Suez Crisis
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| Suez Crisis The Sinai War (Arab-Israeli conflict) |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 HMS Eagle, Bulwark, and Albion of the Royal Navy. |
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| Combatants | |||||||||
 Israel United Kingdom France |
 Egypt |
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| Commanders | |||||||||
| Moshe Dayan Charles Keightley Pierre Barjot |
Gamal Abdel Nasser | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| 175,000 Israeli 45,000 British 34,000 French |
70,000 | ||||||||
| Casualties | |||||||||
| 197 Israeli KIA 56 British KIA 91 British WIA 10 French KIA 43 French WIA |
650 KIA 2,900 WIA 2,000 POW |
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The Suez Crisis[1] (Arabic: أزمة السويس - العدوان الثلاثي; French: Crise du canal de Suez; Hebrew: מבצע קדש) was a war fought on Egyptian territory in 1956. The conflict pitted Egypt against Israel, the United Kingdom, and France.
During the British colonial era, the Suez Canal had been important in the Middle East, as well as for the penetration of Africa and in maintaining control of India. For this reason the British considered it important to keep the canal out of Egyptian control. Thus in 1875, Isma'il Pasha, under the pressure of foreign debt, sold his country's share in the canal to the United Kingdom, and the Convention of Constantinople (1888) declared the canal a neutral zone under British protection.[2]
The United Kingdom gained control over the canal under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. However, in 1951 Egypt declared this treaty null and void, and by 1954 the United Kingdom agreed to pull out.[2]
The United Kingdom objected strongly when the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized the Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956.[3] By this stage, two-thirds of Europe's oil was being imported via the canal. The United Kingdom sought cooperation with the United States throughout 1956 to deal with what it maintained was a threat of Israeli attack against Egypt, to little effect.
The alliance between the United Kingdom, France, and Israel was largely one of convenience; the European empires had economic and trading interests in the Suez Canal, while Israel wanted to reopen the canal for Israeli shipping and end Egyptian-supported fedayeen incursions and hit-and-run raids.
When the Soviet Union threatened to intervene on behalf of Egypt, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson feared a larger war and proposed a plan to separate the opposing forces by placing United Nations forces between them to act as a buffer zone or 'human shield'.
Eventually, economic pressure from the United States forced the United Kingdom to withdraw, soon followed by France and Israel. The crisis resulted in the resignation of the British Conservative Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden. This marked the completion of the shift in the global balance of power from European powers to the United States and the USSR, it was a milestone in the decline of the British Empire and in France's distrust and independence toward the Allies.
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[edit] Background
The Suez Canal was opened in 1869, having been financed by France and the Egyptian government. Technically, the territory of the canal itself was sovereign Egyptian territory, and the operating company, the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal (Suez Canal Company) was an Egyptian-chartered one (originally as part of the Ottoman Turkish Empire). In 1875, the British government of Benjamin Disraeli bought out the Egyptian share of the company, giving it partial control over the canal's operations, which it shared with mostly French private investors. In 1882, during foreign intervention in Egypt, the United Kingdom took de facto control of the canal itself. The canal was of strategic importance, being the ocean trade link between the United Kingdom and its colonies in India, the Far East as well as Australia and New Zealand. The area as a whole was strategic to North Africa and the Middle East.
The importance of the canal as a strategic center was apparent during both World Wars. During the First World War, the British and French closed the canal to non-Allied shipping. During the Second World War, it was tenaciously defended during the North African Campaign.
Daniel Yergin, a historian of the oil industry, wrote:
[I]n 1948, the canal abruptly lost its traditional rationale. India had become independent the year before and so control over the canal could no longer be preserved on grounds that it was critical to the defense either of India or of an empire that was being liquidated. And yet, at exactly the same moment, the canal was gaining a new role — as the highway not of empire, but of oil. The Suez Canal was the way most of the growing volumes of Persian Gulf oil got to Europe, cutting the 11,000 nautical mile (20 000 km) journey around the Cape of Good Hope to Southampton down to 6,500 nautical miles (12 000 km) . By 1955, petroleum accounted for half of the canal's traffic, and in turn two thirds of Europe's oil passed through it. Flanked to the north by Tapline and the Iraq Petroleum Company pipelines, the canal was the critical link in the postwar structure of the international oil industry.[4]
British troops were withdrawn from Palestine in 1947 and the state of Israel was formally established in 1948, shortly followed by the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which further established both Israel's independence and Arab-Israeli enmity. See history of Israel, history of Egypt.
In 1952, officers in the Egyptian army overthrew the monarchy of King Farouk who had been a close ally of the British. The new government abandoned policies friendly to the European powers, while at the same time asserting an independent and Arab nationalist identity.
In 1955, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser was importing arms from the Soviet bloc to build his arsenal for the confrontation with Israel. He announced it on August 31, 1955:
Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the Land of Israel....There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death.
The border between Israel and Egypt had been agreed as part of the ceasefire ending the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, yet both sides tended to regard the agreement as a temporary arrangement and there were occasional attacks carried out by each state against the other along the Gaza Strip, which was now occupied by Egypt.
On July 26, 1956, Egypt, under the leadership of President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, which operated the vital trade route to the east, and in which British banks and business held a 44% stake. This nationalization was done in order to raise revenue for the construction of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River. Concerning the Aswan High Dam project, the United States and Britain had previously agreed to help pay for this project, but cancelled their support after Egypt bought tanks from communist Czechoslovakia, then part of the Soviet bloc, and extended diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China. The improved Egyptian relationship with the Chinese was the result of the Bandung Conference in 1955, where Nasser had asked the Chinese to use their influence on the Soviets to supply Egypt with the necessary arms.
The British Prime Minister of the time, Sir Anthony Eden, tried to persuade the British public of the need for war and so, perhaps in an attempt to recall World War II-era patriotism, he compared Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal with the nationalism of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler twenty years earlier. However, the very first comparisons between 1930s dictators and Nasser during the crisis was made by the Labour Opposition leader, Hugh Gaitskell and the left-leaning tabloid newspaper, the Daily Mirror. Eden had been a staunch opponent of Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and he claimed that a display of force was needed to prevent Nasser becoming another expansionist military threat. Eden had also been annoyed by Nasser's apparent role in the dismissal of British military leader Glubb Pasha in Jordan prior to the canal company nationalization. The French in turn were hostile because of Nasser's support for insurgents in French Algeria.
Between July and October 1956, unsuccessful initiatives encouraged by the United States were made to reduce the tensions that would ultimately lead to war. International conferences were organized to secure agreement on canal operations; no agreement was secured.
[edit] Protocol of Sèvres
In the months that followed Egypt's nationalization of the canal company, with the support of the former managers of the company that operated the canal, Compagnie universelle du canal maritime de Suez, a secret meeting took place at Sèvres, outside Paris. Britain and France enlisted Israeli support for a conspiracy against Egypt. The parties agreed that Israel would invade the Sinai. Britain and France would then intervene, instructing that both the Israeli and Egyptian armies (ie, not solely the aggressor) withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles (16 km) from either side of the canal. The British and French would then argue that Egypt's control of such an important route was too tenuous, and that it need be placed under Anglo-French management.
The interests of the parties were various. Britain was anxious lest she lose access to the remains of her empire. France was nervous about the growing influence that Nasser exerted on her North African colonies and protectorates. Both Britain and France were eager that the canal should remain open as an important conduit of oil. Israel saw the opportunity to strengthen her southern border and to weaken a dangerous and hostile state.
Prior to the operation, Britain deliberately neglected to take counsel with the Americans, trusting instead that Nasser's engagement with communist states would persuade the Americans to accept British and French actions if they were presented as a fait accompli. This proved to be a fatal miscalculation for the colonial powers.
[edit] Invasion
On October 29, 1956, Israel invaded the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula and made rapid progress towards the Canal Zone. As per the agreement, Britain and France offered to reoccupy the area and separate the warring armies. Nasser (whose nationalization of the company had been greeted with joy by the Egyptian public) refused the offer, which gave the European powers a pretext for a joint invasion to regain control of the canal and topple the Nasser regime. To support the invasion, large air forces had been deployed to Cyprus and Malta by the UK and France and many aircraft carriers were deployed. The two airbases on Cyprus were so congested that a third field which was in dubious condition had to be brought into use for French aircraft. Even RAF Luqa on Malta was extremely crowded with RAF Bomber Command aircraft. The UK deployed the aircraft carriers HMS Eagle, Albion and Bulwark and France had the Arromanches and Lafayette on station. In addition, HMS Ocean and Theseus acted as jumping-off points for Britain's helicopter-borne assault (the world's first). Meanwhile the Israel Border Police militarized the Israel-Jordan border (including the Green Line with the West Bank) which resulted in the killing of 48 Arab-Israeli civilians by Israeli forces on October 29 (known as the Kafr Qasim massacre).
The United Kingdom and France initiated Operation Musketeer on October 31, with a bombing campaign. On November 3, 20 F4U-7 Corsairs from the 14.F and 15.F Aéronavale taking off from the Arromanches and Lafayette carriers, attacked the Cairo aerodrome. Nasser responded by sinking all 40 ships present in the canal, closing it to further shipping until early 1957.
On late November 5, the 3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment dropped at El Gamil Airfield, clearing the area and establishing a secure base for incoming support aircraft and reinforcements. At first light on November 6, Commandos of Nos 42 and 40 Commando Royal Marines stormed the beaches, using landing craft of WWII vintage (LCM Landing Craft Material). Salvos from the battlegroup standing offshore opened fire, giving covering fire for the landings and causing considerable damage to the Egyptian batteries and gun emplacements. The town of Port Said sustained great damage and was seen to be alight.
Acting in concert with British forces, 500 heavily-armed paratroopers of the French 2nd Colonial Parachute Regiment (2ème RPC), hastily redeployed from combat in Algeria, jumped over the al-Raswa bridges from Noratlas Nord 2501 transports of the ET (Escadrille de Transport) 1/61 and ET 3/61, together with some combat engineers of the Guards Independent Parachute Company. Despite the loss of two soldiers, the western bridge was swiftly secured by the paras, and F4U Corsairs of the Aéronavale 14.F and 15.F flew a series of close-air-support missions, destroying several SU-100s. F-84Fs also hit two large oil storage tanks in Port Said, which went up in flames and covered most of the city in a thick cloud of smoke for the next several days. Egyptian resistance varied, with some positions fighting back until destroyed, while others were abandoned with little resistance.
In the afternoon, 522 additional French paras of the 1er REP (Régiment Étranger Parachutiste, 1st Foreign Parachute Regiment) were dropped near Port Fouad. These were also constantly supported by the Corsairs of the French Aéronavale, which flew very intensive operations: for example, although the French carrier LaFayette developed catapult problems, no less than 40 combat sorties were completed. In total, 10 French soldiers were killed and 30 injured during the landing and the subsequent battles.
British commandos of No. 45 Commando assaulted by helicopter, meeting stiff resistance, with shore batteries striking several helicopters, while friendly fire from British carrier-borne aircraft caused heavy casualties to 45 Commando and HQ. Street fighting and house clearing, with strong opposition from well-entrenched Egyptian sniper positions, caused further casualties.
[edit] The invaders are stopped
The operation to take the canal was highly successful from a military point of view, but was a political disaster due to external forces. Along with Suez, the United States was also dealing with the near-simultaneous Soviet-Hungary crisis, and faced the public relations embarrassment of criticizing the Soviet Union's military intervention there while at the same time avoiding criticism of its two principal European allies' actions. Perhaps more significantly, the United States also feared a wider war after the Soviet Union threatened to intervene on the Egyptian side and launch attacks by "all types of weapons of destruction" on London and Paris.
Thus, the Eisenhower administration forced a cease-fire on Britain and France, which it had previously told the Allies it would not do. The U.S. demanded that the invasion stop and sponsored resolutions in the UN Security Council for a cease-fire to stop the invasion. Britain and France, as permanent members of the Security Council, vetoed the resolutions in the UN Security Council. The U.S. then appealed to the General Assembly of the UN and proposed a resolution calling for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces. The appeal to the General Assembly was made under a procedure called "Uniting for Peace" (UfP). This procedure had been adopted by the Security Council so that the UN can act even if the Security Council is stalemated by vetoes. Resolution 377 provides that, if there is a "threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and the permanent members of the Security Council do not agree on action, the General Assembly can meet immediately and recommend collective measures to U.N. members to "maintain or restore international peace and security." The General Assembly held an emergency session and passed the UfP resolution. Britain and France withdrew from Egypt within a week.[5]
Part of the pressure that the United States used against Britain was financial, as President Eisenhower threatened to sell the United States reserves of the British pound and thereby precipitate a collapse of the British currency. After Saudi Arabia started an oil embargo against Britain and France, the U.S. refused to fill the gap, until Britain and France agreed to a rapid withdrawal.[6] There was also a measure of discouragement for Britain in the rebuke by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers St. Laurent of Canada and Menzies of Australia at a time when Britain was still continuing to regard the Commonwealth as an entity of importance as the residue of the British Empire and as an automatic supporter in its effort to remain a world power.
The British government and the pound thus both came under pressure. Eden was forced to resign and the French and British forces had finished withdrawing by December 1956; the Israelis did in March 1957.
[edit] Introduction of UN Peacekeepers
Before the withdrawal, Lester Pearson, Canada's acting cabinet minister for external affairs, had gone to the United Nations and suggested creating a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez to "keep the borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out." The United Nations accepted this suggestion, and after several days of tense diplomacy, a neutral force not involving the United States, Britain, France and most of the Soviet Bloc was sent with the consent of Nasser, stabilizing conditions in the area. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his efforts. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force was Lester Pearson's creation and he is considered the father of the modern concept "peacekeeping".
[edit] Aftermath
Eden's resignation marked, until the Falklands War, the last significant attempt Britain made to impose its military will abroad without U.S. support. However, Nigel Ashton argues "that British strategy in the region changed very little in the wake of Suez. Macmillan was every bit as determined as Eden had been to stop Nasser" although he was more willing to enlist American support in the future for that end. Some argue that the crisis also marked the final transfer of power to the new superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.
The incident demonstrated the weakness of the NATO alliance in its lack of planning and cooperation beyond the European stage. From the point of view of General de Gaulle, the Suez events demonstrated that France could not rely on allies anymore. Britain withdrew its troops in the midst of the battle without warning Israel nor France, this decision was due to a strong economic pressure, including a devaluation of the pound sterling, executed by the United States who opposed the invasion. In 1957, following these events, the French government launched an autonomous nuclear programme conducted in the Sahara,[7] known as Force de frappe, as a deterrent not only against the USSR but vis-à-vis every potential threats around the globe. By 1966 de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated NATO military command. According to the protocol of Sèvres agreements, France secretly transmitted parts of its own atomic technology to Israel, including a detonator.[8]
The imposed end to the crisis signalled the weakening of the United Kingdom and France as Global Powers. Nasser's standing in the Arab world was greatly improved, with his stance helping to promote pan-Arabism and reinforce hostility against Israel and the West. The crisis also arguably hastened the process of decolonization, as the remaining colonies of both Britain and France gained independence over the next several years.
After Suez, Aden and Iraq became the main bases for the British in the region while the French concentrated their forces at Bizerte and Beirut.
By early 1957 all Israeli troops had withdrawn from the Sinai. As part of the deal, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was placed in the Sinai (on Egyptian territory only) with the express purpose of maintaining the cease-fire. While effective in preventing the small-scale warfare that prevailed before 1956 and after 1967, budgetary cutbacks and changing needs had seen the force shrink to 3,378 by 1967. The Egyptian government then began to remilitarize the Sinai, and demanded that the UNEF withdraw. This action, along with the blockade of the Strait of Tiran, led directly to the Six Day War. During the war, Israeli armed forces captured the east bank of the canal, which subsequently became a de facto boundary between Egypt and Israel and the canal was therefore closed until June, 1975.
After retiring from office Eisenhower came to see the Suez Crisis as perhaps his biggest foreign policy mistake. Not only did he feel that the United States weakened two crucial European Cold War allies but he created in Nasser a man capable of dominating the Arab world.[citation needed]
[edit] Bibliography
- Walter Arnstein, Britain Yesterday and Today: 1830 to the Present (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001).
- Ahron Bregman, Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947 (London: Routledge, 2002). ISBN 0-415-28716-2
- Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East (I B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2003). ISBN 1-86064-811-8
- Leuliette, Pierre, St. Michael and the Dragon: Memoirs of a Paratrooper, Houghton Mifflin, 1964
- David Tal (ed.), The 1956 War (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001). ISBN 0-7146-4394-7
- Bertjan Verbeek, "Decision-Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis. Small Groups and a Persistent Leader" (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003).
- Yergin, Daniel (1991). The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-671-50248-4. . Chapter 24 is devoted entirely to the Suez Crisis.
[edit] Notes and references
- ^ The Suez Crisis is also known as the Suez War or 1956 War, commonly known in the Arab world as the Tripartite aggression; other names include the Sinai war, Suez-Sinai war, 1956 Arab-Israeli War, the Second Arab-Israeli War, Suez Campaign, Sinai Campaign, Kadesh Operation, and Operation Musketeer
- ^ a b Suez Canal. Egyptian State Information Service. Retrieved on March 18, 2007.
- ^ 1956: Egypt Seizes Suez Canal. British Broadcasting Service. Retrieved on March 4, 2007.
- ^ References Yergin Page 480
- ^ Z Magazine, April 2, 2003, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=1&ItemID=3376 last visited 2/28/07
- ^ Kennett Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, New York:McGraw Hill, 1969, p.651
- ^ [http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/60823/571529/file/SAHARA.pdf Délégation à l’Information et à la Communication de la Défense: Dossier de présentation des essais nucléaires et leur suivi au Sahara], French Defense Ministry, January 2007
- ^ Affaire de Suez, Le Pacte Secret, Peter Hercombe et Arnaud Hamelin, France 5/Sunset Presse/Transparence, 2006
[edit] See also
- Protocol of Sèvres
- Anglo-American relations
- Franco-American relations
- Israel-United States relations
[edit] Media links
- "The Suez canal and the nationalization by Colonel Nasser" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, August 1st, 1956 Fr.
(views of Nasser EG, Pineau FR, Lloyd UK, Murphy US, Downing street, comment on international tension) - "The new pilots engaged for the Suez canal" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, October 3rd, 1956 French
(views of Port Said, the canal and Ferdinand de Lesseps' statue few weeks before the Suez Crisis, incl. a significant comment on Nasser) - "French paratroopers in Cyprus" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, November 6th, 1956 French
(details on the French-British settings and material, views of Amiral Barjot, General Keightley, camp and scenes in Cyprus) - "Dropping over Port Said" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, November 6th, 1956 French
(views of British paratroopers dropping over Port Said, comment on respective mission for the French and British during Operation Amilcar) - "Suez: French-British landing in Port Fouad & Port Said" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, November 9th, 1956 mute
(views of French-British in Cyprus, landing in Port Fouad, landing Port Said, Gal Massu, Gal Bauffre, convoy) - "The French in Port Said" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, November 9th, 1956 mute
(views of prisonners and captured material, Gal Massu, para commandos, Egyptian cops surrender, Gal Beauffre, landing craft on the canal) - "Dropping of Anglo-French over the canal zone" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, November 14th, 1956 French
(views of 2 Nordatlas, paratroopers, dropping of para and material circa Port Said, comment on no bombing to secure the population) - "Canal obstructed by sunken ships" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, November 14th, 1956 French
(views of troops in Port Said, Ferdinand de Lesseps' statue, comment on the 21 ships sunken by the "dictator")
[edit] External links
- Israel's Second War of Independence, essay in Azure magazine.
- Sinai Campaign 1956
- July 2006, BBC, Suez 50 years on
- July 2006, The Economist, An affair to remember
- Suez and the high tide of Arab nationalism International Socialism 112 (2006)
- Detailed report on the Suez campaign by Ground Forces Chief of Staff General Beaufre, French Defense Ministry archive (French)
