Asymmetric warfare
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Asymmetric warfare originally referred to war between two or more actors, or groups of actors, whose relative power differed by a significant amount (David small, Goliath big). Contemporary military thinkers tend to broaden this original meaning to include asymmetry of strategy or tactics (David, "sling" and mobility; Goliath, "heavy sword/armor" and firepower) so today, "asymmetric warfare" describes a military situation in which two belligerents of unequal power interact and attempt to take advantage of their opponents' weaknesses. This interaction often involves strategies and tactics outside the bounds of conventional warfare.[1]. The core idea is that "weaker" combatants will attempt to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality.
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[edit] History
Typically at least one of the parties involved may be referred to as partisans. Partisan comes from the Tuscan word, "partigiano", meaning a member of a party of light or irregular troops engaged in harassing an enemy, esp. a member of a guerrilla band engaged in fighting or sabotage against an occupying army.[2]
The first known wide usage of asymmetric war was by Parthians, who freed Iran from Seleucid rule (remaining from Alexander's invasion) and continued the same techniques against Romans and other invaders from the North of the empire.
[edit] Strategic basis
Usually in warfare at the start of the conflict, the belligerents deploy forces of a similar type and the outcome of the war can be determined by the quality and quantity of the opposing forces. Unless one side calculates that the cost of war is offset by advantages to be gained, there is no point in going to war, otherwise one would assume that the potential belligerents will either be deterred from war or will agree to terms without resorting to warfare.
Often when the belligerents deploy forces of a similar type the outcome of a battle and a campaign can be determined by the side which has a slight numerical advantage or slightly better command and control of their forces. There are times where this is not true because the two belligerents have developed strategies which makes it impossible for either side to bring forces to bear against the other. An example of this is the stand off between the continental land forces of French army and the maritime forces of the United Kingdom's Royal Navy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In the words of Admiral Jervis during Campaigns of 1801, "I do not say, my Lords, that the French will not come. I say only they will not come by sea".
[edit] Tactical basis
The tactical success of asymmetric warfare is dependent on at least some of the following assumptions:
- One side can have a technological advantage which outweighs the numerical advantage of the enemy. The advantage may be the other way around. For example, the vast numerical superiority of the Chinese forces during their initial involvement in the Korean War overwhelmed the technological superiority of the United Nations forces.
- Training and tactics as well as technology can prove decisive and allow a smaller force to overcome forces much larger than they are. For example, for several centuries the Greek hoplite's (heavy infantry) use of phalanx was far superior to that of any enemies they encountered. The Battle of Thermopylae, which also involved good use of terrain, is a well known example.
- If the inferior power is in a position of self-defense; i.e., under attack or occupation, it may be possible to use unconventional tactics, such as hit-and-run and selective battles where the superior power is weaker, as an effective means of harassment without violating the Laws of war. This tactic can sometimes be used to play on the inward political situations of a nation, its citizen's patience with the war, and their demonstration.
- If the inferior power is in an aggressive position, however, and/or turns to tactics prohibited by the laws of war (jus in bello), its success depends on the superior power's refraining from like tactics. For example, the Law of land warfare prohibits the use of a flag of truce or clearly-marked medical vehicles as cover for an attack or ambush, but an asymmetric combatant using this prohibited tactic depends on the superior power's obedience to the corresponding law. Similarly, laws of warfare prohibit combatants from using civilian settlements, populations or facilities as military bases, but when an inferior power uses this tactic, it depends on the premise that the superior power will respect the law that they are violating, and will not attack that civilian target, or if they do the propaganda advantage will outweigh the material loss.
[edit] The use of terrain in asymmetric warfare
Terrain can be used as a force multiplier by the smaller force and as a force inhibitor against the larger force. Such terrain is called difficult terrain.
The contour of the land is an aid to the army; sizing up opponents to determine victory, assessing dangers and distances… those who do battle without knowing these will lose. ― Sun Tzu, The Art of War
Tactics usually attributed to Guerrilla warfare are often used in asymmetrical warfare by the smaller side. In both cases, the forces may rely on a friendly population to provide supplies and intelligence and difficult terrain for cover and escape. The population and terrain are often well-known to native forces, who can use both to escape reprisal from conventional armies and supply themselves to continue their operations. The use of asymmetrical tactics by outside forces often requires extensive reconnaissance to make use of terrain characteristics.
Minority forces often operate in regions providing plenty of cover and concealment, especially heavily forested and mountainous areas. This tactic takes advantage of the relative immobility of a larger army in such terrain. In urban areas they will blend into the population and are often dependent on a support base among the people to hide their where-abouts.
The guerrillas must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea. ― Mao Zedong.
For a detailed description of the advantages for the weaker force in the use of built-up areas when engaging in asymmetric warfare, see the article on urban warfare.
[edit] War by proxy
Where asymmetric warfare is carried out (generally covertly) by allegedly non-governmental actors who are connected to or sympathetic to a particular nation's (the "state actor's") interest, it may be deemed war by proxy. This is typically done to give deniability to the state actor. The deniability can be important to keep the state actor from being tainted by the actions, to allow the state actor to negotiate in apparent good faith by claiming they are not responsible for the actions of parties who are merely sympathizers, or to avoid being accused of belligerent actions or war crimes.
[edit] Asymmetric warfare and terrorism
In the light of present events two different opinions have been formed.
One view is that asymmetric warfare is synonymous with terrorism. Terrorism is sometimes used as a tactic by the weaker side in an asymmetric conflict. Asymmetric warfare is sometimes called terrorism by those wishing to deny the political aims of their weaker opponents and to exploit the pejorative connotations of the word. Likewise, occupying powers often label partisans "terrorists" as part of propaganda campaigns to maintain support in the occupying power's home country, and to win over the occupied people so as to cut off the partisans' principal support base. This is the root of the phrase "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."
The other view is that asymmetric warfare is not synonymous with terrorism, even though terrorism is sometimes used as a tactic by the weaker side. It is typical, in an asymmetric conflict, for the stronger side to accuse the weaker side as being bandits, pillagers or terrorists. These accusations are usually part of propaganda campaigns, although they are sometimes true. In fact we could say that terrorism is more likely to be synonymous with war itself, as causing fear to the enemy is always an advantage, whether this means simply banging your shield and yelling or killing thousands of civilians.
One example of asymmetric warfare involving terrorism is the use of terrorism by the much lesser Mongol forces in the creation and control of the Mongol empire. The other is the use of terrorism by the superior Nazi forces in the Balkans, in their attempt to suppress the resistance movement.
[edit] Examples of asymmetric warfare
[edit] 20th century asymmetric warfare
[edit] Second Boer War
The Second Boer War was the first major war of the 20th century and one in which asymmetric warfare featured prominently. After an initial phase, which was fought by both sides as a conventional war, the British captured Johannesburg, the Boers' largest city, and captured the capitals of the two Boer Republics. The British then expected the Boers to accept peace as dictated by the victors in the traditional European way. Instead of capitulating the Boers fought a protracted guerrilla war. Between twenty and thirty thousand Boer commandos were only defeated after the British brought to bear four hundred and fifty thousand troops, about ten times as many as were used in the conventional phase of the war. During this phase the British introduced internment in concentration camps for the Boer civilian population and also implemented a scorched earth policy. Later, the British began using blockhouses built within machine gun range of one another and flanked by barbed wire to slow the Boers' movement across the countryside and block paths to valuable targets. Such tactics eventually evolved into today's counter insurgency tactics.
The Boer commando raids deep into the Cape Colony, which were organized and commanded by Jan Smuts, resonated throughout the century as the British adopted and adapted for later use the tactics used by the Boer commandos.
[edit] World War I
- Lawrence of Arabia and British support for the Arab uprising against the Ottoman Empire.
[edit] Post-World War I
- Abd-el-Krim resistance from 1920 to 1924 against a ten-times stronger French and Spanish army, led by General Petain.
- TIGR, the first antifascist national-defensive organization in Europe, was fighting against Mussolini's regime in the North-East Italy.
[edit] World War II
- Winter War - Finland vs Soviet Union
[edit] British
- British Commandos and European coastal raids. German countermeasures and the notorious Commando Order.
- Long Range Desert Group and the SAS in Africa and later in Europe.
- South East Asian Theatre: Wingate and Chindits. Force 136, V Force
- Special Operations Executive (SOE)
[edit] United States
- Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
- China Burma India Theatre: Merrill's Marauders and OSS Detachment 101
[edit] Post World War 2
- United States Military Assistance Command Studies and Observations Group (US MAC-V SOG in Viet-Nam
- United States support of the Nicaraguan Contras
[edit] Cold War
The end of World War II established the two most powerful victors, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or just the Soviet Union) as the two dominant world superpowers.
[edit] Cold War examples of proxy wars
- See also proxy war
An example of war by proxy was East Germany's covert support for the Red Army Faction (RAF) which was active from 1968 and carried out a succession of terrorist attacks in West Germany during the 1970s and to a lesser extent in the 1980s. After German reunification in 1990, it was discovered that the RAF had received financial and logistic support from the Stasi, the security and intelligence organization of East Germany. It had also given several RAF terrorists shelter and new identities. It had not been in the interests of either the RAF or the East Germans to be seen as co-operating. The apologists for the RAF argued that they were striving for a true socialist (communist) society not the sort that existed in Eastern Europe. The East German government was involved in Ostpolitik, and it was not in its interest to be caught overtly aiding a terrorist organization operating in West Germany. For more details see the History of Germany since 1945.
In the Korean War the Soviet Union aided the Communists in North Korea and China against the United Nations forces led by the United States, but the Soviet Union did not enter the war directly.
In the Vietnam War the Soviet Union supplied North Vietnam and the Viet Cong with training, logistics and materiel but unlike the United States Armed Forces they fought the war through their proxies and did not enter the conflict directly.
The war between the mujahadeen and the Red Army during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a classic asymmetric war. The aid given by the U.S. to the mujahadeen during the war was only covert at the tactical level, the Reagan Administration was only too pleased to be able to tell the world that it was helping the freedom-loving people of Afghanistan. Of all the proxy wars fought by the USA against the USSR during the Cold War this was the most cost effective and politically successful, as it was the USSR's most humiliating military defeat, and that defeat was a contributing factor to the implosion of the Soviet Union.
[edit] Post Cold War
In the rivalry that arose during the Cold War, small powers, especially those described as composing the Third World, were able to seek protection from one power or the other, or play the powers off against each other, to try to achieve their own national or regional goals.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, powers that had been client states of the Soviet Union, states that were able to gain aid and support from the United States as "bulwarks" against Soviet power, and states that had successfully played the superpowers against each other, found themselves with fewer options to defy US influence or gain material advantages from either of the former rivals.
[edit] 21st century
[edit] Israel/Palestinians
The example of the Israelis and Palestinians is a classic case of asymmetrical warfare. Although Palestinians do not have a regular army, militant organizations (such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad) with small arms (such as Qassam rockets) attack Israeli targets, both civilian and military. On the other side of the conflict, Israel has a strong conventional army, also attacking both civilian and military targets, but the Palestinian forces use asymmetric tactics, in particular putting their forces among civilians, to prevent Israel from responding with conventional forces and tactics. Instead, Israel makes use of counter insurgency tactics, including relocation, curfews and blockades.
The recent 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict featured heavy use of Katyusha rockets by Hizbullah to similar effect.
[edit] Iraq
The ease of victory by the U.S. led coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, demonstrated that training, tactics and technology can still provide one sided victories in the field in conventional wars. After Saddam Hussein's regime was removed from power and the 2003 Occupation of Iraq began, the Iraq campaign moved into a different type of asymmetric warfare where the coalition's use of superior conventional warfare training, tactics and technology were of much less use against continued opposition from Iraq's various insurgent groups. In fact, the Iraqi insurgents have become increasingly sophisticated, with fatal results for Iraqi civilians and coalition troops, and have established control dominance over the Al Anbar Governorate.[3][4][5]
[edit] Al-Qaeda
In the last two decades of the 20th century, along with the globalisation of the world economy, and to a lesser extent a world popular culture, came the perception of a new phenomenon: a new organisational dynamic among Jihadists which was not organised along tribal, regional or national lines, but saw them organised internationally under the banner of an international Muslim jihad, conducted by extremists who were otherwise unrelated. Among such organisations, the multi-national presence of Al-Qaeda has become most prominent, allegedly responsible for carrying out the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and many other terrorist attacks worldwide. According to some sources, this organisation is headquartered in Pakistan, but has members and operatives in many countries.
The argument is put forward that this form of organisation allows Al-Qaeda (and analogous groups) to carry out their form of asymmetric warfare (as they see it) more safely, as it prevents an aggrieved nation from launching an overt military attack upon another nation harbouring Al-Qaeda members, since a nation can argue that Al-Qaeda might be within its borders but is an independent organisation which the government does not support, whether or not the government sympathizes with their cause.
The counter-argument to this states that Al-Qaeda members and other international resistant groups do not exist in "disembodied space" or in international territory (i.e., the open seas, as pirates were claimed to do), but within the borders of a sovereign state, which is responsible for the capture or expulsion of members of such groups, and failure of a state to do this is tantamount to laying themselves open for aggrieved nations to attack them. Under this argument, the state of Pakistan, which refuses to allow US troops inside its territory, can be seen as a practical case in point.
However, there is some debate as to whether this qualifies as asymmetric warfare, as Al-Qaeda and other such organisations, which are not sovereign nations, are not legal combatants under the laws of war. They can therefore be more accurately seen as an international non-governmental paramilitary force, not subject to a command structure as a regular military force is, and (being united as an organisation purely as a result of their religious beliefs) not affiliated with any specific nation's interests or doctrine. They could, however, be seen as an entity separate from issues of government and sovereignty, against which a nation could legitimately wage a war.
[edit] See also
- Fourth generation warfare
- Counter-terrorism
- Khobar Towers bombing
- Low-intensity operations
- Military use of children
- USS Cole bombing
- List of guerrillas
- Management of Savagery
[edit] Notes and references
[edit] General references
- Robert B. Asprey, "War in the Shadows, The Guerilla in History", William Morrow, 1994, ISBN 0-688-12815-7, 1279 pages. Authoritative survey from Darius the Great to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
- Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", The Atlantic Monthly, 1994?.
- Barbara Tuchman, "The Proud Tower, Europe 1880–1914" re: anarchist assassins.
- UN reports on use of child soldiers as assassins.
- General Sir Rupert Smith, "The Utility of Force: The art of war in the modern world", Allen Lane, 2006.
- Sun Tzu 6.
- Mackey, Robert R. (2004). The UnCivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861–1865. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN 0-8061-3624-3. Asymmetric warfare as practiced by the Confederate States in the American Civil War. Includes detailed information of U.S. Army counter-irregular operations as well as CSA irregulars.
[edit] Specific notes and references
- ^ ie. it may involve unconventional warfare
- ^ definion
- ^ Iraq Casualties at Global Security.
- ^ The Washington Post.
- ^ MS NBC.
[edit] Further reading
Bibliographies
- Compiled by Joan T. Phillips Bibliographer at Air University Library: A Bibliography of Asymmetric Warfare, August 2005. Includes this definition: Asymmetric warfare includes "threats outside the range of conventional warfare and difficult to respond to in kind (e.g., a suicide bomber)" ― Dictionary of Military Terms.
- Asymmetric Warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Debate sponsored by the Project on Defense Alternatives
Books
- Arreguin-Toft, Ivan, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, New York & Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005 ISBN 0-521-54869-1
- Barnett, Roger W., Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power, Washington D.C., Brassey's, 2003 ISBN 1-57488-563-4
- Bing, Stanley, Sun Tzu Was a Sissy: Conquer Your Enemies, Promote Your Friends, and Wage the Real Art of War, New York, HarperCollins, 2004 ISBN 0-06-073477-9
- Friedman, George, America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle between the United States and Its Enemies, London, Little, Brown, 2004 ISBN 0-316-72862-4
- Giap, Vo Nguyen, People's War, People's Army, Honolulu, University Press of the Pacific, 2001 ISBN 0-89875-371-6
- Guevara, Ernesto "Che", Guerrilla Warfare, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1998 ISBN 0-8032-7075-5
- Kaplan, Robert D., Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, New York, Vintage, 2003 ISBN 0-375-72627-6
- Jon Latimer, Burma: The Forgotten War, London: John Murray, 2004 ISBN 0-7195-6576-6
- Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America, Panama City, Pan American Publishing Company, 2002 ISBN 0-9716807-2-8
- Metz, Steven and Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, Carlisle Barracks, Strategic Studies Institute/U.S. Army War College, 2001 ISBN 1-58487-041-9 [1]
- Poole, H. John, Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods, Emerald Isle, NC, Posterity Press, 2004 ISBN 0-9638695-7-4
- Sun Tzu, The Art of War, New York, Dover Publications, 2002 ISBN 0-486-42557-6
- Tse-Tung, Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, Champaign, IL, University of Illinois Press, 2000 ISBN 0-252-06892-0
Articles and papers
- Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict", International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 93–128.
- J. Paul Dunne, et al., "Managing Asymmetric Conflict," Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 58 (2006), pp. 183–208.
- C. A. "Bert" Fowler Asymmetric Warfare: A Primer -- IEEE Spectrum, March, 2006. A mathematical approach to the concept.
- Marcus Corbin Reshaping the Military for Asymmetric Warfare CDI website October 5, 2001.
- Vincent J. Goulding, Jr. Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare From Parameters, Winter 2000–01, pp. 21–30.
- Andrew J.R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict", World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175–200.
- Montgomery C. Meigs Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare (PDF)
- Richard Norton-Taylor Asymmetric Warfare: Military Planners Are Only Beginning to Grasp the Implications of September 11 for Future Deterrence Strategy, in The Guardian, October 3, 2001
- Michael Novak, "Asymmetrical Warfare" & Just War: A Moral Obligation in NRO, February 10, 2003
- Jonathan B. Tucker Asymmetric Warfare, a 6 page analysis, Summer 1999.
- Asymmetry and other fables, Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 August 2006
