Battle of Khalkhin Gol
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| Battle of Khalkhyn Gol | |||||||||
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| Part of the Soviet-Japanese Border Wars | |||||||||
 A destroyed Soviet armoured car of the type BA-10 during the Battle of Khalkhin Gol |
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| Combatants | |||||||||
 Soviet Union People's Republic of Mongolia |
 Japan Manchukuo |
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| Commanders | |||||||||
| Georgy Zhukov |
Michitaro Komatsubara |
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| Strength | |||||||||
| 57,000 | 30,000 | ||||||||
| Casualties | |||||||||
| 6,831 killed, 15,952 wounded (stated estimate) | 8,440 killed, 8,766 wounded (stated estimate) | ||||||||
| Manchuria |
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| Lake Khasan – Khalkhin Gol |
The Battle of Khalkhyn Gol (Mongolian: Халхын гол; Japanese: ノモンハン事件 Nomonhan jiken), named after the river Khalkhyn Gol passing through the battlefield and known in Japan as the Nomonhan Incident (after a nearby village on the border between Mongolia and Manchuria), was the decisive engagement of the undeclared Soviet-Japanese Border War (1939), or Japanese-Soviet War. It should not be confused with the conflict in 1945 when the USSR declared war in support of the other Allies of World War II and launched Operation August Storm.
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[edit] Background
After the occupation of Manchukuo and Korea, Japan turned its military interests to Soviet territories. The first major Soviet-Japanese border incident, the Battle of Lake Khasan, happened in 1938 in Primorye. Clashes between the Japanese and Soviets frequently occurred on the border of Manchuria.
In 1939, Manchuria was a puppet state of Japan, known as Manchukuo. The Japanese maintained that the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia was the Khalkhyn Gol (English "Khalkha River") which flows into Lake Buir Nor, while the Mongolians and their Soviet allies maintained that it ran some 16 kilometres (10 miles) east of the river, just east of Nomonhan village.[1]
The principal occupying army of Manchukuo was the Kwantung Army of Japan, consisting of some of the best Japanese units in 1939. However, the western region of Manchukuo was garrisoned by the newly formed IJA 23d Division at Hailar, under General Michitaro Komatsubara and several Manchukuoan army and border guard units.
Red Army forces consisted of the 57th Special Corps, forward deployed from the Trans-Baikal Military District, responsible for the defense of the border between Siberia and Manchuria.
[edit] May, June, and July actions
The incident began on 11 May 1939. A Mongolian cavalry unit of some 70-90 men had entered the disputed area in search of grazing for their horses. On that day, Manchukuoan cavalry attacked the Mongolians and drove them back across the Khalkhin Gol. On the 13th, the Mongolian force returned in greater numbers and the Manchukoans were unable to dislodge them.
This region was the responsibility of the 23rd Division of the Kwangtung Army. On the 14th, Lt. Col. Yaozo Azuma led the 64th regiment of 23rd Division into the territory and the Mongolians withdrew. However, Soviet and Mongolian troops returned to the disputed region and Azuma's force again moved to evict them. This time things turned out differently, as the Communist forces surrounded Azuma's force on 28 May and destroyed it.[2] The Azuma force was suffered eight officers and 97 men killed and one officer and 33 men wounded, for 63% total casualties.
On 27 June, the Japanese launched an air attack. The Japanese 2nd Air Brigade struck the Soviet air base at Tamsak-Bulak in Mongolia. The Japanese won this engagement, destroying half again as many Soviet planes as they lost, but the strike had been ordered by the Kwangtung Army without getting permission from Imperial Japanese Army headquarters in Tokyo. Tokyo promptly ordered the Japanese Army Air Force not to conduct any more strikes.[3]
In June, a new Soviet commander arrived: Lt. Gen. Georgi Zhukov.[4] Throughout June there were continuing reports of Soviet and Mongolian activity on both sides of the river near Nomonhan, and small-scale attacks on isolated Manchukoan units. At the end of the month, the local Kwantung commander, Lt. Gen. Michitaro Komatsubara, was given permission to "expel the invaders". The Japanese plan was for a two-pronged assault. Four regiments of the 23rd Division would advance across the Khalkin Gol, destroy Communist forces on Baintsagan Hill on the west bank, then make a left turn and advance south to the Kawatama Bridge. The second prong of the attack would be the task of the Yasuoka Detachment, commanded by Major General Yasuoka Masaomi. This force, consisting of four infantry and artillery regiments and two armored (tank) regiments, would attack Soviet troops on the east bank of the Khalkhyn Gol and north of the Holsten River. The two Japanese thrusts would meet in the Soviet rear and encircle them.
The northern task force succeeded in crossing the Khalkhyn Gol, driving the Soviets from Baintsagan Hill, and advancing south along the west bank. However, Zhukov, perceiving the threat, launched a counterattack with 450 tanks and armored cars. The Russian armored force, despite being unsupported by infantry, attacked the Japanese on three sides and nearly encircled them. The Japanese force, further handicapped by having only one pontoon bridge across the river for supplies (most of its bridging personnel had been sent south to assist in the war in China), was forced to withdraw, recrossing the river on 5 July. Meanwhile, the Yasuoka Detachment (the southern task force) attacked on the night of 2 July, moving at night to avoid the Soviet artillery on the high ground of the river's west bank. A pitched battle ensued in which the Yasuoka Detachment lost over half its armor, but still could not break through the Soviet forces on the east bank and reach the Kawatama Bridge. [5][6] After a Soviet counterattack on 9 July threw the battered, depleted Yasuoka Detachment back, it was dissolved and Yasuoka was relieved.[7]
The two armies continued to spar with each other over the next two weeks along a four-kilometer front running along the east bank of the Khalkhyn Gol to its juncture with the Holsten River.[8] Zhukov, whose army was 465 miles away from its base of supply, assembled a fleet of 2600 trucks to supply his troops, while the Japanese suffered severe supply problems due to a lack of similar motor transport.[9] On 23 July, the Japanese launched another large-scale assault, sending the 64th and 72nd divisions against the Soviet forces defending the Kawatama Bridge. Japanese artillery units supported the attack with a massive barrage that wound up consuming more than half their ammuntion stores over a period of two days.[10] The attack made some progress but failed to break through Soviet lines and reach the bridge. The Japanese disengaged from the attack on 25 July due to mounting casualties and depleted artillery stores. They had suffered over five thousand casualties to this point but still had 75,000 men and several hundred planes facing the Communist forces.[11] The battle drifted into stalemate.
[edit] August: Zhukov's strike
The Japanese regrouped, and planned a third major offensive against the Soviets for August 24.[12] They never got the chance. Zhukov had been massing a major armored force in the form of three tank (4th, 6th and 11th), and two mechanized (7th and 8th), brigades (mechanized brigades were armoured car units with attached infantry support). This force was allocated to the Soviet left and right wings. In total, Zhukov had three rifle divisions, two tank divisions, two more tank brigades--in all, some 498 tanks--two motorized infantry divisions and an air wing of some 250 fighters and bombers to deploy against the Japanese. The Mongolians committed two cavalry divisions.[13] [14][15] The Kwantung Army, by contrast, mustered only two lightly armored divisions at the point of attack, built around Lieutenant General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23d Division whose headquarters had been at Hailar, capital of Hsingan, Manchu province, over 100 miles from the site of the fighting. Their intelligence had also failed to detect the scale of the Soviet buildup or the scope of the attack Zhukov was planning.[16]
Zhukov decided it was time to break the stalemate. He deployed approximately 50,000 Soviet and Mongolian troops of the 57th Special Corps to defend the east bank of the Khalkhyn Gol, then crossed the river on 20 August to attack the elite Japanese forces with three infantry divisions, massed artillery, a tank brigade, and the best planes of the Soviet Air Force. Once the Japanese were pinned down by the advance of the Soviet center units, the armoured units swept around the flanks and attacked the Japanese in the rear, cutting lines of communication, overcoming desperate Japanese counterattacks (one Japanese officer drew his sword and led an attack on foot against Soviet tanks),[17] and achieving a classic double envelopment. When the two wings of Zhukov's attack linked up at Nomonhan village on the 25th, the Japanese 23rd division was trapped.[18][19][20] On 26 August, an attack to relieve the 23rd division failed. On 27 August the 23rd attempted to break out of the encirclement, but failed. When the surrounded forces refused to surrender, Zhukov wiped them out with artillery and air attacks. The battle ended 31 August with the complete destruction of the Japanese forces. Remaining Japanese units retreated to east of Nomonhan.
As Zhukov completed the annihilation of the 23rd division, great events were taking place thousands of miles to the west. The very next day, on September 1, 1939, Adolf Hitler launched his invasion of Poland and World War II broke out in Europe. The Soviets had already agreed to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which called for the Red Army to enter Poland, Latvia and Estonia. Perhaps as a result of Stalin's new commitments in Eastern Europe, the Soviets advanced no further than the border line they had claimed at the start of battle. The Soviets and Japanese signed a cease-fire agreement on 15 September, and it took effect the following day.[21] Stalin, free of any worry from his eastern border, was free to give a green light to the Soviet invasion of Poland (1939) that begun on 17 September.[22]
[edit] Aftermath
Estimates of casualties are uncertain. Some sources hold that the Japanese suffered 45,000 or more soldiers killed with Russian casualties extending upwards of 17,000 men,[23], while the Japanese reported 8,440 killed and 8,766 wounded, and the Russians claimed 9,284 total casualties.
Although this engagement is little-known in the West, it had profound implications on the conduct of World War II. It may be said to be the first decisive battle of World War II, because it determined that the two principal Axis Powers, Germany and Japan, would never geographically link up their areas of control through Russia. The defeat convinced the Imperial General Staff in Tokyo that the policy of the North Strike Group, favoured by the army, which wanted to seize Siberia as far as Lake Baikal for its resources, was untenable. Instead the South Strike Group, favored by the navy, which wanted to seize the resources of Southeast Asia, especially the petroleum and mineral-rich Dutch East Indies, gained the ascendancy, leading directly to the attack on Pearl Harbor two and a half years later in December 1941. The Japanese would never make an offensive movement towards Russia again. In 1941, the two countries signed agreements respecting the borders of Mongolia and Manchukuo[24] and pledging neutrality towards each other.[25] They remained at peace until Operation August Storm and the Soviet conquest of Manchuria in August 1945, in the final week of the war.
It was the first victory for the soon-to-be-famous Soviet general Georgy Zhukov, earning him the first of his four Hero of the Soviet Union awards. Zhukov himself was promoted and transferred west to the Kiev district. The battle experience gained by the Siberian army was put to good use in December 1941 at the Battle of Moscow, under the command of Zhukov, when Siberian divisions spearheaded the first successful Soviet counteroffensive against the German invasion of 1941. The decision to move the divisions from Siberia was aided by the Soviet's masterspy Richard Sorge in Tokyo, who was able to alert the Soviet government that the Japanese were looking south and were unlikely to launch another attack against Siberia in the immediate future. A year after flinging the Germans back from the capital, Zhukov planned and executed the Russian attack at the Battle of Stalingrad, using a technique very similar to Khalkin Gol, in which the Soviet forces held the enemy fixed in the center, built up a mass of force in the area undetected, and launched a pincer attack on the wings to trap the enemy army.
The Japanese, however, while learning never to attack the USSR again, made no major changes to their tactical doctrines. They continued to emphasize the bravery and courage of the individual soldier over massing force and armor. The problems that faced them at Khalkin Gol, most importantly their lack of armor, would plague them again when the Americans and British recovered from their defeats of late 1941 and early 1942 and turned to the conquest of the Japanese Empire.[26][27]
The Mongolian town of Choybalsan, in Dornod aimag (province) where the battle was fought, is the location of the "G.K. Zhukov Museum", dedicated to Zhukov and the 1939 battle.[28]
The Nomonhan Incident led the Imperial Japanese Army to several conclusions as to the actual combat capability of the Soviet military.
The Soviets possessed superior artillery and armour, giving them a decisive firepower advantage. The Japanese were exceedingly surprised by Soviet capability of transporting and storing war materiel at a battlefront 600 kilometers away from a railroad terminal.[1] Having rid itself of the inflexibility which characterized the old Czarist forces, the Soviet Army proved able to change tactics from battle to battle. At the beginning of the Incident, for example, most of the Soviet tanks were ignited by gasoline-bottles hurled at them by Japanese troops. A month later, however, the Russians were using crude-oil fuel, or were covering the tank chassis with wire nets. Other cases of Soviet field improvisation were numerous. The Soviet Army was more tenacious than had been expected. After the end of the Nomonhan fighting, the Army High Command set up a committee to investigate the Incident. The commission was to evaluate the abilities of the Soviet Army, and to re-examine the performance of Japanese armaments and operations against the Russians.
Where military equipment was concerned, Japanese firepower had proven to be inferior. Heated debate ensued as to whether to effect a thoroughgoing reorganization of the Army to completely correct any deficiencies or to go only as far as improving current capabilities. The latter alternative was ultimately selected.
Lurking in the background of the controversy was the problem of abandoning the principle of hand-to-hand fighting, a tradition of the Japanese infantry. The High Command did not awaken to the remarkable progress of material potentials in modern warfare, but instead continued to esteem the superiority of spiritual fighting strength. This attitude could perhaps be traced to the fact that the Japanese Army did not progress beyond comprehending fire power at the levels of 1904-05. It had never received a baptism of fire on the modern scale of World War I.
Now the second World War had just broken out, Japanese military authorities, admiring the brilliant successes of German Army operations, began to cherish a desire to learn from German experience rather than from that of the Nomonhan Incident. This desire crystallized into the dispatch of the Yamashita Military Inspection Team to Germany.
After the negotiation of the Nomonhan armistice, the newly appointed Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, Yoshijiro Umezu, took immediate steps to prevent further border troubles. He pulled back Japanese troops somewhat behind the frontiers where demarcation lines were not precise.
A fundamental principle designed to prevent border incidents was General Umezu's order that, in the event of Soviet or Outer Mongolian penetration of a disputed area, only the Commander of the Kwantung Army himself could decide whether Japanese troops might counterattack. The new measures represented a fundamental revision of the old border defense principles. Bold and positive front-line attacks against the enemy, which had been formerly stressed, were not to be sanctioned now. As a result, a more peaceful atmosphere thereafter prevailed in the vicinity of the frontiers.
[edit] Notes
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/Maps.html
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/BigMaps.html#map3
- ^ http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/nomonhan.aspx
- ^ http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/nomonhan.aspx
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp#32
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/BigMaps.html#map4
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp#47
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp#1
- ^ http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/nomonhan.aspx
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp#53
- ^ http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/nomonhan.aspx
- ^ http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/nomonhan.aspx
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp#9
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/BigMaps.html#map6
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/Maps.html#map17
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp#71
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp#86b
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp#86a
- ^ http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/nomonhan.aspx
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp#77
- ^ http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/nomonhan.aspx
- ^ Steven J. Zaloga, Howard Gerrard, The Poland 1939: the birth of Blitzkrieg, Osprey Publishing, 2002, ISBN 1841764086, Google Print, p.80
- ^ http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/nomonhan.aspx
- ^ http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/s2.htm
- ^ http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/s1.htm
- ^ http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp#86a
- ^ http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/nomonhan.aspx
- ^ http://regions.guide-mongolia.com/dornod/introduction/introduction.html
[edit] References
- Coox, Alvin D., "Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939", ISBN 0-8047-1835-0
- Drea, Edward. "Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939". Leavenworth Papers study for the Combat Studies Institute of the U.S. Army.
- Erickson, John The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941, Routledge, 2001. ISBN 0-7146-5178-8
- Neeno, Timothy, "Nomonhan: The Second Russo-Japanese War". MilitaryHistoryOnline.com essay. Uses the Coox book and Drea paper as sources.
[edit] External links
- A Russian website, translated into English, about Khalkin Gol. Also contains a large section of maps, mostly in Russian with some English captions, showing the entire course of the battle.
- Nomonhan Incident between Japan and the USSR(Japanese) Battle on the border between Manchuria and Mongolia
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