Schlieffen Plan

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The Schlieffen Plan was the German General Staff's overall strategic plan for victory on the Western Front against France, and was executed to near victory in the first month of World War I; however, a French counterattack on the outskirts of Paris, the Battle of the Marne, ended the German offensive and resulted in years of trench warfare. The Plan has been the subject of debate among historians and military scholars ever since.

Contents 1 Overview 2 Modifications to the Plan, 1911 3 The Schlieffen Plan in action, and its failure 4 Criticism 5 Additional facts 6 In Popular Media 7 Notes 8 References

[edit] Overview

The Schlieffen Plan was created by Alfred Graf von Schlieffen.

After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the French province of Alsace-Lorraine, which had a mixed population of both French and Germans, had been made part of the German Empire. The French revanchism vowed to regain the territories they had possessed for nearly 200 years. Due to Bismarck's alliances, France was initially isolated, but after young Kaiser Wilhelm II took over in 1888, he estranged Germany gradually from Russia and Britain, so fears about having to fight a future war on two fronts simultaneously grew among German leaders.

France, having been beaten in a few weeks in 1870, was not considered as dangerous in the long run as the Russian Empire, which was expected to be hard to beat if the Tsar was allowed the necessary time to mobilize his huge country to full extent. After the Entente Cordiale of 1904 was signed between Britain and France, Kaiser Wilhelm II asked Alfred Graf von Schlieffen to devise a plan which would allow Germany to fight a war on two fronts, and in December 1905 von Schlieffen began circulating it.

The idea of the plan was to win a two-front war quickly by first triumphing in the West again before the "Russian Steamroller" would be able to mobilize and descend upon East Prussia—the Plan scheduled 39 days for the fall of Paris ^[1].

It envisioned a rapid German mobilization, disregard of the neutrality of Luxembourg and Belgium, and an overwhelming sweep of the powerful German right wing southwest through Belgium and Northern France, "letting the last man on the right brush the Channel with his sleeve," ^[2] in the words of Schlieffen, while maintaining only a defensive posture on the central and left wings, in Lorraine, the Vosges, and the Moselle.

Paris was not to be taken (the Siege of Paris had lasted for months) but to be passed by the right wing to the west of the city. The intent of the plan was not to conquer cities or industry in order to weaken the French war efforts, but to capture most of the French Army and to force France to surrender, in essence a repeat of the strategy used to defeat France during the Franco-Prussian War. The plan was that the French army would be hemmed in around Paris and forced to fight a decisive envelopment battle.

A seed of disaster lurked in the conception of the plan: both Schlieffen and the man who would eventually implement his Plan, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, were seduced by the possibility of the double envelopment of the entire French Army by the right wing coming from the north and west of France and the left wing coming from the east. The inspiration was the destruction of the Roman Army by Hannibal's forces at the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC, which was the object of meticulous study by Schlieffen. In essence, his plan was a large scale strategic readressing of Hannibal's tactics, capitalizing on the recent breakthroughs in communications and transport.

Politically, one of the major drawbacks of the Schlieffen Plan was that it called for the invasion of the neutral states of Belgium and Holland. As it turned out, at least formally, it was the decision to invade Belgium which led to war with Great Britain.

As noted previously, Russian mobilization would supposedly be extremely slow, due to its poor railway system. Following the speedy defeat of France, the German General Staff would switch German concentrations to the Eastern Front. The Plan called for sending 91% of the German troops to France and 9% to Russia. His goal was to defeat France in six weeks, the time it took for Russia to mobilize her army, and turn back to the Eastern Front before Russia could react. Kaiser Wilhelm II is quoted as having said "Paris for lunch, dinner at St. Petersburg."

[edit] Modifications to the Plan, 1911

Following the retirement of Schlieffen in 1906, Helmuth von Moltke became the German chief of staff. He disagreed with at least some of the Schlieffen Plan, thinking it to be too risky. The Plan, however, having been devised in 1905, was now too much a part of German military thinking to abandon it completely. All he could do was modify it. Von Moltke decided to pull significant amounts of troops away from the main force entering France from the north, in order to fortify the forces in Alsace-Lorraine, and the forces at the Russian border. The other significant change he made was not to enter through the Netherlands, instead sending troops through Belgium alone. These changes have been the subject of much debate. L.C.F Turner in 1970 described von Moltke's changes as "a substantial modification in the Schlieffen Plan and one which probably doomed the German campaign in the west before it was ever launched." Turner claims that by weakening the main German offensive, they did not have a real chance of defeating the French army quickly enough, hence they became stranded in a two-front-war. He also says that not going through Holland not only created a bottleneck at the German-Belgian border, but also that not having the Dutch railways at their disposal created a huge supply problem, a problem which outweighed the benefits they gained by still having access to the Dutch ports.

It can be argued that these modifications led to failure, and that, had the original concept been followed, the German Army would have attained a swift and decisive victory. Though speculations are essentially not a part of historical investigation, this idea is bolstered when one takes in consideration the French Army's movements early in the war. According to the directives of Plan XVII, the French mobilized and hurled their forces towards the German border, in an ill-fated attempt to recapture the Alsace-Lorraine, which very nearly cost them the war. This played exactly into Schlieffen's conception of a trap through double envelopment, which called for a loose defense of the border, and actually for retreats by which the French forces would have been lured further away from the main thrust of the German advance. However, Moltke's subsequential weakening of the German right, the uncalled for obstinacy of the defense of German territory against the French attacking forces and the transfer of three army corps and one cavalry division from the western front to help contain the Russian advance into East Prussia destroyed the essence of the original plan, and led to the inability of the German army to break through the Allied forces at the Marne. In essence, Schlieffen's audacious plan was never carried out - it was destroyed by Moltke's indecisive policy. With the benefit of hindsight, there is strong evidence to assume that it would have been very successful.

[edit] The Schlieffen Plan in action, and its failure

Despite continual debate on the Schlieffen Plan and its perceived greatness, it failed to lead to a victory for the Germans. There is debate on whether the Schlieffen Plan was ever actually executed, but ultimately the German invasion failed due to five major reasons:

• The Belgian resistance: Although the Belgian army was only a tenth the size of the German army, it still delayed the Germans for nearly a month, defending fortresses and cities. The Germans used their "Big Bertha" artillery to destroy Belgian forts in Liège, Namur and Antwerp, but the Belgians still fought back, creating a constant threat on German supply lines in the North. In addition, the German attack on neutral Belgium and reports about atrocities turned public opinion in many neutral countries against Germany and Kaiser Wilhelm.

• The presence/effectiveness of the British Expeditionary Force: After the war, it was revealed by German documents that many German generals and politicians did not believe that the British Empire would enter the war. Because of the Treaty of London, the Triple Entente, and fear of German expansion, however, they did. While the BEF (British Expeditionary Force) was forced into retreat throughout the month of August, it provided enough resistance against the German First Army under Alexander von Kluck to help induce the German general to break off the Plan. Instead, von Kluck turned south-east towards Compiegne, showing his flank to the Garrison of Paris under Gallieni, making possible the "Miracle of the Marne".

• The speed of Russian mobilization: The Russians moved faster than expected, gaining ground in Eastern Prussia more quickly than the Germans wanted, surprising them. While the Russian advance may not have posed much real threat at the time, had they kept gaining ground at that pace, they were going to get dangerously close to Berlin. This caused the Germans to pull even more men from their main force, in order to reinforce the Eastern Front. While this proved unnecessary, since the forces pulled from the Western Front were still in transit during German victory at Tannenberg in early September 1914, the weakening of the all-important right wing was problematic for the Plan.

• The French railway system: Because of the delays caused by the British and Belgians, the French had more time to transfer troops from the border at Alsace-Lorraine. The Germans greatly underestimated how well they would be able to do this, especially with the extra time they were granted by the slowing of the German forces. The French sent some of their troops by train, some through taxis, and marched the rest of them. By the time the Germans got into France, the French were there waiting for them.

• The changing alliances of Central allies: Before WWI, both kingdoms of Italy and Romania were considered pro-Central. Initially, both stayed neutral, with Italy claiming that the Triple Alliance had only defensive purposes, and that the war was started by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Since Schlieffen planned for Italy and Romania to act as allies, their refusal largely damaged the plan. Both eventually even entered the war as Allies. By doing so, Romania actually helped the Centrals because it was easily and quickly conquered and thus provided large amounts of coal, wheat, and oil, all of which the Centrals desperately needed. Italy, however, made twelve attempts to win the Battle of the Isonzo and gained the territory of South Tyrol only after the truce of the Battle of Vittorio Veneto had been signed. This also triggered the end of the war as it caused the Dual Monarchy to capitulate, after which Germany had to follow to prevent another front in the south.

• Moltke's changes to the plan: Chief of the General Staff Helmuthe von Moltke made several changes to the Schlieffen Plan, initially reinforcing the east with 180,000 men from the right-wing armies, weakening the invasion force in favor of defense. Moltke also had idealogical opposition for the proposed passage of the invading armies through neutral Holland, the subsequent shift delayed his armies in Belgium and resulted in the "race to the sea" after the Marne. Moltke also further reinforced his left-wing with Corps from the right to prevent Allied forces from penetrating too far into Germany itself, an issue Schlieffen was not concerned with (Schlieffen's plan called for the invading French forces to be enveloped, putting the political concern of hostile invasions behind the strategic opportunity to destroy the invading armies). Moltke also chose to send 80,000 more men to the east to assist with the Russian invasion against the advisement of General Ludendorff (Two days before the reinforcements arrived the Germans had destroyed the Russians at Tannenberg). Ultimately Moltke reassigned 250,000 men (an entire army's worth) from the right-wing assault before finally abandoning the Schlieffen Plan. Repulsed by the left wing of Moltke's forces near Sarrebourg, the French retreated to the hills around the city of Nancy. Rather than sweeping around them and enveloping the French armies and Paris itself from the east, Moltke opted to directly attack their reinforced positions around Nancy which ended in an unmitigated failure.

The failures in the West resulted in defeat at the First Battle of the Marne in September 1914, a stalemate, trench warfare, and a two-front war for Germany.

What eventually occurred was a "reverse Schlieffen". The Russian army, aided by the Romanian and Serbian armies and considered by the German command as far more dangerous in the long term than the Western Allies, was utterly crushed with relative ease. On the other hand, the Western Allies had equipment far superior to Central and East Allied weapons, and were better trained. When Russia and the Eastern Front finally collapsed in 1917/18, Germany sent many divisions of victory-flushed troops to fight the Western Allies in Italy and the Franco-Benelux theater. Eventually, however, Italy defeated Austria-Hungary and Austria withdrew from the war, exposing Germany's southern flank, while the defeat of Bulgaria also exposed Germany (and Austria) to an Allied advance up the Danube. The entrance of the United States on the side of the Allies in 1917, and the arrival of substantial US reinforcements, coupled with the failure of the final German offensives in the West in early 1918, allowed the Allies to push the Germans out of France and into Belgium, towards the German border. Germany had to accept the Allies' armistice terms as the withdrawal from the war of her allies meant her position was ultimately hopeless.

[edit] Criticism

Several historians argue that the plan was unfeasible for its time, due to the recent advances in weaponry and the improved transportation of industrial warfare. Some would say the plan was "too good". B.H. Liddell Hart, for instance, praised the Schlieffen Plan as a “conception of Napoleonic boldness”, but concluded that:

“The plan would again become possible in the next generation—when air power could paralyze the defending side’s attempt to switch its forces, while the development of mechanized forces greatly accelerated the speed of encircling moves, and extended their range. But Schlieffen’s plan had a very poor chance of success at the time it was conceived.”

In addition, some historians, including Professor David Fromkin, author of Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? have recently made arguments that what is known as the Schlieffen Plan may not have been an actual plan as such, but instead was laid down in one 1905 hypothetical memorandum and a brief 1906 addition. Schlieffen may not have intended to be carried out in the form he laid down, instead, seeing it as perhaps an intellectual exercise. Fromkin has argued that, given what historians have recently seen in Schlieffen's papers, captured by the US Army along with other German war documents after World War One, that the memoranda had never been refined into an operational program. No orders or operational details (such as specific units for each area of the offensive) were appended. He further goes on to pin much of the genesis of the plan as finally enacted on Moltke, who had seen the memorandum and believed it to be a fully-operational plan which he then proceeded to expand upon. Fromkin, in fact, has advocated referring to the "Moltke Plan" as opposed to the "Schlieffen Plan", as it may have been more a product of Moltke's misreading of the Schlieffen Memorandum of 1905 and its 1906 codicil.

According to the historian A. Palmer, however, closer inspection of documents regarding the German war plan reveal that Moltke's changes were not that great, and that the plan was basically flawed from the start. He claims that the Schlieffen plan does not deserve its high reputation, because it underestimated pretty much everyone—the Russians, French, British, and Belgians.

The British military historian, John Keegan, in summarizing the debate over the plan, criticizes it for its lack of realism about the speed with which the right wing of the German army would be able to wheel through Belgium and the Netherlands in order to arrive outside of Paris on schedule. He observes that, regardless of the path taken, there were simply not enough roads for the masses of troops planned to reach Paris in the time required. In other words, the Plan required German forces to arrive on schedule and in sufficient force, but in reality only one or the other could be achieved, not both.

Keegan also points out to the Schlieffen Plan as a leading example of the separation between military war planning and political/diplomatic considerations which was one of the original causes of the war. Schlieffen conceived his Plan as the best possible solution to a strategic problem, while ignoring the political reality that violating Belgian neutrality was the thing most likely to invite British intervention and expand the conflict.

[edit] Additional facts

• Schlieffen's solution reversed that of his great predecessor, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, whose experiences in the Franco-Prussian War with modern warfare and concerns regarding the increasing lethality of weaponry, made him doubt that a swift success could be achieved. Moltke had accordingly favored limited operations against France and a major effort against Russia. Schlieffen, on the other hand, would seek an immediate all-out victory.

• The absence of General Helmuth von Moltke the Younger from the Western Front was a crucial (though not decisive) factor in the failure of the Schlieffen Plan. Communication was especially poor and, in addition, German forces sent wireless messages uncoded, allowing French forces under the command of General Joseph Joffre to pinpoint the location of the German advance.

• Further, Moltke balked at the weakness of the Alsatian "hinge" region, fearing that the massive strength of the right wing's hammer would allow the French to break through the relatively sparsely-manned left-wing "anvil". This had been part of Schlieffen's design as well—he had been willing to sacrifice some German territory in the short run to decisively destroy the French Army. Moltke refused to run the same risk and shifted some divisions from the right flank to the left flank in Alsace-Lorraine.

• The rigidity of the Schlieffen Plan has also been a source of much criticism. The plan called for the defeat of France in precisely 42 days. Armed with an inflexible timetable, argue many scholars, the German General Staff was unable to improvise as the "fog" of war became more apparent. Thus, many scholars believe that the Schlieffen Plan was anti-Clausewitzian in concept. On the other hand, General Kluck made the decision at the front to wheel southeasterly instead of continuing on past Paris; German generals were taught to think for themselves, and in fact his decision to wheel inwards made orthodox military sense. However, it deprived Germany of the chance to force a decisive envelopment battle around Paris.

• German troops were exhausted by the time they engaged French forces; many horses (towing artillery pieces) died, having eaten green corn.

• German supply lines stretched 80 miles at the Marne; the front line of the German Army had already broken into retreat before the rear had even arrived.

• After Germany's defeat at the Marne, there began a series of flanking maneuvers by both the Germans, and the British and French Allies heading northwards in one last attempt to end the war quickly. However, by December, the two armies had built an elaborate series of trench fortifications stretching essentially from the English Channel to the Swiss border which would remain nearly static for four years. Schlieffen's great gamble would, ironically, result in the one outcome he had feared: A long, drawn-out war of attrition against a numerically stronger enemy.

[edit] In Popular Media

In Harry Turtledove's alternate history novel, How Few Remain, set in an 1881 in which the Confederate States of America won the Civil War, Schlieffen is inspired by Robert E. Lee's capture of Philadelphia.

[edit] Notes

1. ^ Grenville, J.A.S., A History of the World in the 20th Century, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 21
2. ^ Rosinski, Herbert, The German Army, London, Hogarth, 1939

[edit] References

• Foley, Robert Alfred von Schlieffen's Military Writings. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
• Foley, Robert T. "The Real Schlieffen Plan", War in History, Vol. 13, Issue 1. (2006), pp. 91–115.
• Fromkin, David, Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? New York: Vintage Books, 2004. ISBN 0-375-72575-X
• Hull, Isabel V. Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-8014-4258-3
• Landa, Manuel de. War in the Age of Intelligent Machines. 1991.
• Mombauer, Annika, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
• Ritter, Gerhard The Schlieffen plan, Critique of a Myth, foreword by Basil Liddell Hart. London: O. Wolff, 1958.
• Rothenberg, Gunther E. "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment." in Makers of Modern Strategy Peter Paret (Ed.). Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986.
• Zuber, Terence, Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. OUP, 2002. ISBN 0-19-925016-2