Battle of Britain

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Battle of Britain
Part of World War II
Heinkel He 111 over London, 7 September 1940
Date July, 1940 – May, 1941 Location United Kingdom airspace, mostly over southern England Result British victory
Combatants
United Kingdom Including combatants from:[1] Poland New Zealand Canada Czechoslovakia Belgium Australia South Africa France Ireland United States Jamaica Palestine Rhodesia	Germany Including combatants from Italy
Commanders
Hugh Dowding	Hermann Göring
Strength
754 single-seat fighters 149 two-seat fighters 560 bombers 500 coastal 1,963 total[2]	1,107 single-seat fighters 357 two-seat fighters 1,380 bombers 428 dive-bombers 569 reconnaissance 233 coastal 4,074 total[3]
Casualties
1,023 fighters 524 bombers 1,547 total[4] 27,450 civilians dead, 32,138 wounded	873 fighters 1,014 bombers 1,887 total[4]

Western Front (World War II)
France - The Netherlands - Dunkirk - Britain - Dieppe - Villefranche-de-Rouergue - Normandy - Dragoon - Siegfried Line - Market Garden - Aintree - Scheldt - Hurtgen Forest - Aachen - Bulge - Colmar Pocket - Plunder

Battle of Britain is the name commonly given to the attempt by the German Luftwaffe to gain air superiority over the Royal Air Force (RAF), before a planned sea and airborne invasion of Britain (Operation SEELÖWE {Sealion}) during World War II. Neither Hitler nor the Wehrmacht believed it possible to carry out a successful amphibious assault on the British Isles until the RAF had been neutralised. Secondary objectives were to destroy aircraft production and ground infrastructure, to attack areas of political significance, and to terrorise the British people with the intent of intimidating them into seeking an armistice or surrender.

British historians generally date the battle from 9 July to 31 October 1940, which represented the most intense period of daylight air raiding. German historians usually place the beginning of the battle in mid-August 1940 and end it in May 1941, on the withdrawal of the bomber units in preparation for the attack on the USSR. The failure of Nazi Germany to destroy Britain's air forces to allow for an invasion or to break the spirit of either the British government or people is widely considered the Third Reich's first major defeat.

Some historians have argued no invasion could have succeeded; given the massive superiority of the Royal Navy over the Kriegsmarine, SEELÖWE would have been a disaster. They argue the Luftwaffe would have been unable to prevent decisive intervention by RN cruisers and destroyers, even with air superiority.^[5]

The Battle of Britain was the first major battle to be fought entirely by air forces. It was the largest and most sustained bombing campaign yet attempted and the first real test of the strategic bombing theories developed since the previous World War.

Contents 1 Background 2 The opposing forces 2.1 The aircraft 2.2 The men 2.3 The tactics in the air 3 Luftwaffe strategy 3.1 Tactics 3.2 Intelligence 3.3 Navigational aids 4 RAF Strategy 4.1 The Dowding System 4.1.1 Groups 4.1.2 Sectors 4.1.3 Limitations 4.1.4 Efficiency 4.1.5 Effect of signals intelligence 4.2 Tactics 4.3 The Bomber and Coastal Command contributions 5 Phases of the Battle 5.1 Kanalkampf 5.2 Adlerangriff 5.3 Luftwaffe targets RAF airfields 5.4 Raids on British Cities 6 Aftermath 7 Foreign contribution 8 References 9 Bibliography 10 See also 11 External links

Background

Luftwaffe attacks on Britain began on 16 October 1939 when Junkers Ju 88s attacked British warships at Rosyth on the Firth of Forth. Spitfires of No. 602 and No. 603 Squadrons succeeded in shooting down two Ju 88s and a Heinkel He 111 over the firth. In a raid on Scapa Flow the next day, one Ju 88 was downed by anti-aircraft fire, crashing on the island of Hoy. The first Luftwaffe plane to be shot down on the British mainland was a He 111 at Haddington, East Lothian, on 29 November, with both 602 and 603 Squadrons claiming this victory.^[6][7]

Following the British evacuation from Dunkirk (Operation DYNAMO) and the French surrender in June 1940, the Germans were uncertain what to do next on the military front. Hitler believed the war was practically over and that the British, defeated on the continent and without European allies, would quickly be forced to come to terms with Germany.^[8] Although there was a strand of British public and political sentiment favouring negotiated peace with a clearly ascendant Germany, among them the foreign secretary Lord Halifax, the recently-installed Prime Minister Winston Spencer-Churchill nonetheless refused to consider an armistice with the Nazis.^[9] Churchill's skillful use of rhetoric hardened public opinion against a peaceful resolution and prepared the British for a long war. Coining the general term for the upcoming battle, Churchill stated in a speech to the House of Commons on 18 June 1940:

What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, "This was their finest hour."

The British rejection of German terms was therefore emphatic. Recognising this - and in an effort to finish the war in the West - Hitler subsequently ordered the rapid preparation of an invasion plan against Britain on 16 July. Hitler hoped perhaps to frighten Britain into peace before an actual invasion was launched, and used the invasion preparations as a means to apply pressure. The plan was prepared by the OKW (Armed Forces High Command). The operation, code-named Seelöwe, was planned for mid-September 1940 and called for landings on the south coast of Great Britain, backed by an airborne assault. All preparations were to be made by mid-August.

The Kriegsmarine was reluctant to launch an invasion, and on 11 July, Admiral Raeder told Hitler invasion could only be contemplated as a last resort, and only then with full air superiority. The Kriegsmarine had a limited number of ships, while the Royal Navy had over 50 destroyers and dozens of cruisers and battleships in home waters. In the event of a seaborne invasion, the Home Fleet would sortee from their nearby bases and attack the invasion force, something the Kriegsmarine could do little to counter. The only way Germany would be able to prevent Royal Navy interference would be through the Luftwaffe, primarily with their dive bombers, but employing these effectively would require complete air superiority due to the bombers' vulnerability to attack. Nevertheless, Hitler was determined the invasion go ahead, and ordered all services to make preparations for an amphibious assault once air superiority had been achieved.

The opposing forces

In launching Operation Adlerangriff the Luftwaffe was facing an opponent the likes of which it had not met earlier in the war: a sizable, highly-coordinated, well-supplied air force, fielding aircraft that could match the German Bf 109E and Bf 110. The majority of the RAF's fighting would rest upon the workhorse Hurricane Mk I. More shocking to the German pilots was the newer Spitfire Mk I, which was quickly recognised as a nimble, world-class fighter. The fighters they had encountered thus far in the war did not, despite strong showings by their pilots, measure up to the performance of the Bf 109.

The aircraft

The Germans found the Bf 109E only marginally superior to the Hurricane, and the Spitfire was fully its equal. The Bf 109 had a slightly higher speed at altitude, better dive speed and a fuel injected engine (the Daimler-Benz DB 601) that allowed it to perform negative-G manoeuvres without the engine stalling. The Spitfire could manoeuvre slightly better and was faster at medium heights, although both the Hurricane and Spitfire lacked the ability to pull negative Gs without engine loss. The German fighter had a heavier armament in its two 20 mm MG FF cannons. This gave it a greater punch than the eight machine guns of the British fighters, but the low muzzle velocity of the cannons, where the shells dropped quite quickly after firing, meant that only good pilots could use them effectively in fighter duels. The British fighters had much more ammunition - offsetting the fact that many British pilots were not very good marksmen.

The Junkers Ju 87 was one of the planes found wanting during the Battle of Britain. It was slow, had to operate at low altitude to make its bombing runs and possessed inadequate defenses. Furthermore, it could not be effectively protected by fighters, due to its low speed and the very low altitudes at which it ended its dive bomb attacks.^[10] The Stuka depended on air superiority, the very thing that was contested over Britain. It was therefore withdrawn from attacks on Britain early in the campaign, leaving the Luftwaffe short of precision attack aircraft.

The Bf 110 was also a disappointment to the Germans, not because of inherent limitations in design, but because it was deployed in a role for which it was never intended.^[11] It was an excellent fighter-bomber and interceptor, having a higher speed than the Hurricane and about equal to the Spitfire, and a heavy armament capable of dealing with any enemy bomber. When used as a precision bomber, as done by Erprobungsgruppe 210, it proved very effective.^[12] It was still formidable as a high escort for bombers, when it could dive down upon the enemy, fire and then break contact.^[13] But as a fighter escort overall, its clumsiness and lack of manoeuvrability made it easy prey for British fighters. It was forced in this role, however, as the Bf 109 lacked the range necessary to escort bombers to targets beyond the south-east corner of England.

For the British, the main disappointment was the abysmal performance of their Boulton-Paul Defiant two seat fighters and Fairey Battle bombers. These aircraft, which before the war was expected to fill the bomber-killer and precision strike roles respectively, were found to be too vulnerable. The Battles suffered horrendous losses in France, and were eventually relegated to a reserve role, to take on the invasion fleet if it was ever launched. The Defiants were too cumbersome to tangle with the Bf 109s, and after suffering heavy losses in the early part of the battle, were reassigned as night-fighters. There has been some criticism of the decision to keep these flawed aircraft operational instead of retiring and scrapping them, allowing their Merlins to be turned over to fighters and their pilots (about three thousand in all) to be retrained on Hurricanes, thereby freeing large numbers of high-time, combat-experienced Hurricane pilots for Spitfires.^[14]

The men

The British had fewer experienced pilots at the start of the battle, and it was the lack of trained pilots rather than the lack of machines that became the greatest concern for Dowding. Drawing from regular RAF forces as well as the Auxiliary Air Force and the Volunteer Reserve, the British could muster some 1103 fighter pilots on 1 July. The selection processes of potential RAF candidates were more concerned with social standing than actual aptitude leading up to the war.^[15] Replacement pilots, with little actual flight training and no gunnery training whatsoever, suffered high casualty rates.^[16]

The Luftwaffe could muster a similar number of fighter pilots, 1126, but they were more experienced overall. Drawing from a cadre of Spanish Civil War veterans, they had comprehensive courses in aerial gunnery, as well as instructions in tactics that were suited for fighter versus fighter combat.^[17] The Luftwaffe fighter pilot manuals also discouraged heroism, stressing the utmost importance of attacking only when odds were in the pilot's favour. This rule could not be followed in close bomber escort duties though, as the fighter gave up tactical flexibility and the advantage of height.

The tactics in the air

In the early phases of the battle the RAF was hamstrung by its reliance on obsolete formations. These restricted squadrons to tight 12 aircraft formations composed of three-aircraft "sections" in tight "V's" ('vics'). With four sections flying together in tight formation, only the squadron leader at the front was free to actually watch for the enemy; the other pilots had to concentrate on him and each other, to keep station.^[18] RAF fighter training also emphasised by-the-book attacks by sections breaking away in sequence. Fighter Command recognised the weaknesses of this rigid structure early in the battle, but it was felt too risky to change tactics in the midst of the battle, as replacement pilots, often with only minimal actual flying time, could not be readily retrained^[19] and that the unexperienced pilots of RAF needed firm leadership in the air that only rigid formations provided.^[20] German pilots dubbed the RAF formations "Idiotenreihen" ("rows of idiots") because they left squadrons vulnerable to attack. Front line RAF pilots were acutely aware of the inherent deficiencies of their own tactics. A compromise was adopted whereby squadron formations used much looser formations with one or two aircraft flying independently above and behind (dubbed 'weavers') to provide increased observation and rear protection; these, often the least experienced men, were also often the first to die.^[21] After the battle, RAF pilots adopted a variant on the German formations with some success.

The Luftwaffe employed the looser and flexible four-ship Schwarm (two pairs, each consisting of a leader and a wingman) in an open formation. Each Schwarm in a Staffel flew staggered and with plenty of room in between them, making the formation difficult to spot at larger ranges and allowing for a great deal of flexibility.^[22] This formation was developed during the Spanish Civil War by Werner Mölders and other Luftwaffe pilots, based on principles dating to Boelcke in 1916. In the Luftwaffe formations, the basic pair, or Rotte, allowed the Rottenführer to concentrate on getting kills, while his wingman protected him and scanned for threats.^[23]

Luftwaffe strategy

The Luftwaffe was designed as a tactical weapon to support the Army on the battlefield. In Poland and France, the Luftwaffe had operated jointly with the Wehrmacht in its Blitzkrieg. In the Battle of Britain, however, the Luftwaffe had to operate alone, not as support for an advancing army but as a decisive weapon in its own right. This new role was something the Luftwaffe was unsuited for, lacking the strategic bombers and long-range fighters it needed to take up a strategic bombing role. Its main task was to ensure air supremacy over south-east England, to pave the way for an invasion fleet.

The Luftwaffe regrouped after the Battle of France into three Luftflotten (Air Fleets) on the Britain's southern and northern flanks. Luftflotte 2, commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, was responsible for the bombing of southeast England and the London area. Luftflotte 3, under Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle, targeted the West Country, Midlands, and northwest England. Luftflotte 5, led by Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff from his headquarters in Norway, targeted the north of England and Scotland. As the battle progressed, command responsibility shifted, with Luftflotte 3 taking more responsibility for the nighttime Blitz attacks while the main daylight operations fell upon Luftflotte 2's shoulders. See Luftwaffe Order of Battle August 1940 for a detailed breakdown of the Luftwaffe organization prior to Eagle Day on 13 August.

Initial Luftwaffe estimates allotted four days to defeat Fighter Command in southern England, followed by four weeks for the bombers and long-range fighters to mop up the rest of the country and destroy the British aircraft industry. The plan was to begin with attacks on airfields near the coast, gradually moving inland toward London and the ring of sector airfields defending it. Later reassessments gave the Luftwaffe five weeks to establish temporary air superiority over England within the period from 8 August to 15 September.^[24] To achieve this goal, the RAF had to be destroyed on the ground or in the air with the Luftwaffe maintaining a high enough kill ratio to avoid depleting its own forces to such a level that it could not support an invasion. The only alternative to the goal of air superiority was a terror bombing campaign aimed at the civilian population, but this alternative was considered unfeasible and was expressly forbidden by Hitler.^[25]

The Luftwaffe kept broadly to this scheme, but its commanders had differences of opinion on strategy. The commander of Luftflotte 3, Hugo Sperrle, wanted to eradicate the air defence infrastructure by bombing it. His counterpart in Luftflotte 2, Albert Kesselring, championed attacking London directly—either to bombard the British government into submission or to draw RAF fighters into a decisive battle. Göring did nothing to resolve this disagreement between his commanders, and only vague directives were set down during the initial stages of the battle, with Göring seemingly unable to decide upon which strategy to pursue.^[26] He seemed at times obsessed with maintaining his own power base in the Luftwaffe and indulging his outdated beliefs on air fighting, which were later to lead to tactical and strategic errors.

Tactics

The Luftwaffe varied its tactics considerably to try to find a way through the RAF defences. It launched many free-roving fighter sweeps, known as Freie Jagd ("Free Hunts"), to draw up RAF fighters. RAF fighter controllers, however, were often able to detect these and position squadrons to avoid them, keeping to Dowding's plan to preserve fighter strength for the bomber formations. The Luftwaffe also tried using small formations of bombers as bait, covering them with large numbers of escorts. This was more successful, but escort duty tied the fighters to the bombers' slow speed and made them more vulnerable. Casualties were greatest among the escort units.

Standard tactics for raids soon became an amalgam of techniques. A free hunt would precede a raid to try to sweep any defenders out of the raid's path. The bombers would then fly in at altitudes between 10,000 and 16,000 feet, sometimes closely escorted by fighters. A 'detached' escort, or 'top cover,' would fly above the bombers and maintain a distant watch.

Luftwaffe tactics were influenced by their fighters, which were divided into single-engined Bf 109s and twin-engine Bf 110s. The Bf 110 Zerstörer (destroyer) proved too vulnerable to the nimble single-engined RAF fighters. Soon, they had to be given escorts of their own and were eventually restricted in their employment. This meant the bulk of fighter duties fell on the Bf 109. Fighter tactics were then complicated by bomber crews who demanded closer protection against the RAF. Because they had his ear after the hard-fought battles of 15 August and 18 August, Göring ordered an increase in close escort duties. This shackled many Bf 109s to the bombers and, although they were more successful at protecting the bombing forces, casualties amongst the fighters mounted. Tactical flexibility was further hampered by Luftwaffe rejecting drop tanks for the 109s, despite their availability; unquestionably, many German fighter pilots drowned for lack of fuel who would otherwise have survived.^[27]

Intelligence

The Luftwaffe was ill-served by its lack of intelligence on the British defences. The German intelligence services were fractured and plagued by rivalries; their overall performance was amateurish. By 1940, there were few if any German agents operating in the UK and a handful of bungled attempts to insert spies into the country were foiled. This meant the Luftwaffe had almost no recent knowledge of the workings of the RAF's air defences, in particular of the crucial command and control system built before the war. Even when good information existed, such as 5th Abteilung's November 1939 assessment of Fighter Command strengths and capabilities, it was ignored if it did not match conventional preconceptions.

Throughout the battle, the Luftwaffe had to launch numerous reconnaissance sorties to make up for the poor intelligence. Dorner Do 17s proved easy prey for British fighters, even though for the better part of the battle, they were escorted by whole squadrons of 109s. Thus, the Luftwaffe operated 'blind' for much of the battle, unsure of its enemy's true strengths, capabilities and deployment. Many times the leadership believed Fighter Command's strength had collapsed, while raids against supposed fighter airfields fell instead on bomber or coastal defence stations. The results of bombing and air fighting were exaggerated, resulting in the Luftwaffe leadership becoming increasingly disconnected from reality. This lack of leadership and solid intelligence meant the Germans did not adopt any consistent strategy, even when the RAF had its back to the wall. Moreover, there was never a systematic focus on any one type of target (airbases, radar station, aircraft factories), so the already haphazard effort was further diluted.^[28]

Navigational aids

While the British were using radar for air defence more effectively than the Germans realised, the Luftwaffe attempted to press its own offensive advantage with advanced radio navigation systems the British were initially not aware of. One of these was Knickebein ("crooked leg"), a system where carefully positioned radio transmitters in friendly territory broadcast specially targeted navigational beams that intersected over specific bombing targets in enemy territory. Bombers equipped to detect these beams could be guided towards a target and receive a signal to drop their bombs when they were (roughly) overhead. This allowed for somewhat more accurate bombing at night, when British air defence was at its weakest.

Although British intelligence had heard of proposals for this system, they were not taken seriously until a British science advisor to MI6, Dr. Reginald Jones, gathered evidence of its existence and the threat it posed. He then convinced the high command of the menace and confirmed it with special reconnaissance flights. Jones was put in charge of developing countermeasures, which often involved interfering with the beams to make attacking aircraft go widely off course. Although the Germans resorted to other navigational systems, Jones and the Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE) were able to neutralise each in turn. This so-called Battle of the beams resulted in a markedly reduced German bombing accuracy. With the beams no longer accurate, however, many civilian areas that would not normally have been targeted were bombed.

RAF Strategy

The Dowding System

The keystone of the British defence was the complex infrastructure of detection, command, and control that ran the battle. This was the 'Dowding System', after its chief architect, Air Chief Marshal Sir H.C.T. "Stuffy" Dowding, the leader of RAF Fighter Command.

Groups

The UK's airspace was divided up into four Groups.

• 10 Group defended Wales and the West Country and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Sir Christopher Quintin-Brand.
• 11 Group covered the southeast of England and the critical approaches to London and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park.
• 12 Group defended the Midlands and East Anglia and was led by Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory.
• 13 Group covered the north of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Richard Saul.

At the HQ of each Group (e.g. for 11 Group RAF Uxbridge), information from Fighter Command headquarters would be noted on plotting tables, large maps on which counters marking the incoming raids would be moved, and RAF officers known as Fighter Controllers could then order a response.

Despite appearances, the Groups were not mutually supporting; Park, for instance, could not demand assistance from Quintin-Brand (from whom he often got it), nor from Leigh-Mallory (from whom he more often did not). This was because Dowding had never issued standing orders to assist, nor created a method to co-ordinate it.^[29]

Sectors

The Group areas were subdivided into Sectors; each commanding officer was assigned between two and four squadrons. Sector stations, comprising an aerodrome with a command post, were the heart of this organisation, though they also had satellite airfields to disperse squadrons to. When ordered by their Group HQ, the sector stations would 'scramble' their squadrons into the air. Once airborne, the squadrons would be directed by radio-telephone (R/T) from their sector station. Squadrons could be ordered to patrol airfields or vital targets, or be 'vectored' to intercept incoming raids.

Limitations

Though it was the most sophisticated air defence system in the world at that time, the Dowding System had many limitations, including, but not often stressed, its emphatic need for qualified ground maintenance personnel, many of whom had received their training under the Aircraft Apprentice scheme instituted by Hugh Trenchard. RDF (radar) was subject to significant errors and the Observer Corps had difficulties tracking raids at night and in bad weather. R/T communications with airborne fighters were restricted because of the RAF's use of High-Frequency (HF) radio sets. HF radio was limited in range and even with a network of relay stations, the squadrons could not roam more than one or two sectors from their airfields. It was also restricted to a single frequency per squadron, making inter-squadron communication impossible. Finally, the system for tracking RAF fighters, known as HF/DF or "Huff-Duff", restricted sectors to a maximum of four squadrons in the air.

This is, in part, a reflection of the very novelty of the type of combat, as well as the control system. It was perfectly possible for Sector Control to have been assigned one frequency for all fighters to "listen out" on (or "guard", in modern parlance), with "roving" intercept guidance, rather than the close positive control used in the event, which limited controllers' ability to handle large numbers of interceptors.^[30].

Efficiency

In spite of this, RAF Fighter Command was able to achieve high levels of efficiency, at times achieving interception rates greater than 80%. The R/T problems were solved late in the battle with the adoption of Very High-Frequency (VHF) radio sets, which gave clearer voice communications, had longer range, and provided multiple channels. For all of its faults, RAF's system of ground control directed its fighters to be where they were needed. The Luftwaffe, with no such system, was always at a disadvantage.

Effect of signals intelligence

It is unclear how much the British intercepts of the Enigma cipher, used for high-security German radio communications, affected the battle. Ultra, the information obtained from Enigma intercepts, gave the highest echelons of the UK's command a view of German intentions but it seems little of this material filtered down to Hugh Dowding's desk. (It would have had little tactical value in any case.) However, the 'Y' radio listening service, monitoring the patterns of Luftwaffe radio traffic, contributed considerably to the early warning of raids.

Tactics

The weight of the battle fell upon the RAF's 11 Group. Keith Park's tactics were to dispatch individual squadrons to intercept raids. The intention was to subject attackers to continual attacks by relatively small numbers of aircraft and try to break up the tight formations of bombers. Once formations had fallen apart, stragglers could be picked off one by one. Where multiple squadrons reached a raid the procedure was for the slower Hurricanes to tackle the bombers while the more agile Spitfires held up the fighter escort. This ideal was not always achieved, however, and sometimes the Spitfires and Hurricanes reversed roles.

During the battle, some commanders, notably Trafford Leigh-Mallory of 12 Group, proposed squadrons be formed into Big Wings, consisting of at least three squadrons, to attack the enemy en masse, a method pioneered by Douglas Bader. Proponents of this tactic claimed interceptions in large numbers caused greater enemy losses while reducing their own casualties. Opponents pointed out the big wings would take too long to form up, and the strategy ran a greater risk of fighters being caught on the ground refuelling. The big wing idea also caused pilots to over-claim their kills, due to the confusion of a more intense battle-zone. This led to the belief big wings were far more effective than they actually were.

The issue caused intense friction between Park and Leigh-Mallory, as Leigh-Mallory's 12 Group were tasked with protecting 11 Group's airfields whilst Park's squadrons intercepted incoming raids. However, the delay in forming up Big Wings meant this air cover often did not arrive until after German bombers had hit 11 Group's airfields. Post-war analysis agrees Dowding's and Park's approach was best for 11 Group. However, the controversy affected Park's career after the battle and contributed to Dowding's dismissal from Fighter Command.

The Bomber and Coastal Command contributions

Bomber Command and Coastal Command aircraft flew offensive sorties against targets in Germany and France during the battle. After the initial disasters of the war, with Vickers Wellington bombers shot down in large numbers attacking Wilhelmshafen and the near decimation of the Fairey Battle squadrons sent to France, it became clear Bomber Command would have to operate mainly at night to achieve any results without very high losses.^[31] From 15 May 1940 a night-time bomber campaign was launched against German oil industry, communication, and forests/crops, mainly in the Ruhr area.

As the threat of the Luftwaffe mounted, Bomber Command changed targeting priority on 3 June 1940 to attack the German aircraft industry and to attack harbours and shipping able to support an invasion of Great Britain. From early August the assembling invasion fleet in French ports got a high priority target as well. The large barges intended by the Germans to transport troops across the Channel were targeted by bombers. In addition the Germans had few Freya radar stations set up in France, meaning air defence of the French harbours were not nearly as good as the air defences over Germany. In September 1940 Bomber Command was directing some 60% of its strength against the Channel ports.

Coastal Command directed its attention towards the protection of British shipping, and the destruction of enemy shipping. As invasion became more likely, it participated in the strikes on French harbours and airfields, laying mines, and mounting numerous reconnaissance missions over the enemy held coastline. In all, some 9,180 sorties where flown by bombers from July to October 1940. Compared to the 80,000 sorties flown by fighters it is relatively little, but bombers suffered about 50% the number of causalties as their fighter colleagues. The bomber contribution was therefore much more dangerous on a loss-per-sortie comparison.^[32]

Phases of the Battle

The Battle can be roughly divided into four phases:

• 10 July – 11 August: Kanalkampf, the Channel battles.
• 12 August – 23 August: Adlerangriff, the early assault against the coastal airfields.
• 24 August – 6 September: the Luftwaffe targets the airfields. The critical phase of the battle.
• 7 September onwards: the day attacks switch to British towns and cities.

Kanalkampf

The Kanalkampf comprised a series of running fights over convoys in the English Channel. It was launched partly because Kesselring and Sperrle were not sure about what else to do, and partly because it gave German aircrews some training and a chance to probe the British defenders.^[33] In general, these battles off the coast tended to favour the Germans, whose bomber escorts massively outnumbered the convoy patrols. The need for constant patrols over the convoys put a severe strain on RAF pilots and machines, wasting fuel, engine hours and exhausting the pilots, but eventually the number of ship-sinkings became so great the British Admiralty cancelled all further convoys through the Channel. However, these early fights provided both sides with experience. They also gave the first indications that some of the aircraft, such as the RAF's Defiant turret-fighter and the Luftwaffe's Bf 110, were not up to the intense dog-fighting that would characterise the battle.

Adlerangriff

The weather, which was to prove an important feature of the campaign, delayed Adlertag, or Eagle Day until 13 August 1940. On 12 August the first attempt was made to blind the Dowding system when aircraft from the specialist fighter-bomber unit Erprobungsgruppe 210 attacked four radar stations. Three were briefly taken off the air but were back working within six hours. The raids appeared to show British radars were difficult to knock out for any length of time. The Luftwaffe's failure to mount repeated attacks on them allowed the RAF to get the radar stations back on the air.

Adlertag opened with a series of attacks on coastal airfields, used as forward landing grounds for the RAF fighters. As the week drew on, the airfield attacks moved further inland and repeated raids were made on the radar chain. 15 August saw "The Greatest Day" when the Luftwaffe mounted the largest number of sorties of the campaign. This day saw the one major intervention by Luftflotte 5 in the battle with an attack on the north of England. Believing the strength of Fighter Command to be concentrated away in the south, raiding forces from Denmark and Norway ran into strong resistance. Inadequately escorted by Bf 110s, bombers were shot down in large numbers. As a result of the casualties, Luftflotte 5 would not appear in strength again in the campaign.

18 August, which saw the greatest number of casualties to both sides, has been dubbed "The Hardest Day". Following the grinding battles of the 18th, exhaustion and the weather reduced operations for most of a week, allowing the Luftwaffe to review their performance. "The Hardest Day" had sounded the end for the Ju 87 Stuka in the campaign. This veteran of blitzkrieg was too vulnerable to fighter attack over Britain and to preserve the Stuka force Göring withdrew it from the fighting. This removed the Luftwaffe's main precision-bombing weapon and shifted the burden of pin-point attacks on the already-stretched Erprobungsgruppe 210. Göring was not finished: the Bf 110 had proven too clumsy for dog-fighting with single-engined fighters and its participation would also be scaled back. It would only be used when range required it or when sufficient single-engined escort could be provided.

Göring made yet another fateful decision: to order more bomber escorts at the expense of free-hunting sweeps. To achieve this the weight of the attack now fell on Luftflotte 2, and the bulk of the Bf 109s in Luftflotte 3 were transferred to Kesselring's command, reinforcing the fighter bases in the Pas de Calais. Stripped of its fighters, Luftflotte 3 would concentrate on the night bombing campaign. Göring, expressing disappointment with the fighter performance thus far in the campaign, also made a large change in the command structure of the fighter units, replacing many Geschwaderkommodore with younger, more aggressive pilots like Adolf Galland and Werner Mölders.^[34]

Finally, Göring ordered attacks on the radar chain stopped. These were seen as unsuccessful and neither the Reichsmarschall nor his subordinates realised how vital the Chain Home stations were to the defence. It was known radar provided some early warning of raids, but the belief among German fighter pilots was, anything bringing up the 'Tommies' to fight was to be encouraged.

Luftwaffe targets RAF airfields

From 24 August onwards, the battle was essentially a slugging match between Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 and Park's 11 Group. The Luftwaffe concentrated all their strength on knocking out Fighter Command and made repeated attacks on the airfields. Of the 33 heavy attacks in the next two weeks, 24 were against airfields. The key sector stations were hit repeatedly: Biggin Hill and Hornchurch four times each, Debden and North Weald twice each. Croydon, Gravesend, Rochford, Hawkinge and Manston were also attacked in strength. No fewer than seven attempts were made against Eastchurch, which was not a Fighter Command aerodrome but was believed to be by the intelligence-starved Germans. At times these raids knocked out the sector stations, threatening the integrity of the Dowding system. Emergency measures had to be taken to keep the sectors operating.

These were desperate times for the RAF, which was also taking many casualties in the air. Aircraft production could replace aircraft, but replacement pilots were barely keeping pace with losses, and novice flyers were being shot down at an alarming rate. To offset losses some 58 Fleet Air Arm fighter pilot volunteers were seconded to RAF squadrons, and a similar number of former Fairey Battle pilots, familiar with the Merlin engine, were utilised. Most replacements from OTU had as little as nine hours flying time and no combat training. At this point the multinational nature of Fighter Command came to the fore. Many squadrons and individual personnel from the air forces of the Dominions were already attached to the RAF — Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders, Rhodesians and South Africans — they were bolstered by the arrival of fresh Czechoslovak and Polish squadrons. These squadrons had been held back by Dowding, who mistakenly thought the non-English speaking aircrew would have trouble working within his control system. In addition there were other nationals, including Free French, Belgian and even a Palestinian Jewish pilot serving amongst the squadrons.

Polish flyers proved especially effective — the pre-war Polish Air Force had lengthy, extensive and high standards of training and — with Poland conquered and under German occupation — the battle gave the Polish pilots ample opportunity to vent their hatred of the Germans. They reportedly had no qualms about flying directly over the parachutes of bailed-out Germans, collapsing them and sending them falling to their death, or simply machine-gunning them as they descended to earth.

The RAF had the advantage of fighting over home territory. Pilots who bailed out of their shot-down aircraft could be back at their airfields within hours. For Luftwaffe aircrews, a bail out over England meant capture, while parachuting into the English Channel often meant drowning or death from exposure. Morale began to suffer and Kanalkrankheit ("Channel Sickness") — a form of combat fatigue — began to appear amongst the German pilots. Their replacement problem was even worse than the British. Though the Luftwaffe always maintained its numerical superiority, the slow appearance of replacement aircraft and pilots put increasing strain on the resources of the remaining attackers. Because of the shared hardships of the battle, due the constant strain on both the attacking Germans and defending British, a strange sort of camraderie occasionally appeared between the opposing sides. One British pilot, who bailed out after being shot down, recalled how a German fighter began circling him menacingly. He braced himself expecting to be machine-gunned, but the German eventually simply flew off, sparing him. After a savage dogfight, where an RAF pilot and a German both ran out of ammunition at the same time, both pilots looked at each other, threw their hands up, and laughed.

And yet, the Luftwaffe was winning this battle of the airfields. Another fortnight of this pounding and the RAF might have been forced to withdraw their squadrons from the south of England. This was not clear to the Luftwaffe command, which had watched its bomber force start to waste away and had grown desperate to deliver on the original timetable. They could not understand why Fighter Command had not collapsed, or how they were always able to get fighters to the places needed, no matter how many raids were sent. Something needed to be done to force a decisive battle.

On 4 September, Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to bomb London, following RAF raids on Berlin on the night of 25–26 August, themselves in reprisal after London and its suburbs had been unintentionally damaged by bombs on several occasions in late August. The Berlin raid had hurt Göring's pride, as he had previously claimed the British would never be allowed to bomb the city. Kesselring seized his chance and proposed a strategy change. In the face of Sperrle's arguments attacks on airfields should continue, Kesselring persuaded the Reichsmarschall to attack London. The raids would either panic the British population into submission, or force the "last fifty Spitfires" into the sky where they could be annihilated. This attack was no longer seen as a prerequisite for Seelöwe, but was meant to be decisive in itself.

Raids on British Cities

For several months prior to 7 September 1940, when the first major London raid was launched, the Luftwaffe had bombed a series of British cities, killing more than 1,250 civilians in July and August. The 7 September raid targeted docks in the East End of the city, and over the coming days large raids were launched, some targeting the docks but others bombing indiscriminately. The RAF did come up, in greater numbers than the Luftwaffe expected. The Big Wing was deployed for the first time, giving the German pilots a fright. Over the coming days, attacks on London continued. The break from bombing the airfields gave the RAF critical breathing space. It was the turning point.

Without a doubt, the most damaging aspect of the switch to London was the longer range. The Bf 109 escorts had a limited fuel capacity, and by the time they arrived over the city, they had only ten minutes of flying time before they had to turn for home. This left many raids completely undefended by fighter escorts. The Battle of Britain culminated on September 15, 1940 with two massive waves of German attacks that were decisively repulsed by the RAF. The total casualties on this critical day were 60 German aircraft shot down versus only 26 RAF, roughly 2:1 in favour of the RAF. The German defeat caused Hitler to order, two days later, the postponement of preparations for the invasion of Britain. Henceforth, in the face of mounting losses in men, aircraft and the lack of adequate replacements, the Luftwaffe switched from daylight to night-time bombing. The threat of invasion was essentially over although the German night blitz on London and other British cities continued into 1941.

Aftermath

The Battle of Britain marked the first time the Germans were stopped and air superiority was clearly seen as the key to victory. Though the battle was small in the number of combatants and casualties, had the Germans triumphed, the war would have taken a very different path. The British victory marked the first failure of Hitler's war machine. It also signaled a shift in U.S. opinion at a time when many people from the U.S. believed the UK could not survive, a view promoted by Joseph Kennedy, the U.S. ambassador in London.

Both sides in the battle made exaggerated claims of numbers of enemy aircraft shot down. In general, claims were two to three times the actual numbers, due to confusion in the whirling air battles. Post-war analysis of records has shown, between July and September, the RAF claimed over 2,698 kills for 1,023 fighter aircraft lost to all causes, where 147 Polish pilots claimed 201 out of that number, while the Luftwaffe fighters claimed 3,198 RAF aircraft downed for losses of 1,887, of which 873 were fighters. To the RAF figure should be added an additional 376 Bomber Command and 148 Coastal Command aircraft conducting vital bombing, mining, and reconnaissance operations in defence of the country.^[4]

Modern military historians have suggested the battle was unwinnable for the Luftwaffe. Their numerical majority was not sufficient to achieve superiority. Dowding's and Park's strategy of choosing when to engage the enemy whilst maintaining a coherent force was vindicated. Some historians have suggested the existence of the Royal Navy - with few large Kriegsmarine units in service in the Summer of 1940 was enough of a deterrent to the Germans; even had the Luftwaffe won, the Germans had no way to combat the Royal Navy which would have intervened to prevent a landing. Some counter this assertion by quoting the fate of Prince of Wales and Repulse in December 1941 - overwhelmed only by air power.^[35] This assertion ignores the fact that Germany at the time had no armour piercing bomb capable of doing to a British cruiser (let alone a battleship) what Japan did to Prince of Wales.

The theories of strategic bombing, which hinged on the collapse of public morale, were undone by British defiance in the face of the day and night Blitzes. The switch to a terror bombing strategy allowed the RAF to recuperate and to defend against the attacks. Even if the attacks on the 11 Group airfields had continued, the British could have withdrawn to the Midlands, out of German fighter range, and continued the battle from there. Post-war records show British aircraft were being replaced faster than those of the Germans; the RAF maintained its strength even as the Luftwaffe's declined. In losses of aircraft and experienced aircrew the battle was a blow from which the Luftwaffe never fully recovered.

The Germans launched some spectacular attacks against important British industries, but they could not destroy the British industrial potential. Hindsight does not disguise the fact the threat to Fighter Command was very real and for the participants, it seemed as if there was a narrow margin between victory and defeat. The victory was as much psychological as physical. It turned a tide of defeats and heartened the enemies of Nazism.

The British triumph in the Battle of Britain was not without heavy cost. Total British civilian losses from July to December 1940 were 23,002 dead and 32,138 wounded, with one of the largest single raids occurring on December 29, 1940, in which almost 3,000 civilians died.

Winston Churchill summed up the effect of the battle and the contribution of Fighter Command with the immortal words, "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few".^[36] Pilots who fought in the Battle have been known as The Few ever since. September 15 is celebrated in the United Kingdom as "Battle of Britain Day", marking the climactic battles witnessed above London in daylight.

In British military tradition, the Battle is remembered with at least as much pride as the Trafalgar or the Battle of Waterloo. In addition, the Battle has entered popular legend around the world as an inspiring story of how a small island, standing alone against Nazi tyranny, managed to defeat a powerful enemy.

Most important, the end of the Battle allowed the UK to rebuild its military forces and establish itself as an Allied stronghold. Britain later served as a base from which the invasion of Europe was launched.

Foreign contribution

Main article: Battle of Britain Foreign Contribution

The RAF roll of honour for the Battle of Britain recognises^[37] 510 overseas pilots as flying at least one authorised operational sortie with an eligible unit of the Royal Air Force or Fleet Air Arm between 10 July and 31 October 1940. This included pilots from Poland, New Zealand, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Australia, South Africa, France, Ireland, United States of America, Jamaica, Palestine and Southern Rhodesia. The highest scoring unit during the Battle of Britain is remarkably the foreign No. 303 Polish Fighter Squadron.

An Italian expeditionary force called Corpo Aereo Italiano also took part in the latter stages of battle on the German side.

References

Bibliography

• Bishop, Patrick. Fighter Boys: The Battle of Britain, 1940. New York: Viking, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 0-670-03230-1); Penguin Books, 2004 (paperback, ISBN 0-14-200466-9). As Fighter Boys: Saving Britain 1940. London: HarperPerennial, 2004 (paperback, ISBN 0-00-653204-7).
• Brittain, Vera. England's Hour. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005 (paperback, ISBN 0-8264-8031-4); Obscure Press (February 14, 2006 (paperback, ISBN 1-84664-834-3).
• Bungay, Stephen. The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain. London: Aurum Press, 2000 (hardcover, ISBN 1-85410-721-6); 2002 (paperback, ISBN 1-85410-801-8).
• Craig, Phil; Clayton, Tim. Finest Hour: The Battle of Britain. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000 (hardcover, ISBN 0-684-86930-6); 2006 (paperback, ISBN 0-684-86931-4).
• Deighton, Len (1996), Fighter: The True Story of the Battle of Britain, London: Pimlico, ISBN 0712674233
• Fisher, David E. A Summer Bright and Terrible: Winston Churchill, Lord Dowding, Radar and the Impossible Triumph of the Battle of Britain. Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2005 (hardcover, ISBN 1-59376-047-7); 2006 (paperback, ISBN 1-59376-116-3).
• Foreman, John. Battle of Britain: The Forgotten Months, November And December 1940. Wythenshawe, Lancashire, UK: Crécy Publishing, 1989 (hardcover, ISBN 1-871187-02-8).
• Gaskin, Margaret. Blitz: The Story of December 29, 1940. New York: Harcourt, 2006 (hardcover, ISBN 0-15-101404-3).
• Haining, Peter. Where the Eagle Landed: The Mystery of the German Invasion of Britain, 1940. London: Robson Books, 2004 (hardcover, ISBN 1-86105-750-4).
• Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. Fight for the Sky: Stories of Wartime Fighter Pilots (Paperback) (ISBN 978-0850597493)
• Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. Fighter Pilots in World War II: True Stories of Frontline Air Combat (Paperback) (ISBN 978-1844150656)
• Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. Action Stations: Military Airfields of Greater London v. 8 (Hardcover) (ISBN 978-0850595857)
• Hough, Richard. The Battle of Britain: The Greatest Air Battle of World War II. New York: W.W. Norton, 1989 (hardcover, ISBN 0-393-02766-X); 2005 (paperback, ISBN 0-393-30734-4).
• James, Brian. "Pie in the Sky?", History Today, September 2006, Volume 56, Issue 9, pp. 38–40
• Bishop, Patrick. "The Fighter Boys achieved a great military success", The Daily Telegraph, August 24, 2006
• Evans, Michael. "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to . . . the Navy", The Times, August 24, 2006
• Gillan, Audrey. "Historians downgrade Battle of Britain", The Guardian, August 24, 2006
• Harding, Thomas. "It's baloney, say RAF aces", The Telegraph, August 24, 2006
• James, T.C.G. The Battle of Britain (Air Defence of Great Britain; vol. 2). London; New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7146-5123-0; paperback, ISBN 0-7146-8149-0).
• _____. Growth of Fighter Command, 1936–1940 (Air Defence of Great Britain; vol. 1). London; New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7146-5118-4).
• _____. Night Air Defence During the Blitz. London; New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7146-5166-4).
• Overy, Richard. The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001 (hardcover, ISBN 0-393-02008-8); 2002 (paperback, ISBN 0-393-32297-1).
• Parry, Simon W. Intruders over Britain: The Story of the Luftwaffe's Night Intruder Force, the Fernnachtjager . Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 1989 (hardcover, ISBN 0-904811-07-7).
• Price, Alfred. Spitfire Mark I/II Aces 1939–41 (Aircraft of the Aces 12), Osprey Books, 1996, (Paperback, ISBN 1-85532-627-2) [1]
• Ray, John Philip. The Battle of Britain: Dowding and the First Victory 1940. London: Cassel & Co., 2001 (paperback, ISBN 0-304-35677-8).
• Ray, John Philip. The Battle of Britain: New Perspectives: Behind the Scenes of the Great Air War. London: Arms & Armour Press, 1994 (hardcover, ISBN 1-85409-229-4); London: Orion Publishing, 1996 (paperback, ISBN 1-85409-345-2).
• Robinson, Derek. Invasion, 1940: Did the Battle of Britain Alone Stop Hitler? New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7867-1618-5).
• Wellum, Geoffrey. First Light: The Story of the Boy Who Became a Man in the War-Torn Skies Above Britain. New York: Viking Books, 2002 (hardcover, ISBN 0-670-91248-4); Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 0-471-42627-X); London: Penguin Books, 2003 (paperback, ISBN 0-14-100814-8).

See also

• Battle of Britain Aircraft
• Battle of Britain RAF squadrons
• Luftwaffe Order of Battle August 1940
• Battle of Britain Foreign Contribution
• Battle of Britain Memorial Flight
• Battle of Britain Monument in London
• Bombing of Coventry
• British military history of World War II
• Evacuations of civilians in Britain during World War II
• Kent Battle of Britain Museum
• Polish contribution to World War II
• Royal Canadian Air Force
• The Blitz
• The Darkest Hour
• The Few
• Battle of Britain, theatrical release documenting the battle starring Sir Laurence Olivier, Trevor Howard, Michael Caine, Christopher Plummer and Robert Shaw
• Battle of Britain II: Wings of Victory, a PC flight simulator about the Battle

External links

• Battle Of Britain
• Royal Air Force history
• British Invasion Defences
• Map of UK Airfields and squadrons.
• RAF Battle of Britain Roll of Honour
• Battle-Of-Britain Website.
• Battle-Of-Britain Website in Dutch.
• Royal Engineers Museum Royal Engineers and Second World War (airfield repair)

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