to advance until May 24, when they stopped near Dunkirk. On June 14, 1940, the day Paris fell, the German 1st Army went over to the offensive in "Operation Tiger” and attacked the Maginot Line between St. Avoid and Saarbrücken achieving penetrations in several locations.[1] By early June the German forces had cut off the Line from the rest of France and the French government was making overtures for an armistice, which was signed on June 22 in Compiègne. But the Line was still mostly intact and manned with a number of commanders wanting to hold out; and the Italian advance had been successfully contained. Still, Maxime Weygand signed the surrender and the army was ordered out of their fortifications, to be taken to POW camps.
[edit] End of the war
When the Allied forces invaded in June 1944 the Line, now held by German defenders, was again largely bypassed, with fighting only touching a part of the fortifications near Metz and in northern Alsace towards the end of 1944.
[edit] The Line after WWII
After the war the Line was re-manned by the French and underwent some modifications. However when France withdrew from NATO's military component (in 1966) much of the Line was abandoned. With the rise of the French independent nuclear deterrent by 1969 the Line was largely given up by the government, with sections auctioned off to the public and the rest of it left to decay.
[edit] The Legacy of the Line
Generally considered one of the great failures of military history, the term "Maginot Line" is now sometimes used as a metaphor for something that is confidently relied upon though ending up being ineffective. It could be argued that this association is inaccurate, as the Line achieved the specific task it was intended to do, rendering a direct assault against France's eastern border impossible (the few Maginot forts which were directly attacked by German armored troops held very well). It would be more truthful to state that the Line was sound, but France's strategic use of it was poor. As originally envisaged, the Maginot Line was only part of a larger defense plan, in which the Line was to provide coordinated backup to resistance from the French Army. But execution of the plan was lax and this, combined with a failure to appreciate that the frustration of one particular approach would not necessarily render an aggressor impotent, cost both the Line and the French Army their effectiveness. In some sense, French authorities came to believe their own propaganda: that the mere existence of the Line rendered them impervious to invasion.[citation needed]
[edit] See also
- List of all works on Maginot Line (Under Construction)
- cloche GFM
- Siegfried Line
- Atlantic Wall
- Czechoslovak border fortifications
[edit] Notes and references
- ^ Ralph Chelminski. Maginot Line 1940: German Failure. "The Maginot Line". Retrieved on 2007-01-12.